From the Immigration Professors Blog: Judge Rules Search of Immigrants’ Tax Returns Violated 4th Amendment. A Colorado District Judge has held that investigators illegally rooted through over 5,000 client files at a tax preparation firm looking for evidence of immigrants using false social security numbers. People v. State of Colorado, No. 08CR2087 (D.C. Weld County, Mar. 7, 2009). The Fourth Amendment discussion starts at page 12 of the slip opinion. The court even likens this search to a writ of assistance.

No cases today, either.

Defendant’s statements in a bankruptcy proceeding where he disavowed any interest in a Las Vegas house showed he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the house. His post hoc rationalizations were not believed. Going to the merits of reasonable expectation of privacy, he loses there, too. United States v. Burke, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4762 (E.D. Va. January 23, 2009):

Prior to the search, at the time of the search, and months after the search, defendant expressly denied living at the residence and having any ownership interest in the residence or in the boxes stored in the garage and the house. His explicit statements and conduct relinquished any expectation of privacy in the place searched and the property seized. His contradictory and self-serving testimony made years after the search during the course of the criminal prosecution is not credible. As such, the court could deny defendant’s motion to suppress on this basis alone. See Decoud, 456 F.3d at 1007; United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1510 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress because his conduct demonstrates that he did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched).

Vehicle validly seized by the police was still subject to the automobile exception where there was probable cause. A security sweep of the premises that was strictly limited was valid, too. United States v. Weeks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5841 (D.Del. January 26, 2009).*

Officers had probable cause for something after the PC for drugs evaporated. They had probable cause to believe he was driving on a suspended driver’s license, and they learned of the federal investigation. They could continue on the suspended license. Their subjective intent was irrelevant. United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 2009).*

Managerial authority is not enough in a corporation (except for a small one) to have standing to challenge a search of the corporate records. If the affidavit is present at the time of the search, it does not need to be attached to the search warrant for reference to it to be valid. United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 553 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2009):

It thus appears that an employee of a corporation, whether worker or manager, does not, simply by virtue of his status as such, acquire Fourth Amendment standing with respect to company premises. Similarly, and notwithstanding the reference to “an independent … proprietary interest” in Cella, to be merely a shareholder of a corporation, without more, is also not enough. As always, a reasonable expectation of privacy does not arise ex officio, but must be established with respect to the person in question.

. . .

The district court relied on three facts in concluding that Kaplan and Brunk had Fourth Amendment standing: their ownership of SDI, their management of SDI from offices in the building searched, and the security measures SDI took to secure its business records. Our review of relevant precedent indicates that these facts are too broad and generalized to support the district court’s conclusion. The security measures that SDI took to ensure the privacy of its business records are relevant only to the standing of the corporation itself, not of its officers. As for Kaplan and Brunk, their ownership and management do not necessarily show a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Hill, 374 F.2d at 873; Cella, 568 F.2d at 1283. Because neither claims to enjoy “exclusive use” of the places searched–that is, the entire SDI office–they each must show a personal connection, along the lines we have drawn out of Anderson, to justify an expectation of privacy.

As to the reference to the affidavit issue:

With respect to the second prong, there appears to be no question that Special Agent Raftery and the search team had copies of the affidavit in their possession when they executed the warrant. Although it is unclear whether each member of the team had his own copy as he conducted the search, the magistrate accepted Special Agent Raftery’s representation that “the affidavit was available during the search for reference by any member of the Government’s search team.” By making the affidavit available, the search team ensured that it “accompanied the warrant” to satisfy the requirements of incorporation. Nothing more is necessary for the affidavit to ensure “that the discretion of the officers executing the warrant is limited.” Towne, 997 F.2d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).fn10

10 We have long since dispelled any lingering confusion in our case law that the affidavit must be physically affixed to the search warrant. Towne, 997 F.2d at 544-48. We have also clarified that “[t]he documents that are in fact relied upon to serve [the functions of a search warrant] simply are the ‘search warrant’ for purposes of constitutional analysis.” Id. at 548 (addressing the accompaniment requirement). It is true that the magistrate judge questioned how much the search team actually relied on the affidavit to limit its search. As we discuss below, this was in the context of the good faith exception, where the procedural posture in the district court was different. In addition, we have never required actual reliance on an affidavit to meet the second prong for incorporation into a warrant.

