Citizens followed a bank robbery suspect for 15 minutes and lost him. Police got a line on where to look, and an officer entered the backyard of defendant\u2019s property, open off an alley, and saw the car. This was 30 minutes after the robbery, so it was not hot pursuit. The court and Sixth Circuit had previously found the entry into the back yard a Fourth Amendment violation of the curtilage, but it was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances, and the exclusionary rule would not be applied. United States v. Fugate, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89182 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2013):<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
… Under these circumstances, although the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, the warrantless entry, based on all the facts and circumstances, is “close enough to the line of validity” to make his conduct objectively reasonable.<\/p>\n
Even more so, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that the public safety exception to the warrant requirement might apply, since there was an ongoing risk of danger to the police or others. Notably, in determining whether exigent circumstances exist, the gravity of the underlying offense is a factor to be considered. As a general rule, police are given more leeway when the crime is serious and public safety is a concern. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. In this case, there is no doubt that the crimes that had been committed were serious. The suspect had shot a convenience store clerk during the course of an armed robbery, and then shot at the citizens who were following him as he attempted to escape. Since the suspect was armed and dangerous, public safety was clearly a concern, and Officer Saylors could have reasonably believed that this excused the warrant requirement.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
In a similar vein, in this case, the suspect had committed a serious crime. Only 30 minutes had passed since the armed robbery, and only 15 minutes had passed since he had last fired shots at the citizens who tried to follow him. Public safety was clearly an ongoing concern. Moreover, although there was no evidence specifically linking the suspect to the house at 140 Drummer Avenue, Officer Saylors knew that the suspect had last been seen in the same general vicinity just 15 minutes earlier and, since the car had been circling a small area of town, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the car was still in that area. He was actively looking for the black, two-door Cadillac when he spied a dark-colored car parked in a suspicious manner in the back yard of the house. Under the circumstances presented here, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Saylors to believe that he could enter the back yard without a warrant to see if the car matched the description of the getaway car.<\/p>\n
In addition, in the Court’s view, the reasons for applying the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule are even more compelling in this case than they were in McClain. The warrantless entry into the back yard in this case was much less intrusive than the warrantless entry into the house in McClain. Public safety was also a much bigger concern in this case because the suspect was clearly armed and dangerous. In contrast, in McClain, the officers merely suspected a burglary in progress; there was no evidence that the burglar had any weapons.<\/p>\n
Under the circumstances presented here, Officer Saylors could have reasonably believed that the exigency of the situation justified the minimal intrusion onto the curtilage, and there is no evidence that he knew that his conduct was unconstitutional. As in McClain, the warrant affidavit “fully disclosed … the circumstances surrounding the initial warrantless search.” 444 F.3d at 566.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading