Getting a new attorney who saw the suppression issue differently is not a ground to reopen the suppression hearing. Defendant may be able to show it if he alleges and attempts to show IAC in the suppression hearing. Here, defendant was found to have consented. United States v. Holland, 522 Fed. Appx. 265 (6th Cir. 2013):

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Defendant did not have standing to challenge placement of a GPS device on three cars that were not his that he occasionally drove during the conspiracy. United States v. Houseal, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152974 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2013).*

Seeing a gun partially concealed under a toolbox in a vehicle was probable cause to arrest for a concealed weapon. Vega v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 463 (October 24, 2013).*

Defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress would not be dealt with on direct appeal because the record is inadequate. Barber v. State, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 701 (October 22, 2013).*

The Hill: Civil liberties groups back secure email service in surveillance case by Kate Tummarello:

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The roadblock in this case was set up for valid DUI interdiction purposes and not general crime control. However, there was no supervisory planning as to where it was placed and operated, and that made it unconstitutional. Brown v. State, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 862 (October 21, 2013), rev’g State v. Brown, 315 Ga. App. 154, 726 S.E.2d 654 (2012):

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Officers came to defendant’s house after a cell phone stolen the day before was indicating it was in the house. They used the ruse they were looking for a pedophile to get into the house. The court finds the ruse to be extreme and exploitive and suppresses the entry. Redmond v. State, 213 Md. App. 163, 73 A.3d 385 (2013):

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Routine questioning on the roadside is not subject to Miranda. People v Brown, 2013 NY Slip Op 4850, 107 A.D.3d 1305 (3d Dept. June 27, 2013).

Defendant was stopped for speeding and several other traffic violations on a non-street legal motorcycle, and he undertook to shout at the police he was not going to jail and knew his rights. He was wearing a “full face mask” and wouldn’t keep his hands out of his pockets, and that justified his handcuffing. State v. Lewis, 121 So. 3d 128 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).*

The CI’s information was detailed and reliable and provided probable cause. He’d done it before, and this one had great detail which was said to have derived from personal observation of defendant with the drugs. State v. Allen, 118 So. 3d 514 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2013).*

The search warrant listed “39 Twin Oaks” within the “Twin Oaks Terraces” without specifying a city or town within the county. It described a “second building” as being the place to be searched which was not searched. At the suppression hearing, the executing officers testified, not the affiant. “The government argues that the ‘39 Twin Oaks’ within the ‘Twin Oaks Terraces’ is a unique address and contends that Defendant has failed to identify any other address with which it could be confused. However, the government presented no evidence to support a conclusion that the address is, in fact, unique. Instead, it makes this unsupported allegation in its Opposition.” That’s not evidence. This is a close call because this could be curable, but then it turns out that the place to be searched was otherwise misidentified, too, so the motion to suppress is granted. The good faith exception did not apply. United States v. Battle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152689 (D. Vt. October 24, 2013):

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In a civil software copyright infringement case, the U.S. District Court for Idaho issued a TRO authorized seizure of a computer of a self-identified “hacker” for a private search where he publicly proclaimed that he was going to release a knock-off infringing program. The burden to get a TRO is high, and the burden to authorize ex parte seizure of a computer is extraordinary, but the plaintiffs met the burden here. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC v. Southfork Security, Inc., 4:13-cv-00442-BLW (D. Idaho October 15, 2013):

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Motherboard: Why the DEA Stopped Testing Cash for Coke by Brian Anderson:

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HuffPo: How A Drug Raid Gone Wrong Sparked A Call For Change In The Unlikeliest State In The Nation by Radley Balko:

This article is the first in a six-part series about the drug war and police reform.

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A CI apparently busted for marijuana took the police to defendant’s house as his source, and the officers did a knock and talk there, which was valid. Using the carport door was not unreasonable because officers saw people going to that door. United States v. Pryor, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151796 (W.D. La. September 17, 2013):

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Defendant was allegedly illegally parked and confronted by the officer. About the only thing wrong was that he put his hands in his pockets and took them out when told. The officer saw defendant empty a cigar, which he took as removing the marijuana from it. Still, there was nothing to show that defendant was involved in drug distribution, and a patdown was unjustified. United States v. Turner, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151380 (D. Kan. October 21, 2013):

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An alert from Atlanta’s automatic license plate recognition (LPR) system that the owner of a car had an arrest warrant justifies a stop. Defendant was found to have consented thereafter. Rodriguez v. State, 321 Ga. App. 619, 746 S.E.2d 366 (2013).

Officers had an anonymous complaint that people were smoking marijuana in an apartment, so they [apparently having nothing better do to with their time] decided to do a knock-and-talk. When the door was opened, a cloud of marijuana smoke came out. The police entered and found marijuana on the coffee table. The trial court suppressed because it clearly didn’t like knock-and-talks, but the procedure is clearly constitutional. State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 742 S.E.2d 149 (2013).*

The adult half-sister of a mute and autistic girl who was suspected of being sexually abused by her grandfather had vicarious and implied authority to plant a video recorder in the bedroom to record the girl’s interaction with others. Defendant clearly had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom he was using for Fourth Amendment purposes [not that this is anything but a private search; for REP is important for the eavesdropping statute] but vicarious consent is recognized under the eavesdropping statute. Commonwealth v. F.W., 465 Mass. 1, 986 N.E.2d 868 (2013).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that a UA could be seized but not searched. That’s illogical. Also, there was a search authorization. United States v. Sharpton, 72 M.J. 777 (A.F.C.C.A. 2013).*

There were four mistakes in the affidavit because of scrivener’s errors, and the government conceded them. If the information was correct, there still would have been probable cause, so the Franks claim is denied. United States v. Patton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131691 (D. Or. September 16, 2013).*

2255 claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not raising racial profiling fails because the undisputed evidence is that the officer followed defendant because he was known to be a drug dealer on supervised release. United States v. Mathis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131559 (W.D. Pa. September 16, 2013).*

A § 1983 case over a search cannot be based on a violation of state law alone. The claim that the judge did not read the search warrant affidavit is speculative without more, aside from the question of judicial immunity for signing a search warrant. Avery v. Kratz, 522 Fed. Appx. 361 (7th Cir. 2013).

