NYLJ: Plaintiffs Say Stop-and-Frisk Panel Should Be Replaced by Mark Hamblett:

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Reasonable suspicion for continuing a stop. United States v. Juarez-Moreno, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160650 (D. Utah October 16, 2013)*:

1. Recent Vehicle Registration. …
2. Third-PartyVehicle Registration. …
3. Lack of Knowledge of Vehicle Owner. …
4. Vague, Inconsistent, or Evasive Answers. …
5. Deceptive answers. …
6. Other Indicators. Trooper Wood noted a single key in the ignition, rather than on a key ring with other keys, suggesting the vehicle may have been purchased or used for illegal activity. … Trooper Wood also took note of luggage on the rear seat of the car—rather than in the trunk as is generally the case for the motoring public—a circumstance he has observed in other pipeline stops. … Trooper Wood has observed these same indicators during other pipeline stops. … And, while of limited significance, such indicators nevertheless support a finding of reasonable suspicion to briefly detain the defendant for further investigation.

Reasonable suspicion near the border for an immigration stop: United States v. Russell, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158945 (D. Ariz. September 17, 2013)*, adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158946 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2013)*:

The factors relied upon by Agent Cordova in this case were as follows: sensor activity showed vehicle traffic in an area commonly used by alien and drug traffickers to circumvent the border patrol check point; the area where the senor was located was a desolate area, accessible only by a dirt road; the car was relatively clean indicating that it had recently been on a paved highway; Defendant’s car was the only one seen coming out of the area; the car was registered to a woman in Phoenix and was not a car that was familiar to the agent as belonging to one of the locals; and the car was riding low as if it was carrying a heavy load.

Defendant’s car was stopped because it was speeding in a high crime area at night, and, when the police car was seen, it jerked back into its lane. When the car was stopped, defendant fled from the car. That was all reasonable suspicion. United States v. Edmonds, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160773 (W.D. Pa. November 12, 2013).*

Defendant was not on the rental agreement for a rented car as an authorized driver. His mother rented the car. Her prior arrangements with him to let him drive the car she rented does not confer standing. When he saw the police he fled the car. United States v. Barlow, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98967 (M.D. La. July 16, 2013).*

Window tint violation properly led to admission of possession of MJ and search incident. State v. Price, 322 Ga. App. 778, 746 S.E.2d 258 (2013).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging defendant’s stop because the officers knew he was driving on a suspended DL and there was a warrant for his arrest. United States v. Moore, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99594 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2013).*

The smell of marijuana wafting from a group of juveniles wasn’t enough to justify a stop and frisk of this juvenile. There was nothing pointing to him. Guilt by association is not reasonable suspicion (my phrase, not the court’s). D.H. v. State, 121 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

GSR on the hands is easily destroyed, and taking it is justified by exigent circumstances (collecting cases). Jones v. State, 213 Md. App. 483, 74 A.3d 802 (2013).

HuffPo: Anal Probes And The Drug War: A Look At The Ethical And Legal Issues by Radley Balko: (link won’t embed: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/11/anal-probes-and-the-drug-_n_4254600.html):

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Fernandez v. California (Willamette; SCOTUSBlog):

Whether, under Georgia v. Randolph, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

NYT Editorial: When the Police Enter a Home:

But what if the police lawfully arrest the objecting tenant and remove him from the home, may they enter then? That is the question the Supreme Court is considering on Wednesday in Fernandez v. California.

The Guardian: The road to surveillance is paved with good intentions–and warning signs:

Iris scanning and GPS tracking are increasingly central to the delivery of aid. The consequences could be devastating.

Rasmussen Report: 65% Oppose Use of Drones for U.S. Police Work:

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On review of a USMJ’s R&R, the USDJ may apply the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. And, the USDJ is free to come to a different conclusion under “de novo” review. Purchase of a larger quantity of drugs the day before, when there also had been purchases every three days, was not stale. United States v. Sandoval, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158819 (N.D. Iowa October 23, 2013):

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Defendant was found unconscious after an accident, and first responders searched her purse for identification and any medical alert information. Drugs were found. That search was valid, as was an inventory of her vehicle three days later. Case law from other states support the first search, even though the trial court didn’t rely on that. Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 2013 PA Super 252, 76 A.3d 44 (2013):

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“Frost’s statement to the police that they ‘could search his house all [they] want[ed]’ indicated unqualified and unequivocal consent that was not undermined by his refusal to sign a written consent form.” United States v. Frost, 521 Fed. Appx. 484 (6th Cir. 2013).*

