Police want to serve warrants and orders for electronic data electronically to eliminate delay

Police want backdoor to Web users' private data by Declan McCullagh on CNET News:

Anyone with an e-mail account likely knows that police can peek inside it if they have a paper search warrant.

But cybercrime investigators are frustrated by the speed of traditional methods of faxing, mailing, or e-mailing companies these documents. They're pushing for the creation of a national Web interface linking police computers with those of Internet and e-mail providers so requests can be sent and received electronically.

FBI wants records kept of Web sites visited

FBI wants records kept of Web sites visited by Declan McCullagh on CNET News:

The FBI is pressing Internet service providers to record which Web sites customers visit and retain those logs for two years, a requirement that law enforcement believes could help it in investigations of child pornography and other serious crimes.

FBI Director Robert Mueller supports storing Internet users' "origin and destination information," a bureau attorney said at a federal task force meeting on Thursday.

As far back as a 2006 speech, Mueller had called for data retention on the part of Internet providers, and emphasized the point two years later when explicitly asking Congress to enact a law making it mandatory. But it had not been clear before that the FBI was asking companies to begin to keep logs of what Web sites are visited, which few if any currently do.

. . .

Greg Motta, the chief of the FBI's digital evidence section, said that the bureau was trying to preserve its existing ability to conduct criminal investigations. Federal regulations in place since at least 1986 require phone companies that offer toll service to "retain for a period of 18 months" records including "the name, address, and telephone number of the caller, telephone number called, date, time and length of the call."

. . .

Recording what Web sites are visited, though, is likely to draw both practical and privacy objections.

"We're not set up to keep URL information anywhere in the network," said Drew Arena, Verizon's vice president and associate general counsel for law enforcement compliance.

Defendant's removal from the car is "utterly immaterial" to the question of the cause for the stop. The eight minutes for the dog to arrive was not unreasonable. Jackson v. State, 2010 Md. App. LEXIS 24 (February 4, 2010). This is another entertaining opinion by Retired Judge Moylan, inter alia, describing the Arvizu/Sokolow totality of the circumstances approach as "If It Looks Like a Duck and Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck…":

. . . As long as the automobile itself was being constitutionally detained as of the moment the dog made its positive alert, whatever may have been happening to the appellant in the meantime, good or bad, is utterly immaterial.

Whether the appellant was being royally wined and dined, on the one hand, or was being greeted as if exiting the Biograph Theatre in Chicago, on the other, is an extraneous consideration that had no impact on the legitimacy of the dog sniff. For other purposes, of course, it may have made a great deal of difference. We are not suggesting otherwise. We are simply stressing the point, perhaps starkly so, that the treatment of the appellant as a person, whether exemplary or deplorable, was not a factor in the suppression syllogism. The appellant was being lawfully detained. The degree of restraint, minimal or maximal, did not influence, therefore, the fact that the car was properly still in place when the dog arrived. All that matters is that the appellant was not free to drive the car away. Any restraint on him beyond that point, even if excessive, did not affect the immobility of the car.

Every Fourth Amendment violation, assuming one to have occurred, does not, in and of itself, require the suppression of evidence. To justify the exclusion of evidence, it is further required that the discovery of the evidence shall have been the proximate result of the Fourth Amendment violation.

Conclusion

Once we have filtered out the extraneous static, we are left with a legitimate stop followed by a legitimate eight-minute detention followed by a legitimate dog sniff. That's all there is to it.

Arrest warrant justified entry into defendant’s house looking for him. He was unemployed, and, although there were no cars outside, officers heard noises inside that stopped when they knocked. Defendant was suspected of forging IDs and other documents, and it was reasonable to assume that the materiel for doing so would be there. United States v. Thousst, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124601 (M.D. Ala. November 5, 2009)*:

"The focus in a warrant application is usually on whether the suspect committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime is to be found at his home or business." United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002), quoting United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1996). Though not explicitly stated in the warrant, it stands to reason that a person such as Thoussaint, who passes forged instruments and who has no known workplace, may well secret some or all of the equipment used to manufacture the fraudulent instruments at his home. This Court may consider the fact that Thoussaint's residence, as opposed to a non-existent workplace, would be a likely place for evidence of his crime. Martin acknowledges that courts must sometimes "look beyond the four corners of the affidavit and search warrant" to "consider information known to [an officer] that was not presented in the initial search warrant application or affidavit." Martin, 297 F.3d at 1318. Again, the Eleventh Circuit directs courts to view the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether an affidavit presents probable cause for a search. Id. at 1319. The affidavit amply established Thoussaint's connection to the residence, and, by virtue of his unemployed status, Thoussaint's residence is implicitly a potential link to his criminal activity. Martin, id.