Defendant was under investigation starting in October 2009 for obtaining child pornography via a peer to peer network. Months later, a state subpoena was used to get subscriber information, allegedly in violation of state law. Months after that, defendant was stopped and consented to a search for drugs. The officer involved in that stop knew nothing of the CP investigation. Defendant consented to a computer search for drug transaction evidence, and the officer stumbled on the CP, shut the computer down, and acquired a search warrant. The search of the computer is similar to and governed by United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’d in part on other grounds, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The alleged violation of state law in the issuance of the subpoena does not govern the Fourth Amendment analysis, and it was done reasonably. United States v. Suing, 712 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 2013).*

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Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer from police accessing it via Limewire when he was hooked up to the Internet. He did not create an expectation of privacy from his efforts to hide files on his computer. Warshak has no application to this situation. United States v. Conner, 521 Fed. Appx. 493 (6th Cir. 2013):

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Indiana requires a warrant to seize evidence from property in safekeeping when a defendant is awaiting trial. Seizure of DNA from defendant’s shoe when he was in custody in violation of the Indiana Constitution was harmless error where the state put on four witnesses that defendant admitted murder by a baseball bat. Guilmette v. State, 986 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. App. 2013).*

State officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for violation of an order of protection based on statements from the protectees. That supported the finding of the red dye stained money on his person that linked him to a bank robbery. United States v. Douglas, 522 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s stepson had authority to consent to a search of a shed for weapons where he kept his own there and had a key. The consent was not coerced because he was told he did not have to talk to the police. United States v. Ervin, 517 Fed. Appx. 734, 2013-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,288, 111 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1717 (11th Cir. 2013).*

In a case of destruction of a building without notice, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness claim parallels the Fourteenth Amendment claim. The jury instructions were erroneous because they allowed the jury to find a Fourth Amendment violation only if an emergency justified tearing down the building. RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio, 713 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2013).*

One defendant’s patdown was unreasonable because it was done without reasonable suspicion as soon as he got out of the car. He was completely cooperative, but subject to a routine patdown. His codefendant doesn’t have standing to challenge the search of his person. People v. Lewis, 2013 V.I. LEXIS 42 (V.I. Super. Ct. June 18, 2013).*

The manager of a motel had authority to consent to search of a storage room where the key was kept at the font desk. United States v. Perez, 522 Fed. Appx. 674 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. He was asked for permission to precede at every juncture. He was in a small room at his house, but that was the only private place, and there was no intimidation. United States v. Bohlen, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88992 (D. Neb. June 25, 2013).*

Petitioner had a tribal ID and no DL and said he was not subject to the jurisdiction of any nontribal officers (facts sound like he was claiming to be a sovereign American Indian citizen). His case in federal court essentially was an effort to block the state courts from deciding his criminal case over his arrest, and that violates the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. In re Hall, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89375 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2013).

Arguing consent only in the district court does not include attenuation of the consent. Here, police entry was justified because defendant’s co-conspirators were being arrested. They entered when somebody saw them and ran from the door. Even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, there was consent and it was attenuated. This defendant, however, was arrested outside and brought in. United States v. Moreno-Ortega, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13194 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Plaintiff teacher was arrested for sexual offenses involving students. A state grand jury didn’t indict him, and he sued everybody involved, including the students. The fact that some of the things alleged against him couldn’t be proved under state law, a given because of age, for instance, didn’t undermine the probable cause for arrest for something. Summary judgment properly granted. Gonzalez v. Butts County, 522 Fed. Appx. 742 (11th Cir. 2013).*

Police came in the house for an arrest, but they had to wait for an interpreter and left people handcuffed until then. The officer-interpreter Mirandized defendant, and he consented to a search of only the rooms he occupied. The limited nature of the consent suggests that defendant was not coerced. One defendant’s argument was limited: “Garfias-Garcia did not clearly articulate a tainted consent or attenuation argument below.” United States v. Moreno-Ortega, 522 Fed. Appx. 729 (11th Cir. 2013).

Defendant was sitting at a slot machine feeding in red dyed money, obviously from a bank robbery, and casino personnel saw him and reported him to security which also watched. When one of his bills jammed the machine, he sought assistance. Security arrested him and took him to an interview room. Defendant was admittedly laundering money and has a prior for bank robbery, so his version gets no credibility. Even if he did, there was clearly reasonable suspicion to detain him and then arrest him. The search of the backpack was incident to arrest. United States v. Hill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90972 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2013).*

Defense counsel didn’t file a motion to suppress defendant’s search, but defendant on his 2255 can’t show that it would have prevailed. There clearly were exigent circumstances for the entry of his place for manufacturing methamphetamine. Noriega-Valenzuela v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90718 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2013).*