Vehicle was not on the curtilage, but that gave no right to the police to open the doors

Defendant’s car parked 30-40 yards from his house was not within the curtilage, and the police could walk up and look in the windows. Opening the doors, however, violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Manning, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41699 (M.D. Tenn. June 7, 2007):

In this case, the four factors indicate that the Nissan was not within the curtilage of the home. It was parked approximately 30-40 yards from the house and out in the open off the side of a long driveway leading to the house. No steps were taken to shield the area from observation and, in fact, the Nissan was visible from the road. See, United States v. Lakoskey, 425 F.3d 965, 973 (8th Cir. 2006)(expectation of privacy cannot be extended to driveway, walkway, or front door area); United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003)(“an owner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and … police observations made from the driveway do not constitute a search); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 465 (2d Cir. 2002) (“driveways that are readily accessible to visitors are not entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections as are the interiors of defendants’ houses”); United States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 651 (6th Cir. 1986) (no expectation of privacy in driveway which was not obstructed and where there was no effort made to screen off or enclose area). Because the Nissan was not within the curtilage of the home and further because the officers were executing a valid arrest warrant, they had a right to walk by or stop next to the vehicle and look inside. However, they had no right to simply open the doors to the vehicle and search inside.

. . .

“The plain view exception to the warrant requirement applies when (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place where the evidence could be plainly viewed, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately apparent.'” United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by being next to and looking into the vehicle since the vehicle was not within the curtilage and the officers had a warrant for Defendant’s arrest. However, this Court has found as a matter of fact that neither weapon was in plain view and therefore their incriminating nature could not have been apparent. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence will be granted and the shotguns seized on August 22, 2006 will not be admitted at trial.

Defendant’s argument that his stop was invalid was frivolous. He claimed on appeal that manufacturer’s tinting was exempt from state law, and that made the stop illegal, but it did not. Reasonable suspicion on the detention was a closer question, but the government got the benefit of the doubt on that. On the last question, a 90 minute delay for a drug dog to arrive was not unreasonable on these facts because the police were not delaying the stop. United States v. Leal, 235 Fed. Appx. 937 (3d Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Defendant was already known to be a felon and a carrier of weapons when he was stopped, and a furtive motion was made. That justified the officer looking for a gun. United States v. Horn, 234 Fed. Appx. 466 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).