General consent to search allows search into a hidden compartment once it is discovered

A lie about travel plans can be a factor in the totality for reasonable suspicion in detention. Here, defendant consented to a search, and officers found an obvious hidden compartment in the passenger speaker. The search was within the scope of consent. United States v. Garrett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79193 (E.D. Mich. October 25, 2007).*

Defendant’s driving was reasonable suspicion to believe he was DWI, even though it turned out he wasn’t drunk. Then, the officer asked about contraband and he offered to allow a search. United States v. Floyd, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79095 (D. Conn. October 25, 2007):

Here, in response to Officer Rosedale’s inquiry as to whether there was any contraband in the vehicle, the defendant not only advised Rosedale that there was no contraband in the vehicle but invited Rosedale to search the vehicle. The defendant consented to the search of the vehicle and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in connection with the seizure of the firearm.

Compare State v. Washington from Indiana posted on the 26th holding such questioning unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution.

Under Stone v. Powell, there only need be a procedural mechanism under state law to challenge a search, and then the question is whether the procedural mechanism failed somehow such that a Fourth Amendment claim could not have been brought. McNoriell v. Warren, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79199 (E.D. Mich. October 25, 2007)*:

Federal courts will not address a Fourth Amendment claim upon habeas review if the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court and the presentation of the claim was not thwarted by any failure of the state’s corrective processes. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). A court must perform two distinct inquiries when determining whether a petitioner may raise a claim of illegal arrest in a habeas action. First, the “court must determine whether the state procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise a fourth amendment claim. Second, the court must determine whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of a failure of that mechanism.” Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1982)).

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