SDI argues that the failure of the search team to give a copy of the affidavit to the defendants–which the government concedes–means that the affidavit did not “accompany” the warrant for purposes of this inquiry. Certainly some of our precedents have held that the “purpose of the accompanying affidavit … is both to limit the officer’s discretion and to inform the person subject to the search what items the officers executing the warrant can seize.” United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted and emphasis removed); see also Towne, 997 F.2d at 548. Eliminating any doubt on this score, we held, in United States v. Grubbs, that “our prior cases unambiguously require officers to present any curative document … to the persons whose property is to be subjected to the search.” 377 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195 (2006).

However, the Supreme Court overruled our decision. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 98-99. The Court explained that “[t]he Constitution protects property owners not by giving them license to engage the police in a debate over the basis for the warrant, but by interposing, ex ante, the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer between the citizen and the police, and by providing, ex post, a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained and a cause of action for damages.” Id. at 99 (internal quotation and punctuation marks and citation omitted). Because the Supreme Court has rejected our previous position, SDI’s argument that the Fourth Amendment required the search team to provide all defendants a copy of the affidavit fails. We therefore conclude that the warrant did incorporate the affidavit.

The parole search here was justified by reasonable suspicion under Samson (if necessary). Defendant was a regular absconder. He also failed to put on any proof of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises where he was found. Evidence found resulted in a new case. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 2008 PA Super 294, 963 A.2d 545 (2008).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants for matching description of suspects shortly after crime report. Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 453, 898 N.E.2d 864 (2009)*:

In the case at bar, the judge found that the specific facts on which the detectives based the stop of the defendant were the broadcast received by the detectives, the proximity of the suspects to the scene of the crime, the minor lapse of time (three minutes) between the report of the crime and Lyons’s observation of the suspects, and the fact that one of the two suspects was wearing white Converse sneakers. In addition, and of great significance, was the fact that here, unlike the situation in Cheek, the judge found that the suspects were the only persons seen by the detectives “who generally fit the description given via the radio dispatch.” Viewing the circumstances as a whole, we agree with the motion judge that the stop was proper and the evidence secured therefrom admissible.

Consent that defendant contended was a result of coercive circumstances was rejected. On the totality, it was still consent. United States v. Harvell, 298 Fed. Appx. 227 (4th Cir. 2008)* (unpublished):

Harvell argues that her consent could not have been voluntary because the pat-down search in the [*3] parking lot was humiliating and degrading, that she suggested going into the bathroom to protect her privacy, and that her purported consent was simply the result of coercive circumstances. However, Harvell produced no evidence at the suppression hearing to counter the officers’ testimony that she consented to a search of her person in the parking lot and volunteered to go into the restaurant bathroom with Detective Robbins for a more extensive search, nor was there any evidence of coercion or intimidation by Turrentine or Robbins. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Harvell freely consented to the search, and in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant had no expectation of privacy in an inoperable vehicle parked in his mother’s driveway that he had no possessory interest in. United States v. Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90415 (D. S.C. November 6, 2008).*

OnStar® “panic button” call communicated to the police gave probable cause for a stop of a moving vehicle. When the officer got up to the vehicle, the license plate was obscured and that also justified a stop. When stopped, the driver was reaching under the seat. State v. Wilson, 2008 Ohio 2863, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2397 (5th Dist. June 6, 2008).

