Defendant’s conduct and abusive language during stop justified getting him out for a patdown. United States v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 2008)*:

Once the car was stopped Soares refused repeated orders to remain still and keep his hands in Reid’s view. Soares continually used abusive and profane language, and he became increasingly agitated as the stop progressed. Reid testified that Soares’s erratic and uncooperative behavior made him “extremely nervous.” Reid observed him move his hands out of the officers’ sight towards the area that he first saw him motion towards at the start of the stop. Reid could reasonably have thought that Soares was reaching for a weapon.

An action for return of records under F.R. Crim. P. 41(g) when no criminal action is pending is equitable in nature. The warrant was issued with probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found in the documents sought, and the warrant was not overbroad. In re Search of 22 Blackwatch Trail, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6388 (2d Cir. March 26, 2008) (unpublished).*

Officer had plenty of information that the occuapants of the vehicle he just stopped had been involved in a violent crime to justify a frisk. Vadimsky v. City of Melbourne, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6436 (11th Cir. March 15, 2008) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff’s decedent was lawfully arrested before his suicide in jail, and that Fourth Amendment claim fails. She did, however, state enough to continue with discovery on the claim that excessive force was used during the decedent’s arrest. Powers-Bunce v. D.C., 541 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 2008).*

Plaintiff stated a claim for removal of property from his car which was parked on his own property and not subject to impoundment. Gombert v. Lynch, 541 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D. Conn. 2008)*:

In this case, instead of impounding (or otherwise taking custody of) the Plaintiff’s car, the police took items out of his car, purportedly pursuant to their community caretaking responsibilities. The court can find no law, however, to support the proposition that, under the banner of “community caretaking,” the police can search and seize items from a vehicle that was not itself already under police custody or control via the police’s community caretaking function.

Defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine police officers from state suppression hearing record would not have changed the outcome of the federal suppression hearing so it could not be ineffective assistance. The differences were not material. United States v. Cavely, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24111 (N.D. Okla. March 26, 2008).*

An affidavit for a search warrant need not articulate any reasoning for concluding that drug activity would be involved beyond what commonsense would dicate in the situation. United States v. Smith, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251 (E.D. Pa. March 26, 2008)*:

By his reference to “boilerplate representations” about drug dealers or sellers using their residences to maintain the fruits of their activities, Mr. Smith tacitly acknowledges that there is a commonly made connection between illicit drug activity and the suspect’s residence. Nonetheless, Mr. Smith argues that a magistrate is not permitted to infer that there is “a fair probability that evidence will be found” in the place to be searched even after reports of the suspected dealer going in and out of the location with drug buys occurring in between that movement, and he maintains that the probable cause affidavit must actually articulate the affiant’s supposition or presumption that a suspected drug dealer uses his “home base” for some purpose related to his drug business. Thus, Mr. Smith’s position is essentially that the issuing magistrate must shed and eschew use of experience and common sense to make himself no more knowledgeable than the proverbial “blank slate.” This makes no sense to the Court because to enunciate such a stark rule would be tantamount to saying search warrants could be issued by someone less knowledgeable than a “man on the street,” or by the functional equivalent of an ATM machine, so long as certain magic words were presented. Not only does Mr. Smith present no governing case law to support his argument, it necessarily ignores the accumulated direct information that is presented in Officer Francis’s Affidavit, including the summation quoted above from which the magistrate had a sufficient considered basis to reasonably and rationally accept Officer Francis’s experienced belief that evidence of illegal drug activities likely would be found in Mr. Smith’s residence at 136 East Pleasant Street. See United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 103 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Whitner, 219 F .3d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 2000).

