{"id":7344,"date":"2012-06-25T11:05:35","date_gmt":"2012-06-25T11:03:52","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2012-06-25T11:03:52","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=7344","title":{"rendered":"SCOTUS: AZ “papers please” law can lead to unconstitutional detentions"},"content":{"rendered":"

SB 1070, the Arizona \u201cpapers please\u201d law held constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part and the court was concerned with lengthening detentions based on suspected illegal status without only a hunch. Arizona v. United States<\/a>, first from the syllabus:<\/p>\n

(c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, \u00a76 too creates an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being \u201cin the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,\u201d for example, but only where the alien \u201cis likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.\u201d \u00a71357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer\u2019s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., \u00a71357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to \u201ccooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,\u201d \u00a71357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by \u00a76. Pp. 15\u201319.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Then from 22-23 of the opinion:<\/p>\n

Some who support the challenge to \u00a72(B) argue that, in practice, state officers will be required to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. See, e.g., Brief for Former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard et al. as Amici Curiae 37, n. 49. Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 (2005) (\u201cA seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission\u201d). And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. Cf. Part IV\u2013C, supra (concluding that Arizona may not authorize warrantless arrests on the basis of removability). The program put in place by Congress does not allow state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism. <\/p>\n

But \u00a72(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. To take one example, a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification. The first sentence of \u00a72(B) instructs officers to make a \u201creasonable\u201d attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE if there is reasonable suspicion that his presence in the United States is unlawful. The state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12, n. 4 (\u201c[Section 2(B)] does not require the verification be completed during the stop or detention if that is not reasonable or practicable\u201d); cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where questioning about immigration status did not prolong a stop).<\/p>\n

To take another example, a person might be held pending release on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. As this goes beyond a mere stop, the arrestee (unlike the jaywalker) would appear to be subject to the categorical requirement in the second sentence of \u00a72(B) that \u201c[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person\u2019s immigration status determined before [he] is released.\u201d State courts may read this as an instruction to initiate a status check every time someone is arrested, or in some subset of those cases, rather than as a command to hold the person until the check is complete no matter the circumstances. Even if the law is read as an instruction to complete a check while the person is in custody, moreover, it is not clear at this stage and on this record that the verification process would result in prolonged detention.<\/p>\n

However the law is interpreted, if \u00a72(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive preemption\u2014at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 589 (1948) (authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law); …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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