Officers had reasonable suspicion for a patdown of appellant when he was found in a house around the corner from where shots were fired and the gun was found. United States v. Bunkley, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12636 (11th Cir. June 13, 2008) (unpublished).*

Observing a controlled buy made reliance on the CI far less necessary in the affidavit for the search warrant. State v. Cummings, 983 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2008).*

The anonymous tip the officer received[, and therefore subject to particular skepticism], was substantially corroborated by the officer’s observations when he saw defendant. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 2008 PA Super 127, 951 A.2d 393 (2008).*

Private armed security guards in Virginia are heavily regulated by the state, and their arrests are accordingly not private action. United States v. Day, 590 F. Supp. 2d 796 (E.D. Va. December 1, 2008):

For the purposes of our analysis, it is enough to observe that the Virginia legislature specifically granted Officers Slader and Costa the power to arrest as armed security officers. These officers were vetted, trained, and continue to be subject to disciplinary action under the aegis of the state’s Criminal Justice Services Board. In this context, the state is not a mere passive participant; rather, it affirmatively encouraged and enabled these officers to engage in the complained-of conduct, for without their state-granted authority, these officers could not have acted as de facto police. In short, the state was the genesis of their power and activities rather than a mere passive recipient of the largess of their actions. Cf., e.g., United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992)(officers’ mere presence insufficient to turn privately initiated search into government conduct).

Clearly Officers Slader and Costa were operating as de facto police on the night in question. The officers were “patrolling” the area in their unmarked sedan (a car of sufficient similarity to the stereotypical image of an unmarked police car that a Chesterfield officer “assumed” it must be the security officers’ vehicle); noticing a potentially disorderly gathering in their rounds, the officers returned to this area, parking where they could observe the burgeoning situation. Observing a “verbal altercation” that escalated to Day’s retrieval of a gun from a nearby car, the officers exited their vehicle, drawing their weapons and yelling “freeze” as they ran towards Day. Both officers were wearing black uniforms with gold emblems on the sleeves, displaying a gold badge virtually identical to a police shield, and bearing handguns; in short, they were the quintessential image of law enforcement as they ran with weapons drawn towards Day. The officers placed Day in restraints, “terried” him, and began questioning him about the gun and whether he had “anything illegal” on his person. Clearly the officers acted with the intent of deterring crime and assisting law enforcement.

First encounter with driver from the passenger window revealed no criminality, and defendant should have been allowed to go. Instead, the officer re-approached the car for a second contact and ordered him to roll down the window, which he did, and he saw a crack pipe. The second encounter was unjustified, and the search suppressed. Greider v. State, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. App. 2d DCA 2008).*

Officer had cause to search when he smelled marijuana coming from the open window, and the defendant’s voice began quavering. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 491 (2008).*

Search of defendant’s purse was justified by officer’s fear of a weapon. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 N.W.2d 877 (2008).*

Officer had cause to arrest defendant after accident who admitted he was taking drugs but not what or why. Alonzo v. State, 251 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App. — Austin 2008).*

Defendant’s refusal to permit officer who felt a circular tin and asked what was in it to search could not form the basis of reasonable suspicion. State v. Foland, 224 Ore. App. 649, 199 P.3d 362 (2008):

A person’s reaction to a request for consent to search is not sufficient as a matter of law to support an objectively reasonable belief of criminal activity. As here, where a person has the right to refuse consent, the

“refusal to give consent to a search undoubtedly caused the officer to have a healthy suspicion that defendant was probably in illegal possession of something; but such a suspicion, however well founded, having been aroused merely on the basis of an assertion of one’s constitutional rights, can play no part in creating probable cause for a search.”

State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 338-39, 554 P2d 1014 (1976). We view defendant’s reaction to the inquiries concerning the patdown and the contents of the tin as “merely an unsophisticated attempt to assert his right of privacy.” Id. at 338. Defendant’s reaction to a request for consent that he is constitutionally entitled to refuse cannot form the basis of reasonable suspicion. To hold otherwise and “allow[ ] the police to use defendant’s assertion of a privacy right as the basis for depriving him of that right would render the promise of Article I, section 9, illusory.” State v. Brown, 110 Or App 604, 611-12, 825 P2d 282 (1992) (holding that defendant’s “excited and belligerent” demeanor and his action of grabbing his car keys was a clumsy effort to assert his right to the privacy of his cars and refuse consent and could not be a basis for reasonable grounds to believe the cars contained evidence of a parole violation).