Passenger in a truck lawfully stopped was legitimately asked for his identification. Unlawful re-entry conviction was affirmed. United States v. Linares, 258 Fed. Appx. 989 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

The district court properly granted summary judgment because there was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest and no Franks violation. Browne v. Gossett, 259 Fed. Appx. 928 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

W.D. Va. discusses the good faith exception at length [ad nauseum] to determine whether there was probable cause, or at least an objective basis for the officer relying on it. More significantly, the court found that unsworn information outside the affidavit may be considered in determining whether the good faith exception applies. United States v. Doyle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81 (W.D. Va. January 2, 2008):

The court is of the opinion that unsworn testimony may be considered in the context of a Leon good-faith analysis as part of the totality of the circumstances and especially in a case where there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police officers obtaining or executing the warrant. While the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, the judicially created exclusionary rule steps outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment requirements and only seeks to deter illegal searches and seizures by deterring police misconduct. In a situation where police misconduct exists, the exclusionary rule applies. However, if the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). Because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, it is only applicable, therefore, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1998) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907) (internal citations omitted).

A controlled buy with defendant gave probable cause for his arrest in a car when, shortly thereafter, he left the premises and got in a car. Uniform officers made the stop at the narc’s request. United States v. Cardenas-Celestino, 510 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2008).*

Reasonable suspicion quickly developed during defendant’s stop when he didn’t know the name of his passengers and his story about where he was going changed. His consent thereafter was valid. United States v. Rojas-Silos, 260 Fed. Appx. 49 (10th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

Defendant crewmember of a Honduran ship boarded five days out of San Juan lacked standing to contest the search of the vessel at the Port of San Juan. There is a reduced expectation of privacy in hidden compartments of a ship hauling contraband. United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008), district court’s holding posted here:

But even if Verdugo-Urquidez does not apply, Vilches lacks standing to challenge the search. It is “well settled that a defendant who fails to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized will not have ‘standing’ to claim that an illegal search or seizure occurred.” United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-48, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978)). In order to make such a showing, Vilches must show that he had both a subjective expectation of privacy and that society accepts that expectation as objectively reasonable. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988); cf. United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992). The burden of proving a reasonable expectation of privacy lies with Vilches. United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1991). Vilches must demonstrate an expectation of privacy in both the item seized and the place searched. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). Vilches cannot make that showing here.

“[T]he circumstances and exigencies of the maritime setting afford people on a vessel a lesser expectation of privacy than in their homes, obviating the usual fourth amendment requirements of a warrant.” United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 1982). As the Government argues, Vilches had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the secret compartment in which the drugs were found. Cf. United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1993) (distinguishing “substantial vessels such as cargo ships and freighters” from “a small pleasure craft used for fishing” where captain had reasonable expectation of privacy).

Even if Vilches had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not an objectively reasonable expectation. The district court rightly noted that “society would not recognize a justifiable expectation of privacy in a hidden compartment created for the express purpose of hiding illicit contraband. To hold otherwise would grant smugglers standing under the Fourth Amendment solely because they were careful in hiding their illicit merchandise.” Vilches-Navarrete, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74; see also United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e are not willing to say that society is prepared to recognize a justifiable expectation of privacy solely on the basis of appellants’ efforts to secret the contraband. Drug smugglers cannot assert standing solely on the basis that they hid the drugs well and hoped no one would find them.”). As the Supreme Court said in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001), “a Fourth Amendment search does not occur … unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.'” Id. at 33 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986)).

The search was valid in any event because the USCG’s “authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to stop and board a vessel on the high seas is quite broad.” Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d at 23 (internal footnotes omitted). In the instant case, the USCG had consent from Honduras, the vessel’s flag country, to board the Babouth and to take it to a U.S. port to complete the search. The USCG also possessed the requisite “reasonable and articulable grounds for suspecting that the vessel or those on board [we]re engaging in criminal activity.” Green, 671 F.2d at 53.

