The Hill: Court OKs NSA changes by Julian Hattem:

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NPR: AeroCop: Police Put An Eye In The Sky:

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NYLJ: Judge Finds Link Between Reward and Citizen’s Stop:

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At a border checkpoint, a Lexus was allowed to pass. A pickup was next with the same story and 11 people laying down in the back covered up. The story from the Lexus was similar to the one of the driver of the pickup, and that with other factors was reasonable suspicion under Brignoni-Ponce for a stop. United States v. Salazar, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13944 (W.D. Tex. February 3, 2014).*

Considering the “great deference” given search warrants, the court finds probable cause for the search warrant and, in any event, good faith for reliance on it. United States v. Mshihiri, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184707 (D. Minn. December 20, 2013).*

No evidence supported defendant’s claim that the CI was an agent of the police at the time of his private search of defendant’s backpack. Sweet v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 47 (February 5, 2014).*

The trial evidence is no longer to be considered in Pennsylvania in deciding whether a motion to suppress was properly granted. Must be based on the suppression hearing evidence alone. Appeal Of: L. J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013).

The officer had reasonable suspicion to confront defendant, and defendant fled abandoning marijuana. The seizure was valid. State v. Jones, 128 So. 3d 436 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).*

There was reasonable suspicion that an officer observed defendant engage in a drug transaction justifying the stop. Butler v. State, 2013 Md. App. LEXIS 142 (November 1, 2013).*

Officer conducting knock-and-talk with a gun in hand acted unreasonably in blocking the door when defendant tried to shut it on seeing the gun. State v. Campbell, 297 Kan. 273, 300 P.3d 72 (2013).

Defendant came into a Wichita DUI checkpoint with bad driving and looking under the influence. He consented to a breath test, so the proffered need for a warrant and a judge on call would be unnecessary in this case. State v. Johnson, 297 Kan. 210, 301 P.3d 287 (2013).*

911 call from a mother that her daughter was being held in a mobile home against her will and had been beaten brought police. Looking through the window, the inside was in disarray. That was enough for an emergency entry. United States v. Coffelt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63025 (E.D. Tenn. April 2, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was based on following too close, and reasonable suspicion developed. “As the district court correctly observed, ‘reluctantly-given consent is not necessarily involuntarily-given consent.’ Indeed, pausing to think about whether to give consent suggests thoughtfulness, not coercion.” United States v. Brown, 536 Fed. Appx. 376 (4th Cir. 2013).

There was reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed for a frisk. Aside from reasonable suspicion, he admitted it. The frisk was reasonable United States v. Pagan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107092 (D. Conn. July 31, 2013).*

Search warrants for two email accounts were issued, and the court finds there were false statements in support and the officer “not to be a credible witness” who “was the most ill-prepared, unprofessional law enforcement witness this court has encountered.” However, excising the information still left probable cause, and the warrant is sustained. United States v. Barthelman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107123 (D. Kan. July 31, 2013).*

Defendant’s Franks motion and motion to suppress are denied. “No application for a search warrant or affidavit in support thereof will be perfect. The documents at issue in this case are not unassailable. However, there was probable cause to believe that Apartment 7E contained heroin and other instruments of the drug trade. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 40) and Motion for Franks Hearing (Doc. No. 42) are DENIED.” United States v. Yarbough, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135205 (W.D. Pa. September 23, 2013).*

Defendant was arrested for DV at a hotel, and his wife validly consented to a search of the room. United States v. Laflamme, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135760 (W.D. Mo. July 9, 2013), adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135288 (W.D. Mo. September 23, 2013).*

None of defendant’s seven attorneys were ineffective in the course of the proceedings, including defendant’s plea that waived his search claim. Venkataram v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135155 (S.D. N.Y. September 20, 2013).*

The district court’s finding that consent was not coerced was supported by the evidence and affirmed. United States v. Isom, 536 Fed. Appx. 611 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and subsequent search of defendant’s home by the officer, and therefore the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress, because the officer’s testimony did not support a concern for the safety of the child but instead showed that his reasons for entering and his actions upon entry were focused on preserving evidence. The officer did not search for the child but instead handcuffed defendant and interrogated him about whether he was in possession of marijuana. The totality of the circumstances did not reveal any evidence from which it would be reasonable to infer that any exigency existed requiring a warrantless entry into defendant’s home. Turrubiate v. State, 415 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2013), on remand from Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013):

