HuffPo: Amanda Jo Stephen, Jaywalking Suspect, Handcuffed And Thrown To Ground By Cops (RAW VIDEO):

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Four bloody dogs were in defendant’s yard, and one ran through an open sliding door when the police arrived. The dogs were aggressive toward each other, but the officers couldn’t determine whether the blood was from dogs or people, so it was reasonable to enter the house because this presented an exigency. Carpenter v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 70 (February 20, 2014).

The exigency requirement of the automobile exception is based on mobility alone, and defendant’s car was mobile. His backpack was searched based on probable cause and the automobile exception, and the officer had clear reason to believe that evidence would be in there. United States v. Wagner, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185291 (N.D. Ga. December 23, 2013).*

This Franks challenge, believe it or not, was based on the argument that the officer’s failure to note a pair of shoes in the car ultimately searched with a warrant made it based on a false statement. It wasn’t remotely material to the probable cause determination. United States v. Minor, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185290 (N.D. Ga. December 3, 2013).*

NPR: Drone Law, On The Media:

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NPR: In ‘Domain Awareness,’ Detractors See Another NSA by Martin Kaste:

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NYT: Another Step on the Path to Settling Frisk Cases by Benjamin Weiser:

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A “squadrol” is different than in a police car because of the different privacy interest in the enclosed back of the vehicle. Therefore, ATF recorded conversations in the back have a reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Williams, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20802 (N.D. Ill. February 18, 2014):

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Legal Times: ABA Presses the NSA Over Attorney-Client Privilege by Todd Ruger:

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Plaintiff Carter is a police officer for the City of Milwaukee. After a search of a house, the owner of the house claimed money was missing. His superior wouldn’t let him leave without being searched. The search was employment related, not criminally related, and it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because compulsion was a result of the employment relationship, not a criminal investigation. Montell v. City of Milwaukee, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3048 (7th Cir. February 19, 2014):

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Kentucky parole regulations require reasonable suspicion for a parole search. In these two cases, the defendants consented to a suspicionless parole search, and that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Helphenstine v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 8 (February 20, 2014); Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky LEXIS __ (February 20, 2014). The latter:

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Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion by Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, UDC, David A. Clarke School of Law (February 12, 2014). Abstract:

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A computer check showing no matching DL for the owner of the car was reasonable suspicion for a stop. “Officer Zubak had reasonable suspicion, from the two driver’s license searches alone, to stop the vehicle in order to resolve the uncertainty of Manzanares’s driver’s license status.” State v. Manzanares, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 168 (February 19, 2014).

Similarly, a restricted DL for the owner of a car seen 100 miles away from home is reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Donnan, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 170 (February 19, 2014).*

The evidence didn’t support the stop of defendant’s car for being too noisy because of the officer’s mistake of law. “The record indicates Smith believed sound audible from a distance of greater than fifty feet created a violation of the ordinance, when in fact the sound must also have created a noise disturbance. The State has failed to provide any evidence the sound was sufficient to constitute a noise disturbance.” State v. Loots, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 153 (February 19, 2014).*

Arrest on a recalled, and therefore expired, arrest warrant already served nine days earlier was void, despite the officer’s good faith. Since there is no good faith exception in Pennsylvania, the product of the arrest is invalid. Exclusion here would encourage government to keep its warrant files current. [This case essentially rejects SCOTUS’s Herring.] Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2014 Pa. LEXIS 424 (February 18, 2014):

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Defendant was stopped and had a suspended license. The officer believed that required a towing of the vehicle and an inventory. The state supreme court concludes otherwise, and the need to tow, and thus inventory, was essentially a mistake of law. “Impounding” the vehicle would have been accomplished by leaving it on the side of the road where it was not impeding traffic. The officer otherwise was acting in good faith and complied with the inventory policy, but that’s not relevant. Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2013), rev’g 2011 PA Super 68, 17 A.3d 1257 (2011) (concurrence; dissent):

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James L. Lindon, Can HIPAA Information Be Given to Law Enforcement Officials? Medscape (February 20, 2014) (sub. req.):

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The Hill: Dems press Holder on secret FBI letters By Julian Hattem:

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