Defendant was arrested outside, and he told the officers that all the people inside were outside. The officers were not obliged to take the defendant’s word that everybody was out, and they could do a protective sweep. State v. Quartman, 2007 Ohio 329, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2267 (2d Dist. January 26, 2007):
[*P35] With respect to the issue of exigent circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the evidence in the record, which it cited, supports a finding of exigent circumstances, justifying a protective sweep of the house. Although Smith testified that it was his understanding, “based on what Mr. Quartman is telling me,” that the only occupants of the residence had exited, and that it was then vacant, the police could reasonably distrust the information they received from Quartman. Quartman had not been especially cooperative with the police, given that it took an hour before he deigned to communicate with them.
[*P36] Given the fact that Quartman was charged with a violent act involving a firearm, for which a magistrate had found probable cause, his reluctance to even talk to the police who came to arrest him, and the 2002 incident in which police officers came to his residence and a shot was fired from the inside of the house through the door, we conclude that the police had sufficient grounds to be concerned that one or more individuals might remain inside the house, armed, and with hostile intent. This justified a protective sweep of the house. Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276.
Officers were in the defendant’s driveway to talk to him, and they took him to the stationhouse. An officer stayed behind to look in the yard over a solid fence with a flashlight, and he saw a headband that had evidentiary value, which he seized. The court finds that the first and third prong of the plain view exception were met, despite the fact that he was looking over a solid fence but from the driveway. The second prong, however, was the subject of questions from defense counsel that received unresponsive answers. The case was remanded for a further determination of the officers’ purpose that remains unexplained. State v. Lane, 393 N.J. Super. 132, 922 A.2d 828 (2007):
There is no dispute, however, that the headband was located within an enclosure immediately adjacent to the home. The record does not reveal the nature of the uses to which this area was put, but the record gives no reason to doubt that the owner’s use of this area — as demonstrated by the encircling impervious wooden fence — was intended to be kept private from observations by passersby. In short, the record permits no dispute about the fact that the area in which the headband was found was within the curtilage and subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
That the item seized is found within the curtilage, however, does not foreclose the applicability of the plain view exception. The curtilage may include certain “semi-private areas,” where visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways and porches. State v. Johnson, supra, 171 N.J. at 209, 793 A.2d 619 (quoting LaFave, supra, § 2.3(f)). “Observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment.” Ibid. Accordingly, the seizure of an item seen within the curtilage is not invalid if the officer had a right to be at his vantage point, such as a semi-private area or on the street.
The trial judge found credible the testimony of Detective Braconi that, while standing on the driveway near an open gate in the fence surrounding the backyard, he saw with the aid of a flashlight, a headband in plain view. Bound by the finding that the officer was standing on the driveway at this time, State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71, 724 A.2d 234 (1999), we are required to conclude that the officer was in a “semi-private area” where a visitor might be expected to go and what he may have seen in plain view from that vantage point, even with the aid of a flashlight, would not preclude a finding that the first prong of the plain view exception was met.
Officer chasing a motorcycle killed the motorcyclist in a collision. While there was evidence of prior bad blood between the officer and the deceased, that was at best speculation that the officer intentionally killed the deceased. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 2007).*
Officers had qualified immunity for arresting the plaintiff because there was ample probable cause from the alleged victim’s statements and picking plaintiff out of a photo array. Brock v. City of Zephyrhills, 232 Fed. Appx. 925 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
