Motion to suppress filed twelve days before trial and a month after the motions cutoff was clearly untimely and there is no good cause tendered for the delay. Nevertheless, the court will go to the merits [meaning: the court can rule against the defense anyway, so why leave this 2255 issue looming?]. \u201c[I]ncluding but not limited to\u201d in a search warrant with a specific list is not an authorization for a general search because it has to be read in context of what it connects to. Even so, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Staton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83933 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2012):<\/p>\n
Thus, general phrases in a warrant must be read in the context of the entire warrant and not in isolation. Andresen<\/a>, 427 U.S. at 473; see also United States v. Johnson<\/a>, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that warrants must be read as a whole). Here, the phrase “including but not limited to,” followed by the list of materials, certainly is not separate from the list of items to be searched and seized. Based upon a reasonable reading of the language, “including but not limited to” refers to and modifies the prior phrase “business records.” If anything, the list of seven categories of materials, and specific examples, that follow define the term “business records” more narrowly and therefore limit, rather than expand, the scope of the searches. Accordingly, the three warrants at issue are not general warrants. See $92,422.57<\/a>, 307 F.3d at 149 (holding that while the scope of the warrant at issue “was certainly extensive, the warrant was not general” since the warrant “‘describ[ed] in … inclusive generic terms what is to be seized'” and “did not vest the executing officers with ‘unbridled discretion’ to search for and seize whatever they wished”); …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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