Defendant’s broadranging attack on seizure of e-mails that he sent was [utterly frivolous and] rejected. He assumed the risk that the recipient would keep and make use of them. And, violation of the Yahoo service agreement is hardly a ground to suppress. United States v. Grady, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124582 (E.D. Mo. December 18, 2009):

Further, the e-mail communications were not "seized" by the agents within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, nor did Defendant have any legitimate expectation of privacy in the communications. Defendant certainly cannot assert any basis to suppress the e-mails that were created and sent by the undercover officers, and thereafter stored on their own computer. The remaining e-mails were sent by Defendant to the address provided, and the undercover officers simply received and opened them at the address to which Defendant directed them. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that e-mail senders "would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient; at this moment, the e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery of the letter") (citations omitted); see also Ideal Aerosmith, Inc. v. Acutronic USA, Inc., No. 07-1029, 2007 WL 4394447, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2007) (holding that plaintiff had no claim under the Wiretap Act against the defendant, who was not the intended recipient of the e-mail communication, where the communication was nonetheless sent to the defendant).

Moreover, having responded to an anonymous listing, Defendant assumed the risk that the entity with whom he chose to correspond was not an actual purveyor of underage prostitutes. That the undercover agent concealed his identity and stated that he was not law enforcement does not change this result. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-39 (1963) (holding that recorded conversation with agent who gained entry to the defendant's office by misrepresenting and falsifying the purpose of his mission, was not subject to suppression); see also Sega Enters. Ltd v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp 923, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (recognizing that access to a public bulletin board through use of a pseudonym does not constitute an unauthorized access under the SCA, as such forums "are normally accessed by use of an alias or pseudonym").

Defendant’s car frisk was based on objective observations, and the officer’s supposed subjective belief did not matter. He had a knife, overtinted windows, and a "thin blue line" sticker when he had nothing to do with law enforcement. United States v. Vinton, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2450 (D.C. Cir. February 5, 2010)*:

Finally, Vinton's argument that Officer Alton did not subjectively believe Vinton was dangerous may easily be rejected. Because "[t]he Fourth Amendment test is objective," an officer's "actual subjective motives ... are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of [a] traffic stop and protective search of the car." United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Of course, it was possible that Vinton used his sheathed knife only for fishing, that he had benign reasons for having excessively tinted windows, and that his "thin blue line" sticker was not meant to be misleading. But "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. Examining the totality of the circumstances objectively, Officer Alton had a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that Vinton was armed and dangerous. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. Thus, he properly searched the passenger compartment of Vinton's car for additional weapons.

District court and USMJ credited officers on consent issue, and the evidence supports it, so defendant’s standing does not even have to be decided. United States v. Bater, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 2385 (1st Cir. February 4, 2010).*

Speeding on a supermarket parking lot justifies a community caretaking stop because pedestrians were at risk. Pleasant-Bey v. United States, 2010 D.C. App. LEXIS 34 (February 4, 2010).*

A consent to search is non-testimonial and not governed by the Fifth Amendment. State v. Sydnor, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (February 2, 2010).*

Nighttime search warrant failed because of failure to show any specifics of why there was exigency for the nighttime entry. The mere chance of “degradation of evidence” is not enough. State v. White, 2010 Del. Super. LEXIS 27 (February 2, 2010):

Here, the only facts contained in the affidavit that suggest exigent circumstances are the location to be searched, a motel room, and the affiant's cursory statement that he is aware of the "possibility of degradation of evidence, particularly blood and biological evidence." The affidavit is most striking for all the information it does not contain, much of which could have supported exigent circumstances justifying a nighttime warrant. For example, nowhere in the affidavit does the affiant tell the magistrate: [much of anything].

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress the search of the car defendant was riding in because there was probable cause for the search. While drug dog was called in and did not alert, this does not nullify PC that already exists. Holt v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9300 (E.D. Tenn. February 3, 2010):

Holt also argues that Trooper Osborne had no right to walk his drug sniffing canine around the Holt vehicle on March 29. Holt offers no legal support for his contention and none exists. Holt does not argue that Trooper Osborne detained the automobile and its occupants longer than was reasonably necessary; he instead argues once again that the videotaped evidence shows that the dog "did not hit on anything." Even if Holt were correct, this is also irrelevant because the Trooper already had probable cause to search the automobile based on the odor of marijuana he detected when he first approached the automobile. Given that probable cause already existed, it is unclear why the canine was even employed, unless it was to confirm what the officer already had sufficient reason to believe. In any event, the failure of the dog to alert would not negate or destroy the probable cause that already existed. See United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005).