The search of plaintiff’s home was arguably overbroad in his allegation that stuff was taken, but plaintiff can pinpoint (1) nothing that was seized from the house (2) by any person to impose liability. Alford v. Vernier, 524 Fed. Appx. 157 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Police came to a church because of a noise complaint, and they entered and took information. During the course of the litigation, the individual plaintiffs dropped out. The church has no remaining Fourth Amendment standing. “Faith Baptist Church does not assert that any violations of its Fourth Amendment rights occurred. All plaintiffs entitled to assert the Fourth Amendment rights at issue, and all of their claims, were dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Stipulation and Order entered by the district court on March 25, 2009.” Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 Fed. Appx. 322 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Whether a handcuffing was necessary is a question of fact for trial, and it was on video. “More importantly, Officer Lynch had already frisked Brown for weapons, finding none. The officers characterize the frisk as ‘quick’ and ‘restricted,’ but the videotape evidences a pat-down lasting an entire minute and covering much of Brown’s body. The reasonableness of the officer’s belief that Brown posed a threat depends on the scope of the pat-down and whether a concealed weapon might actually have gone undetected. Summary judgment is inappropriate in light of these disputed issues of material fact.” The audio also does not support a need for handcuffing. Brown v. Lynch, 524 Fed. Appx. 69 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived all nonjurisdictional defects, including whether defense counsel properly investigated a suppression issue. Powell v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53610 (S.D. Ala. March 13, 2013).*

The fellow officer rule provided collective probable cause there was drugs in defendant’s car for when it was stopped. Defendant was already under investigation as a part of a DTO where there were wiretaps. United States v. Cabral, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53890 (D. Mass. April 16, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped in his blue Buick because dispatch reported the license plate belonged to a red pickup truck. That was legal cause for the stop. During the stop, the officer always had defendants’ DL in hand, and defendant consented to a search of the car. After the search, the officer learned that dispatch was mistaken, and the vehicle was lawfully registered. The consent search was still valid because the stop was valid, and the stop was not too long. State v. Elkins, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 406 (May 16, 2013).

Defendant’s non-conditional plea was a waiver of the denial of the motion to suppress. United States v. Jackson, 524 Fed. Appx. 44 (4th Cir. 2013).*

There was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant after a detailed call from a CI. When following him, he pulled over like he was trying to lose his tail. He took off again and went to an address known for drug dealing. State v. Harrison, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 524 (May 15, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped in front of his house, and he was roaming around freely until the officers asked him for a frisk, which he objectively agreed to. State v. Pierce, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 541 (May 15, 2013).*

The officer’s statement was not willfully or recklessly “false” for Franks purposes because it was a reasonable inference based on available information. The warrant was for drugs and it was sufficiently particular. In any event, the good faith exception would save it. United States v. Zuber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104031 (D. Vt. July 25, 2013).*

“The totality of circumstances shows that defendant voluntarily consented to let Rose search the car. Once defendant agreed to stay and answer questions, Rose asked about guns and drugs and, in short order, asked for permission to search the car. Defendant unequivocally gave permission, responding without hesitation (and rather enthusiastically) to Rose’s request.” United States v. Aispuro, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103379 (D. Kan. July 24, 2013).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was involved in alien smuggling. There was also reasonable suspicion from the source of the rental cars being well known to the Border Patrol to be involved in alien smuggling, even though it was a subsidiary of Avis. United States v. Bautista-Villanueva, 524 Fed. Appx. 476 (11th Cir. 2013).*

The district court did not abuse its discretion in not letting the City of New Orleans on behalf of the New Orleans Police Department out of a consent decree. One of the DOJ employees negotiating the consent decree was admittedly named in the opinion setting aside the convictions of the five NOPD officers involved in a Hurricane Katrina shooting for prosecutorial misconduct. The City can set aside the decree for changed circumstances, but the district court concluded there hadn’t been enough. United States v. City of New Orleans, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013).*

The opinion setting aside the convictions is far more interesting, if you have the time to read it.

Lack of federal statutory authority for officer’s action does not make it a violation of the Fourth Amendment, applying Virginia v. Moore. United States v. Ryan, 731 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2013):

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During a knock and talk, defendant consented to a search then shoved the officer in the chest, fleeing inside the house. The officers could pursue him inside because of the battery on the officer occurring in the doorway. United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2013).*

There was a shooting at a convenience store, and the people fleeing in a car were described to the police. Officers went to the house the car was registered at and found it. When the door opened, they found the persons matching the description of the suspects. Consent to enter was given. They told defendant to stand up, and a gun was under him. The search by consent was valid as was seizure of the gun. United States v. Herron, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142589 (N.D. Ala. September 20, 2013).*

Once probable cause develops to search a car for drugs because of a hidden compartment, the search may be destructive. United States v. Guevara, 731 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2013):

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Clearly established law does not say that swearing a false arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, so 1983 defendant gets qualified immunity. The complaint could potentially state a claim for malicious prosecution, but plaintiff never alleged that. Schulz v. Gendregske, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22755, 2013 FED App. 0950N (6th Cir. November 5, 2013)*:

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Defense counsel “withdrew the motion to suppress pursuant to calculated strategy,” so there is no Strickland failure of performance. Lee v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143372 (S.D. Ohio October 3, 2013). [Not every motion to suppress is worth pursuing, and many times the evidence illegally seized may even help the defense case. § 60.19 of the Fifth Edition.]

“The specificity, predictive value, and recency of Bracy’s tip are sufficiently strong to balance the flaws in Bracy’s personal credibility and reliability. A total evaluation of these factors shows that the informant tip was supported by sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ to satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirements under Terry.” There ultimately was probable cause, and that moots the lack of consent claim. United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Officers arrested suspects outside the house and then did a knock-and-talk which led to valid consent. It was then used as a valid protective sweep. United States v. Dangla-Sanchez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143025 (W.D. Mo. October 3, 2013).*