AUSA was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of an overbroad search warrant in a fraud case. Slaey v. Adams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103903 (E.D. Va. December 23, 2008).*

Rental property inspection ordinance was constitutional because it provided for a warrant or consent, and there was no penalty for refusing consent. McLean v. City of Kingston, 2008 NY Slip Op 10088, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9810 (3d Dept. December 24, 2008).*

Defendant would have felt free to leave, so he was not detained coercively when he consented to a search of his car. United States v. Crossley, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 26335 (11th Cir. December 23, 2008) (unpublished)* (I’m not convinced.)

Officers had a search warrant for a two story building. The SWAT team came in, upstairs and down at the same time. Then they found out that it was two apartments which was not determinable by the appearance of the building or rooms. The downstairs apartment was the subject of the warrant, and those in the upstairs consented to a further search. Maryland v. Garrison, nearly on point from SCOTUS, was not cited. Herring‘s application of the exclusionary rule did not apply because the DEA knew that there were two apartments and they did not communicate it to the executing officers. Consent, however, justified the search after the mistake was found. United States v. Soria, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14273 (W.D. Wis. February 11, 2009):

The court cannot fault the JPD entry team or JPD searchers for mistakenly entering Apartment B because nobody told them that the warrant was limited to Apartment A on the first floor; further, there was no indication that morning that the upstairs actually was a separate residence.

But the court can fault the DEA, because at least some of its agents-but not those actually present on the scene-knew that there were two apartments at 253 High Street and that the search warrant was limited to the first floor apartment. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the limits of a warrant must be imputed to those who searched [*9] in reliance on it. See United States v. Whitaker, 546 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2008). The DEA’s failure properly to educate and supervise its search team to prevent unwarranted entry into a separate residence constitutes gross negligence, if not recklessness. Accordingly, Herring’s narrowing of the exclusionary rule cannot help the government in this case.

In a clear publicity stunt, the Sheriff’s Office in Elizabethton, TN unearthed an 80-1/2 year old arrest warrant in a storage area and sent it off to be served, oblivious to whether it has already been served. They admittedly don’t even know whether the warrant has already been served. Historical 80-year-old warrant provides blast from the past, posted Thursday, Feb. 25, 2009, in the Elizabethton, TN, Star.

An 80-year-old warrant was recently returned to the department from the Glynn County Sheriff’s Office in Brunswick, Ga., charging J.A. Rowland with violating the Tennessee bad check law on Aug. 13, 1928. The warrant is signed by Justice of the Peace R.T. Johnson and lists the amount of money owed by Rowland–$30 for the bad check, $2 for the arrest fee and 50 cents each for the affidavit and warrant.

. . .

The warrant was found buried in a records storage room at the Glynn County Sheriff’s Office during a cleaning exercise and mailed to the CCSD for its historical significance.

Information detailing whether Rowland was ever arrested or paid the $33 is not provided with the aging papers, but current Sheriff Chris Mathes said legally, he is still under obligation to find him.

So, under Herring, assuming they can find centenarian Mr. Rowland, handcuffing the desperado they believe he is (“Apparently, Rowland’s life of crime began when he passed the bad check [in 1928], ….”), and taking him to jail, the exclusionary rule would not apply to Mr. Rowland’s search incident. (Not that they would find anything, but what about the indignity to him?) Maybe then they will check on whether the warrant was ever served, rather than now, before it is served. Under Herring, do they even have to?

That wouldn’t be as much fun, or worth the press. Imagine the lawsuit against the Sheriff it if the warrant turns out to have been already served. What about strip searching the old man when he is booked in?