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There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop because the vehicle matched the description and location of one involved in a robbery. United States v. Encarnacion, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14146 (D. V.I. February 5, 2014).*

The third party consent was voluntary, and she had apparent authority to consent. United States v. Eastman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14012 (E.D. Tenn. February 5, 2014), R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14223 (E.D. Tenn. January 9, 2014).*

Defendant’s consent was voluntary. His testimony at the suppression hearing is rejected, and he testified that the officers went in and searched without even asking for consent. United States v. Cathey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14017 (W.D. Tenn. February 5, 2014), R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184733 (W.D. Tenn. December 18, 2013).*

There is no Fourth Amendment privacy in the GPS metadata attached to a child pornography photograph posted on a website. GPS coordinates in the metadata led to defendant’s house. United States v. Post, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11663 (S.D. Tex. January 30, 2014):

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Nation: Has the NSA Wiretapping Violated Attorney-Client Privilege? by Nicolas Niarchos:

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WaPo: Troubling new details about the violent police raid in Iowa by Radley Balko:

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WaPo: New surveillance technology can track everyone in an area for several hours at a time by Greg Timburg:

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2255 petitioner can show defense counsel clearly overlooked a meritorious search issue for the deficiency of the warrant in failing to show the things to be seized (Groh) and that the good faith exception would not have saved the warrant because it was clearly deficient and could not be relied up (Herring and Leon). While petitioner can succeed in showing a Strickland failure of performance, he can’t show prejudice because the item seized did not contribute much, if anything, to the verdict so the outcome wouldn’t be different. United States v. Graves, 951 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Pa. 2013):

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Unreasonable search claims should not be decided in post-conviction actual innocence claims. Dickman v. Comm’r of Corr., 143 Conn. App. 780, 70 A.3d 1147 (2013).*

In a Davis GPS good faith case, the court engages in extensive discussion of whether the law was settled or not in the Third Circuit on the use of GPS before Jones, and there was nothing approaching binding precedent saying that it wasn’t permissible. Therefore, Davis applies. United States v. Lopez, 951 F. Supp. 2d 657 (D.Del. 2013).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his Fourth Amendment claim so it wasn’t cognizable in a 2255. United States v. Leus, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89280 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013).*

Police entered reasonably under Payton v. New York when they had an arrest warrant for the defendant. A protective sweep inside was valid. “It is not significant that Barker was arrested prior to and outside of the rooms that were entered incident to the protective sweep.” United States v. Barker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89829 (N.D. W.Va. May 10, 2013),* adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89827 (N.D. W.Va. June 26, 2013).*

Defendant was not detained when he was approached by officers and asked if he had “anything illegal on” him. He said “a bag of weed.” Reasonable suspicion not required. State v. Alberti, 128 So. 3d 351 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).*

Similarly, officers did not need reasonable suspicion to approach defendant’s car to talk to him and then they saw marijuana in plain view. State v. Williams, 128 So. 3d 359 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).*

“If a defendant asserts such an interaction is a seizure rather than an encounter, he bears the initial burden of establishing that the interaction was a seizure rather than an encounter. See Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 413. [¶] The difference between a detention and encounter is that a detention implicates the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure restrictions and requires articulable suspicion to support a temporary seizure, while an encounter is not subject to those requirements or restrictions.” This was a mere encounter. Amaya v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12509 (Tex. App. – El Paso October 9, 2013).*

Defendant who actively disclaimed possession or ownership of a cell phone could not complain about its tracking. United States v. Barron, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108410 (D. Kan. August 1, 2013).

Defendant was not the subscriber of the cell phone he was using, so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical cell site data and call records. State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 2013).

Plaintiff’s failure to object to the Magistrate’s R&R was waiver of his right to appeal SJ in his 1983 case. Battle v. Baalaer, 536 Fed. Appx. 725 (9th Cir. 2013).*

The search of this vehicle was justified by consent or the automobile exception, based on the fact a bag of cocaine was in plain view on the floor. United States v. Sanchez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108394 (W.D. Tex. August 2, 2013).*