An officer surveilling cars frequenting a parking lot known for hand to hand drug deals observed cars and developed reasonable suspicion as to one person but it developed into reasonable suspicion as to his passenger, too. United States v. Hannah, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6885 (N.D. Tex. January 31, 2007):<\/p>\n
When Washington’s conduct is considered, the finding that Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion to detain Hannah follows easily from the evidence developed at the hearing. Officer Johnson articulated several facts that created a reasonable suspicion to justify detaining Washington and Hannah. First, he observed the two men sitting in a parked car outside a restaurant in a high-crime area of Addison. When he approached the vehicle, the passenger immediately stepped from the car. When he inquired whether the passenger had any illegal substances on him, the passenger stated “no, but you can search my car.” Based on Officer Johnson’s experience, he had reason to believe the two were then engaged in criminal activity, or had already completed criminal activity (possession of narcotics). In his experience making drug-related arrests, suspects act together, and they could have been in the middle of a drug transaction. Moreover, for the reasons explained above, he considered suspicious the explanation given concerning placing a to-go order at the nearby restaurant and then deciding to eat inside.<\/p>\n
Considered in their totality, these facts support a finding that Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion that Hannah, too, was then engaged, or had engaged, in criminal activity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Border Patrol officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle after a border vehicle sensor indicated that a vehicle had crossed the border, and there was only one vehicle in the area. Observations added to the reasonable suspicion. United States v. Rodriguez-Reyes, 214 Fed. Appx. 809 (10th Cit. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense. As the officer handed back the paperwork he asked about consent, which defendant agreed to. The asking of consent at that point did not unlawfully extend the stop because the officer had reasonable suspicion by then, and his consent was valid. United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. February 1, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Probable cause for a search warrant is not whether the target of the search is guilty of a crime. The question is whether evidence of a crime could be found in the place to be searched, and that requirement was satisfied here. United States v. Harris, 215 Fed. Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):<\/p>\n
“In determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the crucial element is not whether the target of the search is suspected of a crime, but whether it is reasonable to believe that the items to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.” United States v. Lalor,<\/em> 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily<\/em>, 436 U.S. 547, 556, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 & n.6 (1978)). This court has adopted the rule that “the nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.” United States v. Anderson,<\/em> 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988). In Anderson,<\/em> the affidavit indicated that Anderson was trying to sell a particular gun that had been used in a murder, and we concluded that although no specific facts established a direct link between the gun and Anderson’s residence, it was reasonable to believe that he was probably keeping the gun in his home. Id.<\/em> <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
District court credits officers’ testimony that there was no coercion and the consent form was signed because the signer said “we have nothing to hide.” United States v. Hassoun, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6804 (S.D. Fla. January 31, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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