Aside from pre-Jones placement of a GPS device on defendant\u2019s vehicle to track it for six days, there was probable cause for stop and search of the vehicle, so the motion to suppress is denied. A cell phone \u201cdump\u201d by the DEA and returning the phone was an unreasonable search. The fact a cell phone is a tool of the trade of drug traffickers was not enough. United States v. Lujan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95804 (N.D. Miss. July 10, 2012):<\/p>\n
The Government has not, at either the hearing or through briefing, established that Lujan’s cell phone contained evidence of a crime, or that there was probable cause to believe such evidence existed on his cell phone. The Government asserts that cell phones have been recognized as tools of the narcotics trade, and that is enough to justify its warrantless search. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “cell phones contain a wealth of private information, including emails, text messages, call histories, address books, and subscriber numbers.” United States v. Zavala<\/a>, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008). Indeed, a cell phone is “similar to a personal computer that is carried on one’s person. Id. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information. Id. Because cell phones contain such a wealth of private information, in this situation, where no probable cause has been established as to Lujan’s cell phone, the evidence must be suppressed. Indeed, requiring the government to secure a warrant prior to searching the contents of a properly seized cell phone is typically not overly burdensome in light of the privacy interests at stake. See United States v. Burgess<\/a>, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the “vast amounts of diverse personal information” contained in electronic devices).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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