A traffic stop can be based on reasonable suspicion, not just probable cause, and any ulterior motive is irrelevant.<\/p>\n
Kennedy’s argument I should apply a probable cause standard to the traffic stop is unavailing. The Terry<\/em> reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops. U.S. v. Delfin-Colina<\/em>, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006). A police officer has the initial burden of providing the “specific, articulable facts” to justify a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual has violated the traffic laws. Id.<\/em> (internal citations omitted). When I consider the traffic stop, I find Cpl. Neuhaus credibly articulated the tinted windows gave him reason to make the Feb. 21, 2006, traffic stop. An officer’s ulterior motive for making a stop is irrelevant. Whren v. United States<\/em>, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Reason to believe a traffic violation occurred makes the stop and search legal regardless of the officer’s subjective intent. Ohio v. Robinette<\/em>, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (holding motive of officer irrelevant).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Police responded to a domestic call, and defendant’s girlfriend met the police outside and told them that he choked her and she wanted to go in, get her stuff, and leave. The three went in, and saw the defendant sitting on a couch fidgeting. He stood up and tried to walk away, but the officers were concerned about their own safety so they patted him down, finding nothing, so they searched the couch where he was sitting and found a gun. United States v. Humphrey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33197 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment in his false arrest case. “In this case, if the finder of fact were to credit Parker’s version of the events, it could conclude that Stanhope lacked probable cause to believe the Plaintiff posed a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others and that no warning, if feasible, was given. Consequently, summary judgment is not warranted.” Parker v. Henderson County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33233 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Questions to the defendant after a traffic stop were not unreasonable. United States v. Toranzo, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33309 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2007)*:<\/p>\n
Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s contention, Commander Martinez’s questions were not “commanding and very loaded” thereby detaining the Defendant. In fact, the Supreme Court upheld a similar line of questioning in Robinette.<\/em> …<\/p>\n
After the ticketing was complete, Commander Martinez was free to ask Defendant any questions without probable cause or reasonable suspicion just as he could with anyone on the street or in a public place. …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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