Warrantless entry into the home was based on exigent circumstances. Commonwealth v. McAliley, 2007 PA Super 55, 919 A.2d 272 (2007):<\/p>\n
The factors identified in Walker<\/em> are as follows: <\/p>\n
“(1) the gravity of the offense; (2) whether there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; (3) whether there is a clear showing of probable cause; (4) whether there is a strong showing that the suspect is within the premises to be searched; (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape; (6) whether the entry was peaceable; (7) the time of the entry, i.e., day or night; (8) whether the officer was in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (9) whether there is a likelihood that evidence may be destroyed; and (10) whether there is a danger to police or others.”<\/p>\n
Id.<\/em> (citation omitted).<\/p>\n
[*P14] We will address these factors ad seriatim. With respect to the first factor, the police observed McAliley sell cocaine on two occasions outside his residence, which is a serious felony offense. See 35 PA.STAT. \u00a7 780-113(f)(1.1) (providing that possession with intent to deliver cocaine is a felony).<\/p>\n
[*P15] The second factor, whether there was a reasonable belief that McAliley was armed, was not explored at the suppression hearing; however, it is reasonable to conclude that the officers may have expected McAliley to have been armed. See Commonwealth v. Lopez<\/em>, 525 Pa. 185, 190, 579 A.2d 854, 856 (1990) (opinion in support of affirmance) (noting that second factor was not “investigated during the suppression hearing” but that “experienced narcotics officers may have expected that appellant, engaged as he was in observable drug selling, was indeed armed”).<\/p>\n
[*P16] We also find that there was a clear showing of probable cause. “[P]robable cause for a warrantless search exists if the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Wright<\/em>, 2005 PA Super 35, 867 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted), appeal denied<\/em>, 583 Pa. 695, 879 A.2d 783 (2005), cert. denied<\/em>, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1047, 163 L. Ed. 2d 879 (2006). In the present case, the police officers observed McAliley engage in the sale of cocaine in two separate transactions. Thus, the third factor is easily established.<\/p>\n
[*P17] We also find that the fourth factor is also easily met. The police observed McAliley enter the residence at 1319 West Jerome Street just after the cocaine sales, and did not see him leave thereafter. Thus, their observations established that McAliley was present in the premises which was to be searched.<\/p>\n
[*P18] The fifth factor, whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape, was not established at the suppression hearing. As mentioned, the police officers had the residence under surveillance.<\/p>\n
[*P19] With respect to the sixth factor, whether the entry was peaceable, the Commonwealth established at suppression hearing that the entry was peaceful. The police officers simply opened unlocked doors to enter the residence. See N.T., 7\/20\/05, at 36, 49-50.<\/p>\n
[*P20] As for the seventh factor, the police officers entered the residence in the afternoon, not at nighttime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roland,<\/em> 535 Pa. 595, 600, 637 A.2d 269, 271 (1994) (noting that nighttime “is a particularly suspect time for searches to be conducted”).<\/p>\n
[*P21] The eighth factor, whether the police were in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, is not a factor in this case.<\/p>\n
[*P22] The ninth factor, whether there was a likelihood that evidence would be destroyed, was established at the suppression hearing. This Court has noted the ease with which narcotics can be destroyed. See Walker<\/em>, 836 A.2d at 981. Furthermore, in the present case, the police officers observed that McAliley had what appeared to be a stash of contraband in his pants pocket when he finished his second narcotics deal. Immediately after the second deal, McAliley entered his residence. Subsequent thereto, McAliley reappeared in his doorway and stood there until he was alerted to the police presence, after which, he went into his residence. Thus, there is a reasonable inference that McAliley either had a stash of narcotics on his person or that a stash was in his residence. Therefore, when he was alerted to the police presence, there was a strong likelihood that he could have easily destroyed the narcotic contraband.<\/p>\n
[*P23] The tenth factor, whether there is a danger to the police officers or other persons, was not established at the suppression hearing.<\/p>\n
[*P24] Seven of the ten factors, as outlined above, weigh heavily in favor of finding that the warrantless search was based on appropriate exigent circumstances. Of course, not all of the factors must be present to justify a finding of exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Walker<\/em> (finding that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search where seven of the ten factors were met). As such, we find that the warrantless search was lawful as exigent circumstances existed.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff based on the complainant’s statement that plaintiff pointed a gun. Plaintiff’s search claim was dismissed because he did not name the officers who conducted the search as parties. Jacobson v. Pettersson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14952 (W.D. Wash. March 2, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Pro se plaintiff did not respond to summary judgment motion against his \u00a7 1983 claim, so the court uses the requirement of liberal construction of pro se pleadings. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, defendant must prevail because there was probable cause for a traffic stop and an impoundment of the car led to a valid inventory. Wolschlager v. Anderson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15178 (E.D. Mich. January 22, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Civil case over a housing inspection entry was dismissed because it was evident that the occupant consented to the entry. Fox v. Bay City, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15299 (E.D. Mich. January 3, 2007).*<\/p>\n
(Cases were received after 8 a.m. again today.)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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