The description of the place to be searched was slightly off, but the officer who prepared the affidavit was there and the right house was searched per the “four corners” of the affidavit. This is not a case where the wrong house was searched: there “was no reasonable probability that the officers would search any place other than the intended house.” Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), rev’g Bonds v. State, 355 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2011).

One officer observed defendant committing a gross misdemeanor of loitering for drugs, and he radioed to another to make the arrest. The one arresting did not observed the crime, and the arrest was invalid under state law. State v. Ortega, 171 Wn.2d 116, 297 P.3d 57 (2013).*

Not signaling a left turn when already in a “left turn only” lane is still a traffic offense justifying a stop. Commonwealth v. Brown, 2013 PA Super 60, 64 A.3d 1101 (2013).*

There was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, so the police couldn’t be sued for false arrest. The police don’t have to put in the affidavit for arrest and search warrant everything in the investigation. Their unreasonable search claim of unnecessary destruction of property fails for not being specific enough. Badillo v. Stopko, 519 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2013):

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The juvenile left the school grounds and went to his truck across the street and came back to the school. He was searched when he came back on the school grounds, and nothing was found. School officials then searched his truck across the street. That search exceeded their authority, and drug paraphernalia was found. The student’s 19 day suspension was reversed (already served) and ordered purged from his record. J.P. v. Mlllard Pub. Schs, 285 Neb. 890, 830 N.W.2d 453 (2013).

Defendant’s stop was not prolonged to get consent, particularly because defendant consented within about four minutes of the stop. Powell v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 322, 2013 Ark. App. LEXIS 335 (May 15, 2013).*

The district court disbelieved that defendant effectively withdrew his consent to search his computer for child pornography. The evidence supports that. United States v. Schaefer, 519 Fed. Appx. 71 (2d Cir. 2013).*

The claim of inventory fails because of possible standing. The vehicle was impounded because it could not be determined who the owner was, and defendant had three names he was using. United States v. Akinlade, 519 Fed. Appx. 529 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant validly consented to a search of his house. A consent is not involuntary just because the police tell the defendant that they will get a search warrant if he doesn’t consent when they have probable cause. United States v. Aguilar, 519 Fed. Appx. 541 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant consented to a search of his truck [with no more findings of fact]. United States v. Molina, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72160 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2013).*

In this anticipatory search warrant case, the package of drugs was on a “sure course” to defendant’s hands [as used in pre-Grubbs] cases, and the triggering event was specified in the warrant, so the search is valid. United States v. Barnett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72365 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2013).*

Defendant’s intoxicated rocking back and forth did not give any reasonable justification or suspicion for a frisk. No words or hand movement suggested he was armed, so his handgun is suppressed. Robinson v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 643 (September 26, 2013):

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“[W]e conclude that there existed such a nexus, which was created by law enforcement officers’ personal observation of the Defendant exiting and freely reentering the residence before and after the drug sale.” State v. Boone, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 489 (June 10, 2013)* (concurrence).

Defendant denied ownership or a privacy interest in 40 boxes in a truck that were found to contain marijuana. He was held to have no standing as a mere bailee of the boxes, and the issue wasn’t appealed. “Defendant has not shown how [defense counsel] could have argued the issue differently, or that if he had done so, the result would have been different. Likewise, defendant has not shown that [defense counsel’s] performance was deficient for failing to raise the issue on appeal or that if she had done so, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Robles, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81736 (D. Kan. June 11, 2013).*

Defendant was a suspect in a home invasion and he fled to his apartment. Police had probable cause to arrest, and the entry in hot pursuit was valid. Ahmed v. State, 322 Ga. App. 154, 744 S.E.2d 345 (2013).*

Defendant was behaving bizarrely in jail, so he was examined in the mental health section of the jail. He had a much diminished expectation of privacy in those records. When he filed a NGBRI defense, he waived it all. There was no Fourth Amendment violation by getting the records. Armstead v. State, 293 Ga. 243, 744 S.E.2d 774 (2013).