Consent to search for a person permitted the officer to look under a bed where he saw a rifle in a case, which was immediately apparent. The search was within the scope of consent. United States v. Bater, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28307 (D. Me. April 7, 2008).*

Seat belt violation objectively justified defendant’s stop in the face of a pretext challenge, and everything after that was valid, too. United States v. Price, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28086 (N.D. Ga. January 23, 2008).*

Officers already unlawfully searched defendant’s outside property before they asked for consent, which he refused. The prior search tainted everything thereafter. Inevitable discovery rejected because the police were not on a course of investigation that would have led to the same result. Grant v. State, 978 So. 2d 862 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2008).*

Exclusionary rule did not apply to a dependency and neglect proceeding which is a civil case. State, in the Interest of A.E.L. & K.C.-M., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App. 2008):

Thus, whether the exclusionary rule applies in a civil case in Colorado requires the trial court to weigh the deterrent benefits of applying the rule against the societal cost of excluding relevant evidence. Id. at 519-20. “There is no ‘bright line’ to determine when the rule should apply, and courts must apply the Janis analytic framework on a case by case basis.” Id. at 520. The assessment requires a fact-specific analysis and usually involves two considerations: (1) whether the illegal agency conduct is “inter-sovereign” or “intra-sovereign”; and (2) whether the proceedings may be characterized as “quasi-criminal.” Id. Evidence is not suppressed in a civil proceeding by one sovereign merely because law enforcement agents of another sovereign failed to comply with the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745, 747 (Colo. 1981).

Here, even if we assume the police violated mother’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and they were acting as agents of the department, mother was not charged with possession of an unlawful substance. A different entity (the City and County of Denver) was seeking to introduce the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing for a completely different purpose: to show that mother was not providing the children with a safe and suitable home.

The juvenile court also concluded, and we agree, that a dependency and neglect case is not a quasi-criminal proceeding, and that the societal costs of applying the rule would exceed any deterrent effect that exclusion would have on the department or the police in investigating a child welfare issue. See State in Interest of A.R., 982 P.2d at 78-79. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in denying mother’s motion to suppress.

The affidavit for the search warrant was speculative, and judges should not act as mere rubberstamps for the police. Here, the warrant was so deficient that the good faith exception could not apply. Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572 (Ky. App. 2007), released for publication April 25, 2008:

When requested to issue search warrants, judges may not simply act as rubber stamps for the police and merely ratify the bare conclusions of others, nor may they consider information outside the affidavit. See Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 688-9 (Ky. 1992) (judicial officers must issue or deny warrants solely on facts within four corners of affidavit). It is clear to us that Officer Hodge’s affidavit does not pass constitutional muster as it contained no substantial basis for the district judge’s determination that probable cause existed to issue a search warrant.

Having held the affidavit to have been so deficient as to have provided no basis for the issuance of the search warrant, we further hold the trial court erred in applying the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule in denying the motion to suppress the seized evidence. The dual purpose of the exclusionary rule has historically been to deter police misconduct by excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as to encourage compliance with the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), Young v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1958). The exclusionary rule was made binding upon the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), by application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We further note that the language found in the Fourth Amendment is nearly identical to that used in Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, thus making federal caselaw analysis particularly relevant to our decision.

Historically, a violation of the Fourth Amendment required the automatic suppression of the evidence seized. However, in Leon, supra, the Supreme Court reversed this per se suppression rule and added what we know today as the “good faith exception.” The Supreme Court in Leon held an officer’s reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate could save evidence from being excluded when the warrant was later determined to be deficient for lack of probable cause. However, the Court went on to add that if the magistrate had been misled with false information, any evidence seized should be suppressed as the officer’s reliance on the search warrant could not be seen as reasonable. Further, if the magistrate abandons the “detached and neutral” judicial role or if the officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause was wholly unreasonable, suppression of evidence remains available as a remedy. Upon a careful review of the record, it is clear the magistrate was misled by false information provided by Officer Hodge, and the officer’s later reliance on the resultant search warrant was wholly unreasonable.

