The stop was justified, and officers had a CI that said defendant kept a gun in the car. That was enough for a protective frisk. The weapon here was found before a search incident or a search under the automobile exception, but it’s still valid. State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-1201, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1104 (1st Dist. March 26, 2014).*

Defendant was validly stopped for a lane change violation and a “large firearm” was in plain view on the rear floorboard. State v. Williams, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 819 (La. App. 5 Cir. March 26, 2014).*

Appellant’s property had been unoccupied since 1995, and city inspectors went on the property to take pictures before bringing a nuisance action. He didn’t object at trial, so he couldn’t raise it on appeal. Jumonville v. City of Kenner, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 816 (La. App. 5 Cir. March 26, 2014).*

The statute of limitations for a 1983 case from an illegal search claim runs from the time of the search, not the date some court holds it was illegal. Wallace v. Kato on false arrest distinguished. Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County, 543 Fed. Appx. 499 (6th Cir. 2013).

After a domestic dispute with his mother for trashing her house, defendant left on foot. The police had been called and encountered defendant and talked to him. He agreed to go back to the house to get a friend’s phone number off his mother’s phone. He stayed in the police car while the officer went to retrieve it. Inside, he found drugs and drug paraphernalia. The search was reasonable and the entry was by consent of the mother. State v. Wynne, 258 Ore. App. 787, 311 P.3d 978 (2013).*

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a commercial dumpster on a parking lot. There was probable cause for the multiple search warrants based on wiretaps and surveillance. The warrant authorized search of cell phones, albeit only the serial number of the phone came in. United States v. Nwobi, 543 Fed. Appx. 706 (9th Cir. 2013).*

The inventory of defendant’s car by the Key West PD was valid, looking at the policy and the facts of the case. United States v. Itten, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152886 (S.D. Fla. October 24, 2013).*

Allegations in the search warrant affidavit that there was an ongoing drug operation overcame defendant’s staleness argument. United States v. Sandoval, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151956 (N.D. Iowa October 23, 2013).*

Defendant consented to his blood draw for his DUI case, so a warrant was unnecessary. State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013).*

Defendant consented to a search of his hotel room. He didn’t need to be warned because he twice refused, and once they were inside, he refused consent to search a backpack in the room and denied ownership in it. United States v. Hardy, 543 Fed. Appx. 721 (9th Cir. 2013).*

An anonymous tip for a stop is not enough, but here the totality showed it was a high crime area, late at night, and defendant ran when he saw police. That was enough. United States v. Hayes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153528 (E.D. N.C. October 23, 2013).*

The car was being lawfully inventoried, so the glove compartment could be opened. United States v. Calvin, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22014 (10th Cir. October 29, 2013).*

Defendant was not in custody at an immigration checkpoint such that Miranda was required. Alternatively, it was harmless error. United States v. Salinas, 538 Fed. Appx. 574 (5th Cir. 2013).*

The protective sweep of defendant’s motel room was authorized by consent of a co-occupant and on the merits. United States v. Mobley, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154602 (S.D. Ga. October 11, 2013).*

“The trial court erred in finding that Cooper did not have standing to challenge the search. Although Cooper did not introduce a lease or deed or other documentation, the evidence showed that Cooper had a possessory interest in the residence. Bradley’s father testified that Bradley was living with Cooper. And the testimony of Bradley’s mother twice referred to 2450 North Market as ‘Ms. Cooper’s house.’ This witness testimony about Cooper’s residency was unchallenged.” Cooper v. State, 80 A.3d 959 (Del. 2013).

Defendant waived review of the U.S.M.J.’s R&R by not seeking de novo review. Even so, defendant was arrested in his house and there was a protective sweep. He was Mirandized and spoken to in Spanish and consented, so the search is good on the merits. United States v. Brache, 543 Fed. Appx. 930 (11th Cir. 2013).

The motion to suppress was denied on the police report and the pleadings by agreement. The case is remanded to settle the record as to what exactly happened. Jones v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 611, 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 640 (October 30, 2013).*

ABAJ: Does Fourth Amendment protect computer data? Scalia says it’s a really good question by Debra Cassens Weiss:

Continue reading →

BBC News: Google says government requests ‘up 120%’ in four years

Continue reading →

BLT: Twitter and Yahoo! Silenced-For Now-in Subpoena Spat by Zoe Tillman:

Continue reading →

Working, but for how long? Kudos to the software guys for fixing it.

I’ll get caught up later and tomorrow. I’m working on a motion to suppress in a fascinating case in state court to efile this afternoon.

I’ll have to bite the bullet and find new software after all.

Officers received an anonymous call about a specific suspicious car on a parking lot potentially involved in drug trade. They didn’t see it then, but found it parked and unattended with the engine running nearby. An officer shined his flashlight inside and saw marijuana packaged for sale on the seat in plain view. The motion to suppress was properly denied. State v. McLaughlin, 2014-Ohio-1150, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1084 (6th Dist. March 21, 2014).*

Defendant’s motion to reopen the suppression hearing to attempt to show alibi as a reason there was no probable cause to arrest is denied. That still doesn’t undermine the probable cause to arrest. United States v. Johnson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39152 (E.D. Ark. March 25, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39149 (E.D. Ark. January 16, 2014).*

Defendant consented to a search of his bedroom that revealed multiple firearms. He pled. Then he filed a motion to withdraw the plea without disassociating himself from the guns. The motion was properly denied. State v. Douglas, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (March 25, 2014).*

“Less intrusive means” isn’t rejected for inventory searches, but it is something that must be considered case-by-case. The inventory of defendant’s purse with her when she was arrested was proper. State v. Demontiney, 2014 MT 66, 374 Mont. 211, 2014 Mont. LEXIS 75 (March 11, 2014):

Continue reading →

The Atlantic: What Stop-and-Frisk Means to the Descendants of Slaves by Theodore R. Johnson:

Continue reading →

WaPo: Volokh: A remarkable new opinion on search warrants for online accounts — and why I think it’s wrong by Orin Kerr:

Continue reading →

Once again, USMJ Facciola of the D.D.C. limits a search warrant application for a cell phone because the search warrant doesn’t ensure that the search won’t be overbroad and that things not sought won’t be seen. Essentially, the court treats the cell phone like a computer search. [Thus, in a matter of weeks, one judge had created a body of work on electronic searches that SCOTUS should pay attention to when deciding its cell phone search cases this spring. Really, this judge is only saying what we’re all thinking.] In re the Search of Apple iPhone, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39703 (D. D.C. March 26, 2014):

Continue reading →