NYT Editorial: GPS Tracking and Secret Policies:

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After an illegal search produced evidence of suborning perjury, there was no reason for the exclusionary rule to apply because there was nothing to deter. Also, there was no objection at trial, so the plain error rule applies. Essentially, subsequent criminality after a Fourth Amendment violation won’t be suppressed because the deterrence rationale does not apply. (This is the D.C. court’s first time to deal with the subsequent criminality issue.) Silver v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 500 (August 15, 2013):

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Officers unlawfully entered the apartment to seize it while getting a search warrant. Therefore, the observations made should not have been included in the search warrant application. Excluding those observations still left probable cause. “Because a valid search warrant would have issued regardless of the inclusion of the tainted information discovered during the initial entry into the apartment, there was an independent source for the challenged evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 990 N.E.2d 528 (2013).

The strong odor of marijuana coming from the car when the window was rolled down implicated the driver and passenger and was probable cause. People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 110857, 990 N.E.2d 916 (2013).*

“In photographing defendant’s shoes and clothing for criminal investigative purposes [six months after seizure] and in ultimately retaining those items as evidence, Doble exceeded the scope of a lawful inventory and effectuated an unlawful warrantless search and seizure.” State v. Lovaina-Burmudez, 257 Ore. App. 1, 303 P.3d 988 (2013).*

Threat to arrest if defendant didn’t consent to a search did not lead to involuntary consent where there was probable cause to arrest. People v. Walton, 2013 IL App (3d) 110630, 990 N.E.2d 861 (2013).

Officers observed what appeared to be a drug deal go down between the driver of a car had nothing more than the passenger’s presence in the car, which the court finds is not reason to search her under the state constitution. State v. Kingsmith, 256 Ore. App. 762, 302 P.3d 471 (2013).*

While a motion to suppress has to consider only the information before the magistrate on the “four corners” of the affidavit, that does not prohibit the magistrate from asking questions of the affiant before the warrant issues. Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180 (Pa. 2013).*

Reason.com: Cop Records Police Chief Pushing Ticket Quotas, Boasting About Always Finding a Reason to Stop Someone by Ed Krayewski:

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Slate: New Research Supports the Notion That There’s No Such Thing as a “Consensual” Police Encounter by Justin Peters:

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Forbes: NSA, DEA, IRS Lie About Fact That Americans Are Routinely Spied On By Our Government: Time For A Special Prosecutor by Jennifer Stisa Granick and Christopher:

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NYT: N.S.A. Often Broke Rules on Privacy, Audit Shows by Charlie Savage:

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Dog sniff invalid because stop was unreasonably extended to conduct it. Defendant’s DL and paperwork had been returned. State v. House, 2012AP2414-CR (August 14, 2013):

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Noting a conflict in the circuits, this court holds that an unauthorized driver of a rented car can’t show standing. United States v. O’Hara, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114201 (D. Nev. May 20, 2013)*:

In this case, it is uncontroverted that Emily Samples, the renter of the vehicle, was not present during the stop. She was Sean Deaver’s girlfriend. Deaver was one of the occupants of the vehicle when the officers responded to this call. Deaver was not given the keys and there is no testimony that he had permission to use the rental car from Samples. In fact, he was not aware, until police recovered the keys from the car, that they had been left in the vehicle. O’Hara has not established that he has standing to directly challenge the search of the rental car. However, the court finds O’Hara has standing to challenge his initial detention and subsequent arrest, and to seek suppression under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

Defendant, a Thai national here since 2009 on a permanent resident visa worked the counter at a 7-Eleven in Ft. Myers. A woman saw child pornography on his computer and reported him to the police. They came to his work to talk to him, and he consented to a search of his computer. The only contention was that he didn’t understand enough English to validly consent. Testimony at the suppression hearing was conflicting, but the court credited that defendant understood the conversation with the officers and consented to the search of his apartment and computer. Even if the consent was tainted and excluded, the police had probable cause for the search warrant excising that information. United States v. Srisanthia, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84761 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2013).*

Consent was recorded, and was requested and not demanded. It was voluntary. The fact he “was not feeling well” does not undermine consent. State v. Davis, 2013 NMSC 028, 304 P.3d 10 (2013).*