Officer had probable cause to search car based on the defendant’s apparent drug intoxication discovered during a stop and a search of her person produced paraphernalia and cash. “I find that the inebriated appearance of the passenger, her possession of drug paraphernalia, the defendant’s suspicious responses, and the cash were sufficient evidence from which a reasonable officer could conclude that she had probable cause to search the vehicle for narcotics.” United States v. Valentine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 816 (W.D. Va. 2007).*

Defendant’s search and arrest were justified by probable cause. The search incident that followed was valid. United States v. Quiroz-Mendieta, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76900 (D. Minn. August 15, 2007).*

Officer saying “Have a good evening” and turning to go back to patrol car before returning was a sufficient break in causation to make the consent independent. State v. Cameron, 2008 Wisc. App. LEXIS 47 (January 23, 2008).* (Comment: I refuse to buy into this. A motorist never feels free to leave as long as he or she is being spoken to by a cop.)

Anonymous tip corroborated by prior knowledge of defendant’s drug activity supported reasonable suspicion. Coupled with flight, that was enough. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 248 S.W.3d 538 (Ky. 2008):

Sheriff Staples stated that his stop of Morgan and Evans was based on the totality of three factors: the anonymous tip specifically identifying Morgan, Evans, and Mansfield as engaging in drug-related activity; his prior knowledge about the suspects’ drug-related arrests and convictions; and their attempt to elude the police by leaving Morgan’s trailer. After considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that Staples’s prior knowledge and his observations of Morgan and Evans adequately corroborated the anonymous tip. Therefore, Staples possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that Morgan and Evans were engaging in criminal activity to justify his investigatory stop.

In a knock-and-announce civil case over a drug raid where plaintiffs’ door was broken down and the search netted nothing, the plaintiffs alleged enough to overcome summary judgment and qualified immunity for unreasonableness of the entry. The lack of announcement was based on mere generalizations about drug dealers, and, under Richards, this is not enough. Andulan v. City of Seattle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30811 (W.D. Wash. March 21, 2008).*

Defendant was not seized when he fled from officers trying to stop him. The offenses he committed in flight are not excluded. United States v. Eldridge, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96791 (W.D. N.Y. September 5, 2007).*

CI’s information was sufficiently corroborated to show probable cause. State v. Johnson, 286 Conn. 427, 944 A.2d 297 (2008).*

In response to defendant’s argument that the warrant lacked probable cause, the state responded with the good faith exception. The Virginia court held that the affidavit was not bare bones and provided a substantial basis for finding probable cause [essentially finding probable cause]. Lane v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 565, 659 S.E.2d 553 (2008)*:

Given that the informant has provided past information that has proven to be correct, that the informant was personally on the property that was the subject of the warrant within 72 hours, and that the informant personally observed narcotics at that property and on appellant’s person, we conclude that the informant’s reliability was sufficiently established to provide a reasonable officer with some indicia of probable cause to support a belief that the warrant was valid. Thus, we find that the affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress.

Defendant stayed with a couple in their basement, using their computer. The woman of the couple consented to an entry and a viewing of the hard drive of the computer, and child porn was found. The court finds that the defendant did not have exclusive use of the area sufficient to preclude consent by the woman. (Also, the court noted that it was not his computer and he probably lacked an expectation of privacy in the hard drive because it was not password protected. The parties, however, failed to address that argument, so the court didn’t.) United States v. Sager, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 326 (N.D. Ind. January 2, 2008).*

Utah parole agreement’s language that the parolee “‘permit’ searches upon reasonable suspicion” did not mean that the parolee had to consent. The Utah courts had already rejected similar arguments in the past (also, “allow” searches). Here, a social worker passed on information about defendant’s criminal associations. “[A]lthough the record contains little information about when Officer Hansen received the tip from the DCFS social worker, the social worker’s information was sufficient to support the search of a probationer.” United States v. Carter, 511 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2008).*

