TX7: Anonymous tip of DV in home supported by defendant’s surprised look on seeing police and backing away from door; entry valid

Police received an anonymous call defendant was assaulting his girlfriend in his home, was armed, and likely had warrants for his arrest. Nothing was checked out ahead of time. When they got there and defendant answered the door, he looked “shocked” and backed away from the door. Police entered and saw nothing that indicated an assault had occurred. They fanned out to look for the woman, and found her hiding in a closet, saying she was “afraid of the police.” The defendant’s look and backing away supported exigency for the entry. Shadden v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1998 (Tex. App. – Amarillo February 20, 2014):

In the present case, the police received an anonymous tip that appellant was assaulting a female at his residence and that he might be using a weapon. Rohlik testified that he dispatched officers to appellant’s residence to “check [the] welfare” of the alleged victim. Rohlik also testified that, due to the nature of the allegations in the tip, there was not sufficient time to secure a search warrant. Thus, Rholik’s reason for having officers dispatched to appellant’s residence was to protect or preserve life and avoid serious bodily injury and not to conduct a criminal investigation. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684; Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860-61. The trial court was entitled to believe Rholik’s testimony. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

When the officers that went to appellant’s residence knocked on appellant’s door, they were all in uniform. When appellant answered the door, he appeared “shocked,” and began backing away from the door. As he backed away from the door, he either pushed the door closed or allowed the door to close by itself. The combined effect of appellant backing away and the door closing was that the officers began to lose sight of appellant. Considering the nature of the dispatch and the officers’ perspective on appellant’s actions, we believe that the trial court could conclude that the officers’ entry into appellant’s home was based on a reasonable belief that their actions were immediately necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684; Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 860.

Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the officers had a reasonable belief that they needed to enter appellant’s home to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.