Hot pursuit justified police entry into defendant’s premises. Dorkoski v. Pensyl, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114 (M.D. Pa. March 9, 2007):<\/p>\n
Hot pursuit involves following an individual from a public place into a private place. United States v. Santana,<\/em> 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). The doctrine applies when the pursuit is immediate and fairly continuous from the scene of the crime. Welsh,<\/em> 466 U.S. at 753. Although hot pursuit of a suspect must be fairly continuous, it is not necessary that the suspect be kept physically in view at all times. See e.g., U.S. v. Miller,<\/em> 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Escudero,<\/em> 592 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1979). In addition, a “hot pursuit” need not be “an extended hue and cry in and about [the] public streets.” Santana,<\/em> 427 U.S. at 42-43. Further, “it is not necessary under cases defining hot pursuit that each defendant be in flight in order to sustain warrantless arrests of persons in their homes by pursuing police officers.” Jones v. Waters,<\/em> 570 F.Supp. 1292, 1297 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Where police officers know where a suspect is, but decide that it would be dangerous to enter without reinforcements, the officers are justified in waiting to enter until reinforcements arrive. See U.S. v. Johnson<\/em>, 256 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2001)(comparing U.S. v. Linsey<\/em>, 877 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1989)). Under such circumstances, the “continuity” of the chase is delayed, but not broken. Id.<\/em> (citing United States v. Lindsay<\/em>, 506 F.2d 166, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).<\/p>\n
In this case, the court finds that exigent circumstances existed, which justified the defendants’ warrantless entry into the plaintiff’s property. To this extent, the record establishes that Kip had assaulted Mr. Gilligbauer, threatened to kill him, and brandished either a baseball bat or a pipe at the time. While the police were investigating the incident, Kip returned to the scene of the crime and taunted Mr. Gilligbauer and the officers. Kip was noted to have a red substance on his face, which was believed to be blood. When defendant Wolfe pursued Kip in his police cruiser with lights and siren activated, Kip led defendant Wolfe on a high speed chase through Shamokin and into neighboring Coal Township.<\/p>\n
When the vehicle chase came to an end, Kip exhibited erratic behavior and charged at defendant Wolfe, asking “Why don’t you just shoot me?” Afterwards, defendant Wolfe attempted to physically subdue Kip, at which time Kip attempted to strike defendant Wolfe. Kip was pepper sprayed. He then ran from defendant Wolfe and a foot chase ensued, which ultimately ended at the plaintiff’s property.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Punitive damages claim in police shooting death case survived summary judgment based on allegations of wilfullness. Martin v. Davis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16975 (E.D. La. March 8, 2007).*<\/p>\n
“Custody” for purposes of Miranda<\/em> requires more than just being the target of an investigation. Custody must be communicated. United States v. Fred, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95639 (D. N.M. August 11, 2006):<\/p>\n
Pursuant to this understanding, both the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have held that an individual is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes simply because the individual is the target of an investigation or a suspect in a crime. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California<\/em>, 511 U.S. at 319 (“We hold, not for the first time, that an officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody.”); United States v. Leach<\/em>, 749 F.2d 592, 599-600 (10th Cir. 1984)(refusing to classify defendant as “in custody” merely because he was the target of a counterfeit note investigation). For an individual’s status as a suspect to be relevant, the questioning officer must convey his knowledge or belief with regard to that status, by word or deed, in such a manner as to “affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom of action.'” Stansbury v. California,<\/em> 511 U.S. at 325.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer’s observation that the defendant’s vehicle was proceeding in a straight line close to the lane divider markings did not provide an objectively reasonable and particularized suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle while impaired. State v. Hess, 154 P.3d 557 (2006).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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