Officers busted Cook, and then rolled him on the defendant via a controlled buy. When Cook came out and met with the officers, he said that defendant would be leaving soon, before they could get a warrant, so an officer approached the house to do a knock and talk. The district court found that defendant consented to the entry. While they were first inside, defendant was agitated and moving around, and the officers did a protective sweep for others, but did not search. Another officer went off for a warrant, and the defendant fell asleep. They searched after the warrant returned, and the motion to suppress was properly denied. Nothing was seized during the protective sweep because officers waited for the search warrant. United States v. Legette, 260 Fed. Appx. 247 (11th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

Exigency ceased to exist on defendant’s arrest, despite the fact it was initiated by a 911 call. Moreover, he expressly refused consent. United States v. Davis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1224 (N.D. Ill. January 8, 2008):

In this case, any emergency created by Cupito’s 911 call ended when the deputies arrived on the scene to find her safely outside Davis’s house. According to their testimony, the deputies made the decision to arrest Davis before they requested his identification. If there was an exigency that Davis would harm the officers, retrieve a weapon, flee, or destroy evidence, it was created when the officers requested and consented to Davis reentering his home to retrieve his identification. This police manufactured exigency did not justify entry into the home.

Furthermore, even if there was an exigency that was not created by the deputies, the exigency would have ended after they handcuffed Davis and would not justify the deputies remaining in his home. See Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir. 1998) (“As to what may be done by the police or other public authorities once they are inside the premises, this must be assessed upon a case-by-case basis, taking into account the type of emergency which appeared to be present … The officer’s post-entry conduct must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry-the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance.”). Because there was no exigency, the only other way the Government may justify the deputies’ entry is by consent.

Plaintiff lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in an open storage room where his stuff was in open boxes at his father’s house where he did not live or even stay as a guest. Warner v. McCunney, 259 Fed. Appx. 476 (3d Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

The officer did not exceed defendant’s scope of consent when, touching the molding on the vehicle, it popped off. When that happened, he could look further. United States v. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 2008 FED App. 0011P (6th Cir. 2008).*

Officer encountered a group of men standing around, and the odor of burnt marijuana was surrounding them. The officer lacked any reasonable suspicion to patdown the defendant based on the odor alone. The defendant first consented to a search of his person and then withdrew it, and that could not be considered reasonable suspicion. Robinson v. State, 976 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2008):

We conclude that there was no probable cause to support the warrantless search of Robinson’s person which yielded the firearm and the marijuana. The fact that Robinson was standing with a group of men surrounded by the odor of burned marijuana was insufficient to supply more than a “mere suspicion” that Robinson was in possession of marijuana. The fact that Robinson initially consented to a search of his person and then withdrew that consent did not give the officer probable cause to search for marijuana.

Defendant service member’s refusal of consent to search his computer was binding as to removing him and then asking his wife under Randolph. He was confronted with allegations that child pornography was found in his former quarters on a base in England, and he was detained after he refused consent. He was no potential objector under the government’s theory because he unequivocally refused consent. The search was otherwise saved, however, by a search authorization obtained from a proper official. United States v. Sanders, 66 M.J. 529 (A.F. Ct. App. 2008).*

Defendant was stopped and the officer smelled alcohol. The officer’s patrol car video was not admitted at the hearing, but the trial court saw it. In the first appeal, the videotape was not in the record, and the court affirmed, Amador v. State, 187 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006), but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed because of the lack of the video in the record. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 667-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A five minute portion was certified by the trial court as what it saw, and it did not include the field sobriety test that defendant allegedly failed. The video thus did not support probable cause. Reversed. Amador v. State, 242 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. App. — Beaumont 2007).