A search warrant for firearms and its accessories permitted a search of a duffle bag. State v. Bentley, 116 So. 3d 891 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was on a bicycle and committed a misdemeanor offense for which he was arrested. His search incident to that arrest was valid. The state’s alternative argument was not made in the trial court, so it is rejected as waived. State v. Butler, 2013 La. LEXIS 1147 (La. May 17, 2013).*

The smell of marijuana coming from defendant’s car justified handcuffing him without escalating the stop into an arrest. “ To show that an investigatory detention involving the use of handcuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry stop, the State must show some fact or circumstance that could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of restraints was necessary to carry out the legitimate purpose of the stop without exposing the law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself to an undue risk of harm.” State v. Turner, 2013 La. App. LEXIS 980 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 16, 2013).*

An anonymous phoned-in tip of a drunk driver is treated different than other anonymous tips because officers usually confirm facts before making a stop. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 2013):

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Police reliance on a prosecutor’s legal advice on probable cause to arrest is entitled to qualified immunity. Fiore v. City of Bethlehem, 510 Fed. Appx. 215 (3d Cir. 2013).*

In this § 1983 false arrest case, defendants did not violate plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by arrest and seizure of a car for a hit-and-run where the car well matched the description given by the victims. There was probable cause. Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s truck was illegally parked near the visitor center of Yosemite National Park, and a park ranger approached to get defendant to move it. The smell of marijuana coming from the truck was probable cause more might be found in the truck. United States v. Parker, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2013).*

The trial court did not err in concluding that a “dap” (first bump) was potentially really a hand-to-hand transaction for reasonable suspicion purposes for a stop. State v. Ulmer, 114 So. 3d 1274 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013).

It was reasonable to remove defendant’s hands from his pockets. “Although both officers stated that they never actually observed a weapon or a bulge other than the Defendant’s hands, Detective Martin testified that he suspected the Defendant was armed because of the manner in which his hands were tucked into his pockets and because of his continued refusal to remove his hands.” State v. Chaplain, 2013 La. App. LEXIS 1073 (La. App. 4 Cir. May 29, 2013).*

Furtive movements toward purse justified frisk. State v. Smith, 2013 Ohio 2208, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2136 (1st Dist. May 31, 2013).*

Defendant claimed that his motel room was searched without a warrant, but there was a warrant, and it wasn’t challenged. United States v. Balde, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78336 (E.D. N.C. June 4, 2013).*

WSJ: Noonan: What We Lose if We Give Up Privacy | A civil libertarian reflects on the dangers of the surveillance state. By Peggy Noonan:

What is privacy? Why should we want to hold onto it? Why is it important, necessary, precious?

Is it just some prissy relic of the pretechnological past?

NLJ: Defense Lawyer Challenges Subpoena of his Bank Records by Sheri Qualters:

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“A decision regarding whether to file a motion to suppress is a tactical decision, for which greater deference is given to trial counsel’s skill and experience.” A 2255 petitioner also has to show that the motion would be successful, and here he can’t. Brown v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114825 (N.D. W.Va. May 30, 2013). [So true on tactics, as a general proposition. I’ve waived good motions to suppress because we were better off with the evidence coming in. It all depends on the case.]

A probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy, and it doesn’t matter that the police officers involved don’t know he’s a probationer at the time. United States v. Baker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114412 (M.D. Ga. August 14, 2013).

Slight inaccuracy in the color of a vehicle wanted for a “man with a gun” report did not make the stop invalid. Greater inaccuracies have survived in case law before. United States v. Atkins, 513 Fed. Appx. 577 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Nexus to gun in house for a search warrant was shown from the officer’s knowledge of defendant’s keeping gun in car, and the general knowledge of the utility of guns. United States v. Pando, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14602 (W.D. Okla. February 4, 2013).*

Smell of burned and raw marijuana coming from a car is probable cause to search the trunk. Jones v. State, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 42 (February 5, 2013).*

LA Weekly: Federal Judge Awards Lancaster Man $3.8 million for L.A. Sheriff’s Deputies’ Use of Excessive Force by Patrick Range McDonald:

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