The prosecutor\u2019s comment on defendant\u2019s refusal to let the police look at the soles of his shoes was not a comment on the exercise of a constitutional right because there was no expectation of privacy in the soles of one\u2019s shoes under state precedent. State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 283 P.3d 795 (App. 2012).<\/p>\n
Defendant was suspected of a murder and the police had the weapon and probable cause for her. There was a substantial basis for issuing a search warrant for her house to look for more. Hughes v. State<\/a>, 90 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2012).* [Note: What is missing from this case is a discussion of nexus: What is the relationship of the murder to the house or potential evidence in the house? Sure defendant lived there, but more has to be required. Granted, cases say \u201cis it a reasonable and normal inference that evidence will be found in one\u2019s house after a crime, a normal base of operations?\u201d They never say what. Here, they found shoes linked to the murder, but they had no idea before; this was a general rummaging. Thus, the case virtually stands for the proposition that a murder suspect\u2019s house is subject to search even though the murder didn\u2019t occur there. Remember also that there is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, so does this case mean that there is a murder suspect exception to nexus?]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading