First encounter with the defendant produced no evidence of wrongdoing, so the second was unjustified. Greider v. State, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2008):

In sum, a proper analysis of the case at bar requires partitioning the encounter continuum described by Officer Perna into two police-citizen encounters. This approach recognizes that the second encounter was an unlawful detention and invoked constitutional safeguards. We agree with the trial court that Officer Perna had a duty to check on Mr. Greider. However, once it was determined that Mr. Greider was “okay” and not involved in any criminal activity, the officer lacked the proper authority to order Mr. Greider to lower his window. We conclude and hold that the illegal detention and search of Mr. Greider were constitutionally invalid actions by Officer Perna and that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

State conceded in oral argument in the Court of Appeals that the initial search was illegal. The case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the fruit of the poisonous tree applies. State v. Poulton, 286 Kan. 1, 179 P.3d 1145 (2008).*

CA10: Qualified immunity denied to defendant sued for removing plaintiffs’ child from the home without just cause; the child has a Fourth Amendment right, too. Two cases:

Turner v. Houseman, 268 Fed. Appx. 785 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished):

Turner has also met the second element of his burden, to show that the right allegedly violated was clearly established. “The law is clearly established when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as the plaintiff maintains.” Roska, 328 F.3d at 1248. It was clearly established, at least two years before the events in question, that absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, neither police nor social workers may enter a person’s home without a valid consent, even for the purpose of taking a child into custody, much less to conduct a search. Id. at 1248-50 & n.23. It was also established that the warrantless seizure and detention of a person without probable cause or exigent circumstances, as alleged in Turner’s petition, is unreasonable. See Olsen, 312 F.3d at 1312. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Turner’s Fourth Amendment claim against Houseman.

Burgess v. Houseman, 268 Fed. Appx. 780 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished):

The law was clearly established, prior to the events in question, that children enjoy Fourth Amendment rights to be free from seizure, including the improper removal from their home. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1997). We therefore affirm the denial of qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

The Tenth Circuit [somehow] finds an independent source in a tractor trailer cab search from a continuous occurrence after a dog sniff on the highway of the trailer during a traffic stop and license check, essentially holding that a lawful canine search [something not clear to me in the first place] cures all ills. United States v. Forbes, 528 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2008):

Similarly, in this case, agents recovered the marijuana following a lawful canine inspection of Forbes’ tractor-trailer rig. Nothing that led agents to the truck’s tractor was in any sense derived from the search of the trailer. Even under the facts alleged by Forbes, border agents did not recover contraband or discover any evidence of wrongdoing when they entered the trailer. It is therefore impossible to say that the later discovered evidence could have been the product of the earlier unconstitutional search. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984) (“[E]vidence will not be excluded as ‘fruit’ unless the illegality is at least the ‘but for’ cause of the discovery of the evidence. Suppression is not justified unless the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity.” (quotation omitted)); see also Moore, 329 F.3d at 404 (“The evidence was simply not the product of police illegality.”). In this case, the sole and independent source of the evidence was the legal canine sniff, which provided the agents with the necessary probable cause to enter the tractor’s cab and search for contraband. See Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1152. Although the two events may have been temporally close, the exterior canine sniff was conceptually unrelated to the search of the trailer. In other words, the canine inspection was a sufficiently distinguishable means of obtaining the necessary probable cause that an independent source for the evidence existed to purge any taint from the search of the trailer. We therefore hold that, even assuming that the search of the trailer occurred prior to the canine sniff of the exterior of the vehicle, the government has discharged its burden of showing that an independent source led to the discovery of the marijuana.

Strip search was properly based on reasonable suspicion where defendant was known to hide drugs in his buttocks and his pants were hanging low and unzipped when he was stopped, based on United States v. Logan, 219 Fed.Appx. 533 (7th Cir. 2007). United States v. Jones, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45717 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2008).

The consenter to the apartment search had apparent authority, and it was a question of law for which a hearing was not required given the admitted facts. United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008).*

ABC search of a bar for violation of state law permitted seizure of surveillance videotapes which could have shown violations of state liquor laws. United States v. Savoy, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12529, 2008 FED App. 0319N (6th Cir. June 5, 2008) (unpublished).*

The inventory in this case was prior to a valid impoundment for a broken taillight [right!] and it revealed a machine gun. United States v. McCartney, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2008).*

Defendant fails to show standing in the building that “was uninhabited, dilapidated, and littered with debris,” and he could not show who he allegedly rented from or who paid the utilities. United States v. Robinson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21421 (E.D. Mich. March 19, 2008).*

Officers had probable cause to believe that defendant had drugs in his truck when they stopped him, and that permitted a complete search of the vehicle. United States v. Stotler, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21483 (C.D. Ill. March 19, 2008).*

Defendants showed that plaintiff was detained for mental health reasons, so they were entitled to summary judgment. Boehme v. Loth, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21275 (N.D. Cal. March 18, 2008).*

While consent in this case was invalid and coerced, the state proved that inevitable discovery should apply because they had probable cause and, just as important, they were in the process of getting a search warrant. McDonnell v. State, 981 So. 2d 585 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2008):

Thus, federal law suggests that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not be applied in every case where the police had probable cause for a search warrant, but failed to get one. The cases focus on whether the police made an effort to get a warrant prior to the illegal search and whether strong probable cause existed for the search warrant.

The trial court specifically found, based on competent, substantial evidence in the record, that Investigator Mathis was in the process of obtaining a warrant when Christopher consented to the search. See Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 159 (Fla. 2007) (“An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress presumes the trial court’s findings of fact are correct and reverses those findings only if they are not supported by competent, substantial evidence.”). The record also demonstrates that probable cause existed upon which a warrant could have been obtained.

Search of a cruise ship cabin on return to port from a trip to Mexico was a routine border search. People v. Laborde, 163 Cal. App. 4th 870, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860 (2d Dist. 2008).

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s arrest, and one communicated to another to yet another. So the search incident was valid. United States v. Hayden, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43604 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 2008).*

NYPD Housing Bureau was working a housing project to deter crime, and they encountered the defendant who seemed not to belong and asked him for his ID, trying to ascertain why he was there. He fled instead and was caught and said “I’m holding” when they grabbed him. Besides a gun, drugs were found. All this was reasonable because he was not stopped or unlawfully detained when they asked for his ID. United States v. Mason, 550 F. Supp. 2d 309 (E.D. N.Y. 2008)*:

There is no indication that any of these factors was present when Officer Porras asked if defendant was a resident of the building, requested defendant’s identification, and asked where he was going. Until the defendant attempted to flee, the Officers remained several feet away from defendant. Defendant does not contend that he was touched, that the Officers displayed any weapons, held his identification for a prolonged period of time, or otherwise indicated that he was not free to leave. Thus, during this initial period, the encounter was consensual.

A fact question remained as to whether plaintiff was a recent occupant of his car under Thornton that was searched by the police on a civil commitment order. Lyman v. City of Albany, 536 F. Supp. 2d 242 (N.D. N.Y. 2008).*

“If [this § 1983] were to attack the validity of the three subject arrests under the Fourth Amendment, this court would be running afoul of the Heck and Rooker/Feldman doctrines. The court therefore concludes that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest should be dismissed.” Burton v. City of Senatobia, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16376 (N.D. Miss. March 3, 2008).*

State court’s finding on post-conviction petition that trial counsel was not ineffective in his conduct of the suppression motion was not an unreasonable application of the law for § 2254(d)(1) purposes. (Stone not even cited.) Steffen v. McDonough, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16952 (S.D. Fla. March 5, 2008).*

Did the police officer’s actions “communicate the message of ‘We Who Must Be Obeyed'”? Here, it did not. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (over dissent):

Police officers are as free as any other citizen to knock on someone’s door and ask to talk with them, to approach citizens on the street or in their cars and to ask for information or their cooperation. Police officers may be as aggressive as the pushy Fuller-brush man at the front door, the insistent panhandler on the street, or the grimacing street-corner car-window squeegee man. All of these social interactions may involve embarrassment and inconvenience, but they do not involve official coercion. It is only when the police officer “engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen,” does such an encounter become a seizure. It is the display of official authority and the implication that this authority cannot be ignored, avoided, or terminated, that results in a Fourth Amendment seizure. At bottom, the issue is whether the surroundings and the words or actions of the officer and his associates communicate the message of “We Who Must Be Obeyed.”

. . .

Each citizen-police encounter must be factually evaluated on its own terms; there are no per se rules. “The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” The officer’s conduct is the primary focus, but time, place, and attendant circumstances matter as well. “A court must step into the shoes of the defendant and determine from a common, objective perspective whether the defendant would have felt free to leave.”

. . .

The court of appeals erred in focusing upon one single fact–Officer Okland’s use of a spotlight–instead of the totality of the circumstances. We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling, the totality of the circumstances support his conclusion that appellee was detained by Officer Okland for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, uphold the trial court’s suppression ruling, and remand the case for further proceedings in the trial court.

Officers objectively had reason to believe that a missing woman might be in appellant’s apartment, and that was an exigency for an entry. One officer’s subjective belief they did not have enough was irrelevant. Pitonyak v. State, 253 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-–Austin 2008):

Considered together, these facts strongly suggested that Jennifer’s disappearance was the result of foul play and pointed to appellant’s apartment as the most obvious place to look for her. Granted, there were no signs of foul play at the apartment. There had been no reports of shouts or gunshots coming from the apartment. No foul odor had been detected. But Jennifer had been missing without explanation for almost two days, appellant was her last known companion, her car was parked outside appellant’s apartment (as was appellant’s), and appellant had lied about having been with Jennifer on Tuesday night. If Jennifer was sick or injured or otherwise physically threatened, each passing moment increased the risk of death or serious injury. We conclude that a police officer standing in Sedwick’s shoes would have had an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed and that entry into appellant’s apartment was immediately necessary to protect or preserve Jennifer’s life or to avoid serious injury to her. See Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh’g) (holding that emergency doctrine justified warrantless search to locate complainant or to find evidence that would lead to complainant’s discovery at different location).

That one or more Austin police officers subjectively believed that they did not have a legal reason to enter the apartment, and conveyed that belief to Sedwick, is irrelevant. It is not clear from the record whether the officer or officers who made the decision not to forcibly enter appellant’s apartment on that Thursday night knew all the pertinent facts and circumstances. In any event, an action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1978)). The question is not whether the Austin police subjectively believed that an emergency existed, but whether a police officer standing in Sedwick’s shoes and knowing what Sedwick knew would have been objectively warranted in believing that an emergency existed. We hold that he would have been.

“Premises” and outbuilding included a utility shed 25′ from defendant’s house within the fence on the property. Walls v. State, 179 Md. App. 234, 944 A.2d 1222 (2008).

Police received a 911 call about a domestic dispute with shots fired from defendants’ house. When they arrived, the female was outside hysterical. The officers talked to the female, and she told them to leave because they were not wanted or needed. Despite this, they went inside and found a meth lab. No emergency existed. The denial of the motion to suppress is reversed. State v. Bookheimer, 221 W. Va. 720, 656 S.E.2d 471 (2007):

Applying the above-cited legal principles to the present case, we find it unreasonable for the officers to have conducted a warrantless entry and search. At the suppression hearing, the responding officers testified that Ms. Tingler clearly told them that there was no domestic dispute, they were not wanted, they were not needed, and that she wanted them to leave. In the face of this clear rebuke, it would not be reasonable for an officer to proceed to enter and search the premises unless there was some other condition lending to an emergency circumstance.

While the officer testified that Ms. Tingler was acting in a “hysterical” manner, a review of the record reveals the contrary. After listening to the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the trial judge could not agree that “hysterical” was a proper characterization of Ms. Tingler’s behavior. From the bench, the judge “note[d] that upon arriving at the scene the testimony of [the] Deputy … was that Ms. Tingler was yelling, and was in a state of less than quite [sic] demeanor. I would not say that she was irrate [sic], but it appears that there was yelling by Ms. Tingler[.]” Moreover, the order stemming from the suppression hearing referred to Ms. Tingler’s demeanor as “agitated.” Being less than “irate” and “agitated” does not lend support to the officer’s contention that Ms. Tingler was hysterical. An objective review of the record reveals a woman who was angry and who was, indeed, probably yelling. However, her anger and yelling were not caused by circumstances occurring prior to the arrival of the officers. Rather, her agitation was aimed at the fact that the officers were present on her property. Thus, Ms. Tingler’s behavior did not create an emergency or an exigent circumstance justifying entry into the residence.

Plaintiffs § 1983 claim failed as to digging holes on their property under a search warrant for evidence from a 30 year old homicide because it was reasonable to believe some of the evidence sought would be buried. Other interpersonal actions undertaken by the police in conducting the search were sufficient to survive summary judgment. Lykken v. Brady, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35479 (D. S.D. April 30, 2008).

Tip in an anonymous 911 call that defendant had a gun was not sufficiently predictive under J.L. to justify a stop and frisk. Describing clothing is essentially nothing, and possession of a gun is not illegal under Delaware law. United States v. Waterman, 549 F. Supp. 2d 593 (D. Del. 2008).*

The traffic stop was executed reasonably quickly such that defendant was not unreasonably detained. While the officer never said that the defendant was free to go, the stop became consensual. United States v. Velazquez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35378 (D. Kan. April 28, 2008):

An encounter does not become non-consensual merely because an officer fails to advise a driver that he was free to go. It was only after the trooper told defendant to take care and stepped away from the vehicle towards the patrol vehicle that defendant was asked if he had any illegal drugs in the vehicle, followed by a request to search the vehicle. After reviewing the video of the stop, the Court finds there is no indication that Trooper Ranieri made any “coercive show of authority” such that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.

Car theft is an offense that carries with it enough risk of use of weapons to justify a frisk. Independently, there were facts justifying a frisk on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Bullock, 379 U.S. App. D.C. 114, 510 F.3d 342 (2007):

In this case, once Bullock could not produce the registration information and could not identify the owner of the car, Officer Jackson possessed reasonable suspicion that Bullock had stolen the car. Like burglary, car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety, and thus justifies a protective frisk under Terry to ensure officer safety. As the Eighth Circuit has held, “when officers encounter suspected car thieves, they also may reasonably suspect that such individuals might possess weapons.” United States v. Hanlon, 401 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 7 F. App’x 876, 885 (10th Cir. 2001) (permissible to frisk driver prior to consensual search of potentially stolen van); United States v. Bradley, 1990 WL 124205, at *2 (6th Cir. 1990) (officers were “justified in frisking both the driver and passenger of the car that they believed to have been recently stolen” because it was reasonable to believe that a person “suspected of having recently been involved in a car theft[] might have been armed and dangerous”).

. . .

Statistics show that traffic stops continue to be extraordinarily dangerous to the police officers who risk their lives to protect the public. Every year in traffic stops and pursuits in the United States, about 6,000 police officers are assaulted-and about 10 officers are killed. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED (2006), at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/index.html. By ordering Bullock out of the car and frisking him for purposes of officer safety, Officer Jackson did not take “any unreasonable steps in attempting to ensure that he would not become one of these statistics.” Holmes, 385 F.3d at 791.

Qualified immunity was improperly granted to an officer for a three hour detention of a Haitian-American who was driving a cargo van with ten cardboard barrels inside on the Taconic State Parkway in Westchester County. The officer suspected an IED, but neither a bombsniffing or a drug dog alerted. The officer had her unhandcuffed and required her to come to the stationhouse to clear it up. After a few telephone calls, the plaintiff’s story checked out that she was merely driving the barrels to a shipping company that contained things the Haitian community in Westchester County was shipping home, and she was released. Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007).*

Narcs received a report that defendant was dealing drugs in a bar. Undercover officers watched defendant go to his car, come back, and meet people in the bathroom. They followed him and he committed several traffic offenses, so they stopped him. They could frisk him based on the reasonable suspicion he was a drug dealer, not just based on the traffic stop. State v. Bellow, 982 So. 2d 826 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008), released for publication June 9, 2008.*

Plaintiff’s consent defeats his § 1983 case for search of his car. Dawson v. City of Montgomery, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20417 (M.D. Ala. March 7, 2008).*

Traffic stop led to plain view of a rock of crack sitting in a cupholder holder next to the driver. State v. Smith, 2008 La. App. LEXIS 367 (5th Cir. March 11, 2008), released for publication June 9, 2008.*

Shutting a dresser drawer that had been opened by consent did not work to prevent the officer from seizing contraband that he had already seen. Revocation of consent after a plain view of contraband is ineffective to prevent a seizure. State v. Ford, 220 Ore. App. 247, 185 P.3d 550 (2008).*

State confessed error that the officer held defendant’s identification too long and asked for consent. State v. Adams, 220 Ore. App. 305, 185 P.3d 570 (2008).*

Asking the defendant for consent to search for weapons was not related to the purpose of the stop, so the search was unlawful. State v. Kirkeby, 220 Ore. App. 177, 185 P.3d 510 (2008):

This case is controlled by Rodgers. At the point at which Steele asked defendant for permission to search him, Steele testified that, although he had defendant’s name, date of birth, and driver license number, he “probably” did not have everything he needed to issue defendant a citation because he did not have defendant’s proof of insurance and vehicle registration information. However, even if that information was essential for the issuance of a traffic citation, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Steele asked defendant for those items or was waiting for defendant to retrieve them, nor that he was engaged in any other steps related to the investigation of the traffic offense. Thus, the request for consent to search defendant did not occur “during an unavoidable lull in the investigation.” Rodgers, 219 Ore. App. at 372.

Instead of asking defendant for that information–a logical next step in processing the infraction–Steele proceeded down an unrelated path, that is, he asked defendant for permission to pat him down. That, in turn, led Steele to ask defendant for consent to examine the items that Steele felt during the patdown, and, ultimately, for consent to look inside one of those items. Those actions, which were unrelated to the basis for the traffic stop, unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop in violation of Article I, section 9.

Search warrant after an invalid subpoena for BAC results was an independent source. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2008 PA Super 101, 948 A.2d 875 (2008):

[*P18] Therefore, based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Sergeant Adams’ decision to seek a search warrant was premised only upon information that had been observed legally by his colleagues on the night of the arrest and recorded in their reports and not based upon illegally-obtained information. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 (reviewing court must consider whether subsequent police decision to obtain warrant was based on information observed by police misconduct). It is true that Sergeant Adams’ investigation retraced the steps of the previous investigation, but we decline the invitation to penalize Sergeant Adams for the comprehensiveness of the previous investigation, especially here, where there was nothing of substance added to his investigation or the search warrant application by virtue of the illegally-obtained BAC results. Ruey, 854 A.2d at 571. Likewise, it is evident from the search warrant application that no mention was made of the illegally-obtained BAC results to the magisterial district judge. Id., 854 A.2d at 565; see also Murray, 487 U.S. at 542.

Officer saw people in a building at 2 a.m., and he initiated a burglary investigation. He entered and talked to the people inside. The officer could extend the initial stop. State v. Sawyer, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 556 (May 9, 2008).*

Telephonic search warrant complied with the duplicate that had been made according to the recording of the telephone call. State v. Jennings, 220 Ore. App. 1, 184 P.3d 1200 (2008):

Here, by contrast, the duplicate original warrant was facially valid, and the state relies on its validity, not on the validity of the preceding oral recital by the judge who considered and granted the telephonic warrant request. Moreover, as discussed, defendant’s effort to undermine the validity of the duplicate original warrant fails because the judge’s statement to the officer, when viewed in a common-sense, nontechnical way, evinced an intention to authorize the preparation and execution of a search-and-seize warrant.

Being under the influence was not a reason for a frisk because there was no indication that the defendant was armed. State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d
621, 183 P.3d 1075 (2008):

¶17 We do not find such a basis here. The police received an anonymous call claiming Setterstrom was under the influence, heard a lie about his name, and observed his nervous, fidgety behavior. The record shows no threatening gestures or words. Setterstrom did not even stand. At most, the record shows that Setterstrom was under the influence; this is not a crime in itself.

