Parole officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless search of plaintiff’s home, when he was not there, searching for child porn on his computer. The officers had the requisite “well founded suspicion” under Washington law based on a report from a neighbor. He signed a parole agreement agreeing to such searches on “well founded suspicion.” Plaintiff was on parole for a sex offense. Addleman v. King County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35117 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2007).<\/p>\n
Demolition of plaintiff’s uninhabited and collapsing building was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but it was reasonable on a balancing of interests. Gariffo Real Estate Holdings Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35071 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2007):<\/p>\n
Balancing the relative interests at issue, it is clear that the balance is struck in favor of the City. The Plaintiff retained little or no reasonable expectation of privacy in a dilapidated, uninhabited rental property after L&I provided notice by mail, as well as posted on the structure itself, of its imminently dangerous condition. See Freeman,<\/em> 242 F.3d at 652. Moreover, the City has a strong interest in ensuring that structures located within City bounds do not pose a threat to the safety of the general public. See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco<\/em>, 387 U.S. 523, 537, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (“[T]he public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated.”).<\/p>\n
It is important to note that a seizure in this circumstance is not per se unreasonable without the City first obtaining a warrant. See Gardner v. McGroarty,<\/em> 68 Fed. Appx. 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2003); Manganaro v. Reap<\/em>, 29 Fed. Appx. 859, 861 (3d Cir. 2002); Freeman v. City of Dallas<\/em> 242 F.3d 642, (5th Cir. 2001). Although a warrant may first be necessary before inspectors may enter an inhabited building to inspect suspected violations of municipal housing code, Camara<\/em>, 387 U.S. at 534, this safeguard is not necessary where, as here, the evidence of the municipal code violations were already obtained by means unchallenged by the Plaintiff, i.e.<\/em> the collapsed outer wall was visible from the street. Freeman<\/em>, 242 F.3d at 651.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Generalized motion to suppress could be denied in the court’s discretion, but the court denies the motion on standing because the car the marijuana was stored in was being used as a shipping container and it was out of defendant’s control for shipping, having been driven by another. United States v. Crowder, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34946 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007):<\/p>\n
Here, Crowder’s unsupported claims that he “had a proprietary interest and legitimate expectations of privacy” in the Mustang does not carry the day. See Def.’s Brief, P 5. Any reasonable expectation of privacy Crowder alleges “must be demonstrated to the Court.” United States v. Mendoza<\/em>, 438 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2006). Absent a supporting affidavit “or testimony from the defendant, it is almost impossible to find a privacy interest ….” Id. Given the fact that the Mustang was registered to co-defendant Watkins’s mother, that Crowder was not even the driver of the Mustang at the time the DEA agents stopped the car, and that Crowder relinquished control of the Mustang to a third party shipping company, Crowder does not have standing to claim that the search of the car was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
Plainly put, Crowder cannot establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the drug-laden Mustang. He delivered the car and its contents to the shipping company to transport across the country, and surrendered the keys to the automobile upon delivery. As a result, the bailee, in this case the driver, had complete access to the car, in order to drive it onto and off of the truck, in addition to a number of other purposes. “A reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed when the defendant exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy, and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Mendoza<\/em>, 438 F.3d at 795. The driver had complete control and full access to the Mustang when it was shipped to Illinois. No individual, who relinquishes control over a vehicle in the manner done so by Crowder, could possess a subjective expectation of privacy in that vehicle. See id.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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