MI: Dog sniff at the door of a home does not violate Fourth Amendment, and a conflict is created with FL

A dog sniff at the front door of a house is not unconstitutitonal. The question of a dog sniff is the place where the sniff was made, and the front door is open to the public. People v. Jones, 279 Mich. App. 86, 755 N.W.2d 224 (2008):

Thus, the Court did not state or suggest that police activity at a home is categorically distinguishable from police activity involving the trunk of a car for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of a canine sniff. Rather, the categorical distinction of which the Court spoke related to the difference between police activity that reveals lawful as well as unlawful conduct, thereby invading a zone of privacy and implicating Fourth Amendment protections, and a dog sniff that reveals only the presence of contraband (unlawful conduct) and does not intrude on legitimate privacy interests. Indeed, the Court distinguished Kyllo not because a home was involved there, but because lawful as well as unlawful activity could be detected in Kyllo. If the dissent were correct in its analysis, the Court in Caballes could have simply disregarded or distinguished Kyllo on the basis that the Kyllo search was of a home.

Comment: The court thus creates a conflict with Florida’s 4DCA Rabb case. State v Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. App. 4DCA 2006) (a canine sniff from outside a home to detect narcotics inside the home uses extra sensory procedure such that violates firm line at door of home protected from intrusion by Fourth Amendment), review denied, State v. Rabb, 933 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2006), cert. den. 127 S. Ct. 665, 166 L. Ed. 2d 513 (U.S. 2006), posted here, distinguished, on remand from Florida v. Rabb, 125 S. Ct. 2246, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1051 (U.S. May 16, 2005), in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005).