Evidence supports conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing for a frisk during traffic stop. United States v. Bowen, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10981 (9th Cir. May 12, 2008) (unpublished).*

D.C. District approves of a class action of arrested protestors who were strip searched when booked. Bame v. Dillard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40805 (D. D.C. May 22, 2008):

Plaintiffs have successfully established that there is sufficient commonality and typicality for the class to be certified. As this Court said in a recent order certifying a class action, “‘a strip-search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.'” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 248 F.R.D. 46, 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996)). This intrusion is alleged to have been commonly experienced by the putative members of the class. Further, Plaintiff has laid out issues of law and fact that are common to all members of the proposed class, including, primarily, whether the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. See Pls.’ Mem. at 16.

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk defendant who was acting suspicious in a high crime area, hanging with others, and they split up, the officers believing it was a diversion. When defendant was stopped, he said he was going home, but it was in the wrong direction. Then, an officer noticed a bulge in defendant’s pocket, and when defendant reached into that pocket to find identification, defendant immediately withdrew his hand, indicating that he was hiding something. The court also found that defendant consented to a search of his person because in response to an officer’s asking to search, defendant raised his arms in the air. [Right up to the last sentence, they were doing so well; how could that consent possibly be valid?] United States v. Diggs, 267 Fed. Appx. 225 (4th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished).

The question of whether a search warrant that covered a dwelling and another car covered the car in which drugs were found was moot because the officer had probable cause to search the car without the search warrant. United States v. Dickerson, 514 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2008).*

The traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, and it was not unreasonably extended. The consent was then found to be voluntary. United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008).*

Defendant was stopped and frisked because he matched the description of a trespasser. When he was seen, he was doing nothing wrong. His stop and frisk was unjustified. After acquired information from the defendant cannot justify the search. United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2008):

The district court ruled that the frisk was justified because the officer became aware that Hughes was on supervision and affiliated with a gang. This information can support reasonable suspicion to frisk only if it were received before the frisk. As the timing of the computer check is “not clear,” it cannot form the basis of reasonable suspicion. See Carter v. United States, 729 F.2d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 1984) (burden is on the government to justify warrantless search). Further, the officer testified that the first thing he normally does when he stops individuals is to “have the person place their hands on the vehicle and I pat them down and I frisk them.”

Publishing traffic offenders’ social security numbers on a municipal website did not constitutionally invade a privacy interest. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 2008 FED App. 0089P (6th Cir. 2008).*

Defendant’s consulting with her attorney before consenting showed that it was voluntary. United States v. Boulette, 265 Fed. Appx. 895 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)*:

Application of these factors support the district court’s finding that Thompson’s consent was voluntarily given. Thompson spoke with Agent Warren prior to his entry, and she permitted him to come inside to discuss the situation further. After Agent Warren explained the circumstances of Boulette’s arrest to Thompson, she called her attorney for advice and spoke with him for about ten minutes. Moreover, she allowed Agent Warren to speak with her attorney prior to giving consent. The testimony reflects that Thompson was aware of her right to refuse consent, and only did so after careful consideration and upon the advice of her attorney.

District court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment on an unlawful claim not explicitly raised when all the facts shown justified it under Randolph. Zamora v. Smith, 267 Fed. Appx. 602 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Fact questions remained on the necessity of Tasering the plaintiff, so summary judgment denied. Mattos v. Agarano, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13201 (D. Haw. February 20, 2008).*

Defendant stayed on a lady’s property, and he excluded her from his private papers and certain things, but she was capable of consenting to an outside search, including digging into the ground and looking in an ammunition can where police found a murder weapon. The digging was a minimal intrusion since it was outdoors. State v. Harvey, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 166 (March 4, 2008).*

Police may seize a vehicle in a public place that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband. United States v. Gourley, 267 Fed. Appx. 656 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

The officer “did not violate defendant’s privacy rights under the fourth amendment by asking him whether he had any knives, guns, drugs, or needles.” Defendant’s argument that this extended the stop was rejected. People v. Terry, 883 N.E.2d 716, 318 Ill. Dec. 485 (4th Dist. 2008).*