An anonymous 911 call about a home invasion robbery by two men and a woman brought the police who were able to corroborate essential details at the scene, and the corroboration was sufficient for the entry and subsequent search that led to syringes in plain view. State v. Wilson, 2007 Ohio 353, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 299 (12th Dist. January 29, 2007):<\/p>\n
The caller indicated that two white men and a white female were breaking into a specific apartment, and police arrived to find evidence of a forced entry into that apartment. A white male came to the door as police were reacting to what they perceived to be a discovered forced entry. Some, and eventually all, of the statements of the anonymous caller were corroborated by police observation or investigation. Further, the evidence supported the belief by the police that the exigent circumstances continued and an additional suspect and weapon were still inside the residence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Consent for search of defendant’s home was not shown to be voluntary. Officer asked three times and defendant insisted on talking on the porch. The officer demanded to speak inside, and defendant let him, but it was not consensual. People v. Plante, 308 Ill. Dec. 856, 862 N.E.2d 1059 (3d Dist. 2007):<\/p>\n
Defendant did not consent to Bass’s third entry into the home. Defendant never told Bass that he may enter the home on his third attempt and specifically asked if they could speak outside. The State relies on defendant’s “nonverbal conduct” in walking back into the home after Bass demanded to speak inside to support its theory of consent. While “‘there is little authority as to what constitutes consent in the absence of an express verbal statement'” (Anthony<\/em>, 198 Ill. 2d at 202, quoting People v. Henderson<\/em>, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 298, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 154 Ill. Dec. 785 (1990)) the supreme court has recognized that “‘mere acquiescence to apparent authority is not necessarily consent'” (Anthony<\/em>, 198 Ill. 2d at 202, quoting People v. Kelly<\/em>, 76 Ill. App. 3d 80, 87, 394 N.E.2d 739, 31 Ill. Dec. 537 (1979)). Bass admitted that he told defendant “I am going to talk to you inside.” This is not a request. It is an evident display of “apparent authority” to which defendant merely acquiesced.<\/p>\n
The State’s repeated assertion that Bass never “yelled, screamed, *** threatened [or] touched” defendant is both unavailing and misplaced. Consent may not be “extracted ‘by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” (Emphasis added.) Anthony<\/em>, 198 Ill. 2d at 202, 761 N.E.2d at 1192, quoting Bustamonte<\/em>, 412 U.S. at 228, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 863, 93 S. Ct. at 2048 (1973). Bass’s tactics were more than “subtly coercive.” Bass at minimum implied that force would be employed to secure his final entry when he blocked defendant in the door to the residence and stated affirmatively his intent to enter in spite of defendant’s request to speak outside.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Dirty license plate was not cause for a stop that led to the defendant being ordered out of the car and the officer seeing drug paraphernalia. 75% of the license plate was visible [and a computer check would verify its validity]. State v. Brooks, 2007 Ohio 344, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 302 (11th Dist. January 26, 2007).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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