Even if first search was invalid, defendant’s shooting of a police officer during it was an independent basis for a second search untainted by the first. United States v. Tab, 259 Fed. Appx. 684, 2007 FED App. 0827N (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).*

City lawfully obtained a warrant for defendant’s property because of the unsightly junk he collected there for his various engineering projects. Carpiaux v. City of Emeryville, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91574 (N.D. Cal. December 13, 2007).*

Inmate’s § 1983 case directly attacked his conviction, so it was Heck barred, and he is directed to show cause why it should not be dismissed, without the defendants even being required to answer. Heath v. Gurski, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91342 (D. Or. December 6, 2007).*

The Minnesota implied consent law does not violate the Fourth Amendment because it is based on probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Netland, 742 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. App. 2007). The court’s free link is not up at the time of this posting, but LexisOne has it. This is the concluding paragraph, and how the court gets to this point is interesting and completely noncontroversial:

Thus, contrary to Netland’s argument, the State of Minnesota does not condition a person’s driving privileges on surrendering a constitutional right. Before “the [chemical] test may be required of a person,” the implied-consent law requires the requesting officer to have probable cause to believe a person is driving while impaired. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b). And if, as it often will be, a warrantless search is necessary to prevent evidence of the driver’s intoxication from imminent destruction by physiological processes, the exigent-circumstances exception authorizes the search. See Shriner, 739 N.W.2d at 439 (emphasizing that “the exigent-circumstances requirement is not a high threshold”). Since the Fourth Amendment does not grant the right to refuse a search supported by probable cause and authorized by exigent circumstances, the implied-consent law does not require a driver to surrender the right to be free from unreasonable searches.

Defendant’s wife let in an officer with an arrest warrant for defendant in hand so he could see for himself that the defendant was not there. In plain view, there was paraphernalia for meth manufacturing, which the officer seized. The seizure was valid, and consent to enter with an arrest warrant was not coerced. Pate v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 327 (Ky. 2007), released for publication November 1, 2007.

There was an objective basis for defendant’s stop from the only evidence, so it was valid. United States v. Tejeda-Ramirez, 259 Fed. Appx. 535 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

The CI was of unknown reliability, but it was based on personal observations occurring within the previous 24 hours, and the officer was able to corroborate psuedophedrine purchases from records of sales to the defendant. “Under a totality of the circumstances test, the state court judge had sufficient information to make a finding that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in Nickels’s residence and garage. Therefore, Wilkerson has not rebutted the presumption that the search was legal.” The good faith exception also applied. United States v. Wilkerson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90852 (S.D. Ill. December 11, 2007).*

Officer’s questions can be unrelated to the purpose of the stop, as long as it was justified at its inception. United States v. Swan, 259 Fed. Appx. 656 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished):

The second prong of the Terry test is satisfied if the officer’s actions after making a legitimate traffic stop were reasonably related to either the circumstances that justified the stop or to dispelling reasonable suspicion developed during the stop. A Terry “‘detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,'” but if further reasonable suspicion emerges during the stop and is supported by articulable facts, detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed. During this brief period of detention, the officer may examine the driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check on the driver and the vehicle, and question the driver about a wide range of matters, including those unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. There is no specific prohibition on the scope of permissible questioning “so long as the overall detention is justified by reasonable suspicion.” Moreover, this court has eschewed any particularized limitations on the permissible investigative tools that may be utilized in connection with a Terry stop, holding that the relevant inquiry is “‘whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.'”

Stop became consensual after the defendant’s papers were returned, and she validly consented after that. United States v. Cardwell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92130 (D. Utah December 14, 2007).* (Comment: Consent on the side of the highway with two armed officers is a fiction.)

The affidavit for search warrant was 22 pages long, and it incorporated by reference a 121 page wiretap affidavit, and it provided a substantial basis for probable cause for the search of defendant’s property. United States v. Morris, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92162 (E.D. Pa. December 14, 2007).* (Comment: Picking apart that much information for a probable cause challenge seems virtually pointless. It may be good for an overview of the case, but a PC challenge is just not going to win under the “soft standard” of Gates.) In the co-defendant’s case, United States v. Thompson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92163 (E.D. Pa. December 14, 2007), adopting the other order by reference, the court also held that the issuance of a no-knock warrant was of no consequence since the officers knocked. The co-defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the car in the case since it was not his.

Contents of defendant’s camcorder were properly viewed by Customs when defendant returned to the U.S. after having fled when others in his conspiracy had been previously arrested. It gave further information justifying indictment. United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 Fed. Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished).

