The defendant’s employer had a computer use and e-mail policy that effectively eliminated all reasonable expectation of privacy in the system or defendant’s own work station. United States v. Hassoun, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3404 (S.D. Fla. January 17, 2007):<\/p>\n
However, the Defendant argues in his objections that the employer’s ownership of the seized computer and components and the existence of the above-quoted policy, which does not forbid all personal use of computers and allows for employee monitoring of an employee’s work computer, is not dispositive of the employee’s expectation of privacy.<\/p>\n
In his R & R, the Magistrate Judge relied on cases that did not forbid all personal uses of the employer’s computer and\/or computer network systems. United States v. Angevine,<\/em> 281 F. 3d. 1130 (10th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Scrushy,<\/em> No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2005 WL 4149004 (N.D. Ala. 2005). Moreover, MarCom’s policy did not limit in any way its right to monitor an employee’s computer. Although the MarCom policy did not forbid employees’ personal use of their assigned computers, the policy makes clear that all uses –work or personal, would be subject to the company’s monitoring. “Employer monitoring is largely an assumed practice, and thus…a disseminated computer-use policy is entirely sufficient to defeat any expectation that an employee might nonetheless harbor.” United States v. Ziegler<\/em>, 456 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In a forfeiture case, the record supports the finding that the claimant consented to a search of the vehicle that produced the cash. Jury verdict of relation to drugs was supported by the evidence. United States v. Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Dollars in United States Currency, 214 Fed. Appx. 432 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
A suspicionless search of a known parolee, under the authority of Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 3067(a), did not violate the Fourth Amendment. That section applied to defendant’s parole via \u00a7 3067(c) because the underlying offense for his parole was committed on March 7, 2001. Because even a suspicionless search of a person known by police to be a California parolee subject to \u00a7 3067(a) was not unconstitutional, defendant’s challenge to the search based on lack of reasonable suspicion failed. The court noted that defendant did not challenge the search as arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. United States v. Dixon, 217 Fed. Appx. 712 (9th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished) (virtually quoting from the Lexis Overview).<\/p>\n
Police responded to a 911 call that someone in the area of defendant’s house was firing a shotgun at their house. Police arrived and found shotgun shells on the ground, and defendant was associated with the premises. He was removed from the area. Officers then talked with his girlfriend, and they learned that she had moved into the house months earlier. She also paid the telephone bill. She had apparent authority to consent, and Randolph<\/em> did not apply. United States v. Groves, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3518 (N.D. Ind. January 17, 2007)* (on remand from the Seventh Circuit in light of Randolph<\/em> which was decided after briefing).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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