Stopping defendant a few blocks away from the residence to be searched was valid under Summers, even though in Summers the defendant detained was coming down the front steps. A marked police car was needed for the stop, and it took awhile to show up. United States v. Whitley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12582 (E.D. Mich. February 19, 2009):

Like the situations seen in Cochran, Head and Yates, the officers in this case stopped and detained Whitley as soon as was practicable after he departed the Residence. The Officers at the scene when Whitley left the residence did not have a marked patrol car there and therefore radioed for a marked patrol car to make the stop. Officer Colosky testified that, after seeing Whitley leave the Residence, the officers decided to stop Whitley a few streets away from the Residence, so that the stop would be out of the view of any remaining occupants of the Residence. Whitley’s car was therefore followed for a few blocks before he was stopped by the marked patrol car. The Court therefore rejects Whitley’s argument that Summers does not apply because the vehicle was stopped a few blocks away from the Residence.

U.S. v. SDI Future Health, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 2009), posted here, applied: If the affidavit is referred to and around, it need not be attached. Also under SDI, the warrant was sufficiently particular. United States v. Akpan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12656 (D. Nev. February 12, 2009).*

Defendant was delivering bananas on a pallet as a cover for cocaine, and he lacked requisite control over the bananas as a mere deliveryman to claim standing. United States v. Arias, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12579 (D. Conn. February 18, 2009).*

There was no reason shown to revisit the prior decision denying the motion to suppress. Caver v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12435 (N.D. Ohio February 9, 2009).*

Where defendant could not prevail on the search claim, defense counsel could not be ineffective. United States v. Marutz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12219 (E.D. Cal. February 3, 2009).* See also United States v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12445 (N.D. Ill. February 18, 2009).*

Scrap metal business under Mississippi law is a closely regulated business where the buyer of scrap is required to gather information from sellers and turn over the information on reasonable demand from law enforcement. The likelihood of success of plaintiff’s suit on the merits is not good. Metal Management of Mississippi v. Barbour, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10716 (S.D. Miss. August 13, 2008):

The defendant further notes that scrap metal businesses such as the plaintiff’s are closely regulated under the new Act, as well as the prior law. Closely regulated businesses are characterized by licensing, registration, maintenance of records, and criminal penalties. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703-04; Peterman, 764 F.2d at 1421. Furthermore, says defendant, reducing metal theft crime, protecting theft victims, and recovering stolen goods from scrap dealers all constitute substantial governmental interests, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Burger test. Id. Secondly, says defendant, warrantless inspections are necessary in this instance in order to deter and detect crime. Thirdly, says defendant, the government’s discretion is limited to searching only records and inventory during customary business hours. Moreover, the new Act limits the scope of inspection to mandatory records and inventory on premises.

Based on the foregoing, this court is not persuaded that the plaintiff has shown likelihood of success on its Fourth Amendment argument. At this juncture of the lawsuit, this court is persuaded that the new Act meets the constitutional standards set forth in New York v. Burger and that no basis for granting injunctive relief on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim has been substantiated.

The Tulsa airport is the first in the nation with only backscatter body scanners that can see you under your clothes. The Tulsa World noted it was received “without complaint” by travelers. From Gadling:

It was only a matter of time – the first airport in the nation has switched to full body scanners as a replacement for the usual metal detector at the checkpoint.

The scanners use electromagnetic waves to create an image of you – sans clothes. The image is viewed by a TSA agent in a nearby room, which should at least mean you don’t hear their chuckles as you pass through the scanner.

A TSA screener who operates the machine reported that the images “are not pornographic at all”, and that she merely sees them as “a thing that could have something on it”.

But make no mistake – the 3D images will show all your parts to the screener, right down to the size of your breasts and genitals.

The trial aims to determine whether the full body scanners can be a true replacement for metal detectors, and whether the use of the scanners increases, or decreases efficiency at the checkpoint.