The officers had reasonable suspicion the defendant was patronizing a prostitute when they approached his car and talked to him. He was still free to leave when he was talking to them. Holmes v. State, 293 Ga. 229, 744 S.E.2d 701 (2013).*

Defendant’s stop was based on a concededly valid window tint violation, so his subjective intent to find drugs was irrelevant. The trial court’s findings the stop was not stalled were supported by the record. Walker v. State, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 478 (June 12, 2013).*

The traffic stop here was valid, and consent was obtained during the normal time of the stop. Defense counsel was not ineffective because any other ground of a motion to suppress would have been futile. Betancourt v. State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 744 S.E.2d 419 (2013).*

A search warrant for child pornography on the premises permitted a search of a digital camera found there. State v. Gurule, 2013-NMSC-025, 303 P.3d 838 (2013), revg State v. Gurule, 150 N.M. 49, 256 P.3d 992 (2011), posted here.

Defendant was clearly in custody for Fourth Amendment purposes, arrested on outstanding warrants, when he was interrogated without Mirandizing him. United States v. Andrade, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84728 (D. Nev. May 3, 2013).*

Officers surveilling a drug house watched a car leave, and they pulled it over when traffic offenses were committed. The officer could immediately smell methamphetamine when the window was rolled down. That was probable cause to search the vehicle. Instead, the officer called a drug dog which took 50 minutes to get there. Because there was probable cause, the delay was not unreasonable. Westmoreland v. State, 322 Ga. App. 299, 744 S.E.2d 822 (2013).*

The FBI told defendant she might as well consent because New Hampshire Probation and Parole was going to order a search anyway (and did). Was this a reasonable mistake of fact that the good faith exception will overlook? Regretfully, an inadequate record was made on all of this, so the court orders a remand. United States v. Vázquez, 724 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2013):

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AOL: Officer Suspended For One Day For Invasive Search; No drugs were found:

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BBC: FBI drone use prompts calls for new surveillance rules:

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HuffPo: DOJ Spent Millions On Drones Despite ‘Uncoordinated’ Policy by Ryan J. Reilly:

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AP: Use of drones prompts privacy concerns in Okla. by Sean Murphy

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BLT: Privacy Board Set to Assess Surveillance Court, Patriot Act:

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Legal Times: Senate Considers Changes to Surveillance Law by Alex Zank:

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An officer had a tip of a DUI driving on a resort parking lot, and he saw the driver go into a condo. He went to the door and said “I need to talk to the person that just ran in.” The entry was by consent. State v. Briggs, 257 Ore. App. 738, 307 P.3d 564 (2013):

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A “bra lift” search at school without any individualized suspicion was unreasonable. The entire school was going through a shakedown for drugs. [The court also cites numerous cases disapproving of strip searches at school without individualized suspicion.] In re T.A.S., 713 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. App. 2011), Vacated by, Remanded by In re T.A.S., 366 N.C. 269, 732 S.E.2d 575 (2012):

Where the blanket search of the entire school lacked any individualized suspicion as to which students were responsible for the alleged infraction or any particularized reason to believe the contraband sought presented an imminent threat to school safety, the search of T.A.S.’s bra was constitutionally unreasonable and we reverse the trial court’s order denying her suppression motion.

. . .

While certain aspects of the search here may have been reasonable based on the general suspicion that pills were coming into the school—possibly by concealment in some students’ undergarments—the search of T.A.S.’s bra, without individualized grounds for suspecting that she had the pills on her person, was excessively intrusive. Once the search extended to such intimate places, the generalized suspicion upon which the trial court relied was no longer sufficient to justify the heightened intrusion. Thus, in light of T.L.O. and Redding, the search was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The exclusionary rule does not apply to state termination proceedings, assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, which here there wasn’t. California Science Center v. State Personnel Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 765 (2d Dist. 2013):

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In seven consolidated cases, the court concluded that the blood draw in each case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. All the defendants chose to have a blood test. In each case, a police officer witnessed blood draws performed by a person the officer believed to be a trained phlebotomist or blood technician. None of the defendants exhibited any signs of pain or discomfort during the blood draw procedure; indeed, the testimony reflected these were routine blood draws consistent either with the officer’s own experience of having blood drawn or with the officer’s observation of other arrestee blood draws. Moreover, the testimony reflected the blood draws were conducted in a cooperative manner, utilizing needles from sealed packages and ensuring the blood extraction area was cleaned prior to inserting the needle and cleaned and bandaged after the blood was drawn. Under the totality of the circumstances presented, in each case the officer’s un-rebutted testimony showed the blood draw did not expose the defendant to an unjustified element of personal risk of infection or pain. People v. Cuevas, 218 Cal. App. 4th 1278, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (1st Dist. 2013).