Probation officers conducted a home visit of a probationer, and he was being visited by defendant. When defendant left, he took a bag with him which the officers decided to search. Their authority extended only to the probationer and not his visitor, the suppression motion was properly granted. The officers could not seize defendant. Commonwealth v. Scott, 2007 PA Super 16, 916 A.2d 695 (2007):<\/p>\n
[*P5] Further, unless there are exigent circumstances, none of which existed here, a search of [probationer] McDowell’s residence must have been supported by reasonable suspicion that, “the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” Searches by county probation and parole officers, supra.<\/em> That is to say, if there had been evidence McDowell was under supervision for a drug offense, then perhaps the officers would have had reasonable suspicion for the search, but they still would have needed a supervisor’s approval absent exigent circumstances. Here, no such suspicion existed; in fact, Officer Yasenchak testified his sole purpose for being at McDowell’s residence was to conduct a routine home visit, and Officer Kerstetter testified he went along on the “spur of the moment.” N.T. at 6, 44. Even if one were to concede the officers had the “right” to conduct a Terry<\/em> stop, which this Court specifically denies, the officers had no reasonable basis (suspicion) upon which to detain appellee. Once the bag was removed from the premises by appellee, the officers had no authority to detain appellee, search the bag that he removed from McDowell’s residence, or do anything other than perhaps call the police on McDowell’s behalf, if they believed the bag was being stolen. No evidence was presented to suggest the officers believed appellee to be armed and dangerous, warranting a search for their protection. Suppression was properly granted. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Habeas petitioner did not file a suppression motion before trial, but he raised the issues on appeal, and the state appeals court reached the merits, denying relief. He had his fair opportunity to litigate the suppression issue under Stone v. Powell<\/em>, and his certificate of appealability (“COA”) is denied. Webster v. AG of Oklahoma, 213 Fed. Appx. 664 (10th Cir. 2007).* (Note: This opinion is the first I’ve encountered to attempt to comply with new F.R.A.P. 32.1. It does not say it is “unpublished,” just not binding.)<\/p>\n
Likewise, a 2255 petitioner who admitted that he consented to a search and then never pursued the search claim could not claim counsel was ineffective for not raising it. Lopez-Contreras v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2357 (M.D. Fla. January 11, 2007).*<\/p>\n
On the government’s motion to reconsider, two informants independently provided information about the defendant that corroborated each other. This, coupled with defendant’s actions, gave the officers at least reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, and that permitted the officers to pat the defendant down for weapons when they stopped him. United States v. Maxfield, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2364 (D. Utah January 11, 2007)* (Note: The court was concerned that this issue was not fully raised in the first response to the motion, but it gave the government an opportunity to argue it again, this time siding with the government.)<\/p>\n
Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a \u00a7 1983 action, which is deemed consent to granting the motion under local rule. Nevertheless, the court goes to the merits, and plaintiff loses because the officers’ actions were reasonable in making a stop of a potentially stolen vehicle and his subsequent detention. Hudson v. City of North Las Vegas, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2377 (D. Nev. January 4, 2007):<\/p>\n
Hudson has neither alleged, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Defendants were not diligent in performing their investigation or that the scope of their investigation ventured into areas unrelated to their suspicion of a car theft. Although Defendants ultimately determined Hudson was not stealing the vehicle, that does not mean Defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to perform the stop. The Fourth Amendment accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Gallegos,<\/em> 308 F.3d at 992.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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