During the first day of operation, only 2 out of 1039 passengers declined to use the scanner. Of course, this could simply be because the general public is not fully aware what these new machines are, and just what the images reveal.

Are travelers becoming the frog in the heating water such that they would rather travel unimpeded than be seen naked by a TSA screener?

Previous posts about backscatter technology are here (airports), here (portable machine at border), and here (prison use).

Nearly two years ago, officers pled guilty in the botched Atlanta drug raid that led to the death of Kathryn Johnston. Sentencing approaches and Ex-cops apologize for deadly drug raid ahead of sentencing. Proceedings continue today. From CNN.com which paints an ugly picture of false affidavits for search warrants:

Smith, Junnier and Tesler pleaded guilty to federal charges of conspiracy to violate civil rights resulting in death. Smith and Junnier also pleaded guilty to state charges of voluntary manslaughter and making false statements, and Smith admitted to planting bags of marijuana in Johnston’s house after her death.

Tesler was convicted on one state count of making false statements for filling out an affidavit stating that an informant had purchased crack cocaine at Johnston’s home in a crime-plagued neighborhood near downtown Atlanta. The informant denied having been to Johnston’s home, leading to investigations by local authorities and the FBI, and the breakup and reorganization of the Atlanta police narcotics unit.

Police said Johnston fired at them with an old pistol during the raid, and they shot back in self-defense. Johnston’s one shot went through her front door and over the officers’ heads; they responded with 39 shots, hitting Johnston five times.

“Her death was the foreseeable culmination of a long-standing conspiracy in which the officers violated their oaths of office,” Assistant U.S. Attorney Jon-Peter Kelly said, according to CNN affiliate WSB. The officers “regularly swore falsely” to get warrants and make cases, he said.

Federal prosecutors said officers cut corners to make more time for lucrative side jobs providing additional security to businesses, often while on duty and for cash payments.

From a reader: The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office plans to draw blood from DUI suspects who refuse a breath test at checkpoint stops. PBSO Plans To Draw Blood At DUI Checkpoints.

PBSO deputies plan to set up driving under the influence checkpoints. If they suspect a driver is under the influence, they’ll offer an on-the-spot Breathalyzer. If drivers refuse, deputies will ask to draw blood from their arms.

Officers plan on having a judge on stand by to get a warrant for blood.

Attorney David Olson said that “would only be lawful if a warrant is issued by a judge.”

That’s just what deputies plan to do. They’ll actually drive to a judge’s home for a signature and return to the checkpoint.

Olson said drawing blood from drivers is usually done in extreme cases like homicides and fatal collisions. Olson said he’s not sure a judge would actually sign a warrant.

“I admire and respect the sheriff’s intention to investigate driving under the influence cases, but I am glad that they apparently are going to go to judges before they independently exercise what they believe would be a valuable tool in conducting these kinds of investigations,” Olson said.

This elevates “checkpoints” to a new level.

The state right to warnings before a consent entry of a home does not apply to a shed near the home. State v. Overholt, 147 Wn. App. 92, 193 P.3d 1100 (2008).*

Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not apply at suppression hearings. State v. Rivera, 2008 NMSC 56, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.3d 1213 (2008).*

While the issue was close, the court finds reasonable suspicion from an informant’s tip because it showed first hand knowledge without an apparent motive to lie. United States v. William, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81295 (D. V.I. October 10, 2008).*

Search of defendant’s wallet was justified as either search incident or inventory of the wallet when defendant was in custody. The police had reason to look in the wallet for specific evidence related to the victim’s disappearance. State v. Saiz, 2008 NMSC 48, 144 N.M. 663, 191 P.3d 521 (2008).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion for detention of a rental car that was five days overdue 1500 miles from where it was to be turned in, contradictory travel plans, and a drug history. State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008).*

Citizen’s tip defendant was likely intoxicated was corroborated by officer’s observations of defendant’s driving and that justified the stop. Keenan v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 6474 (Tex. App.–-Texarkana August 15, 2008).*