Information that defendant had a paid subscription to a child porn site was probable cause to search his computer. Unpaid visits not necessarily so. United States v. Diaz, 529 F. Supp. 2d 792 (S.D. Tex. 2007).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress a shirt found during a search for the weapon used in a robbery where the shirt was lawfully seized. Landry v. Cain, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93276 (E.D. La. October 23, 2007).*

Use of a flashlight to illuminuate defendant’s pocket to make what was not visible at night visible was not an unreasonable search. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 446 (December 18, 2007).*

Defendant was not entitled to a Franks hearing. There was an anonymous tip, but it was significantly corroborated by defendant’s possession of a small amount of marijuana in his car. United States v. Yarbrough, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 30058, 2007 FED App. 0871N (6th Cir. December 20, 2007)* (unpublished):

Yarbrough concedes the presence of marijuana in the car, yet maintains the small amount indicates personal use. Even if we accept this premise, the presence of any marijuana in a vehicle outside of a residence where police have received an anonymous tip of drug activity contributes to a finding of probable cause. See Elkins, 300 F.3d at 659-60 (anonymous tip plus smell of marijuana provided probable cause for search warrant); United States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 651-52 (6th Cir. 1986) (tip from confidential informant plus marijuana plant growing outside of house provided probable cause).

Plaintiff did not show a future likelihood of being searched under a local ordinance to justify finding an Art. III case or controversy. Sapienza v. Forest Preserve Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94777 (N.D. Ill. December 28, 2007).*

The trial court’s jury instruction on consent to a strip search accurately reflected the law that consent did not have to be “express” as long as the defendant officer would reasonably believe that consent had been given. Plaintiff was entitled to a new trial in a § 1983 case for an illegal search where the defendant put plaintiff’s drug history in over objection. It was more prejudicial than relevant. Reppert v. Marino, 259 Fed. Appx. 481 (3d Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Hot pursuit from a violent felony justified entry into defendant’s home. Also, defendant’s stepfather had the authority to permit the entry. Thomas v. State, 290 Ga. App. 10, 658 S.E.2d 796 (2008).*

Defendant’s ex-husband came over for visitation with their teenage son, and he saw what he suspected was a meth cook going on, so he called the police. They arrived, and the front door was open, and the smell of a meth cook was coming from inside. The entry was justified on exigent circumstances. Richards v. State, 290 Ga. App. 360, 659 S.E.2d 651 (2008):

Richards is correct that the presence of contraband, without more, does not give rise to exigent circumstances. Here, however, there was more. The officer was told that children lived in the house, he saw what appeared to be a methamphetamine laboratory, and he smelled chemicals which he believed were associated with a methamphetamine laboratory and could be hazardous to inhale.

A search incident to arrest may occur prior to the arrest. State v. Abrams, 2008 Ohio 94, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 69 (12th Dist. January 14, 2008).*

A search incident of a backpack 30 minutes after arrest was still “contemporaneous.” State v. Malloy, 178 P.3d 1283 (Colo. App. 2008).*

When officers have subdued a person in his own home for his own protection, the officers are not authorized to search the entire residence under the emergency-aid exception unless specific information exists to support entry into other areas of the home, such as an immediate threat to the subdued person from elsewhere in the residence or another person who may be injured or in need of immediate assistance elsewhere in the residence. State v. Jeffery, 38 Kan. App. 2d
893, 173 P.3d 1156 (2008).*

Owner of house was shot by co-defendant and fled the house and called 911 from a neighbor’s house. He could consent when the police arrived. Inside, the police found his marijuana, and he was arrested, too. The entry was valid. United States v. Linton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2290 (N.D. Fla. January 11, 2008).*

Defendant pro se raised a search without consent at trial, but a ruling was never obtained. It was irrelevant to the appeal because the search of that place was never used at trial. State v. Brannon, 971 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007).*