Defendant consented because of a fear for her family\u2019s well being if she didn\u2019t but it was of her own making and the police did nothing to exacerbate it. Therefore, consent was valid. United States v. Lopez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86912 (E.D. Wis. April 5, 2013):<\/p>\n
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First, while the Court “must look at the ‘possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents,'” “the [C]ourt must also look at the ‘reasonableness of that fear.'” United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Castrillon, 716 F.2d 1279, 1283 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229)). In this case, Rodriguez became hysterical when the police explained that the dogs would have to be removed if a search warrant was obtained. Lopez argues that even if the police did not explicitly threaten harm to the dogs, they took advantage of Rodriguez’s misunderstanding that the dogs would be harmed. But there is no indication that the police threatened to hurt the dogs or used any violent language as it pertains to the dogs. Cf. United States v. Bramble, 894 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Haw. 1995) (in finding defendant’s Miranda waiver voluntarily given, the court stated that an alleged threat to “cap,” i.e., shoot the defendant’s four pit bulls was reasonable as the officers feared for their safety). Nor does the record support that the police took advantage of Rodriguez’s concerns about the dogs. While Rodriguez’s fears are understandable because of her affections for her dogs and even perhaps because of prior experiences with the police and her dogs, there is no evidence that the police acted in a way to feed or manipulate that fear.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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