{"id":6953,"date":"2012-06-10T19:35:35","date_gmt":"2012-04-08T00:13:06","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2012-04-07T15:24:27","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6953","title":{"rendered":"UT: Refusal of consent does not end stop where there is RS"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Defendant\u2019s refusal of consent did not dispel reasonable suspicion nor mandate ending the stop if there is reasonable suspicion. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.utcourts.gov\/opinions\/appopin\/gomez040512.pdf\">State v. Gomez<\/a>, 2012 UT App 102, 275 P.3d 1073, 705 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (2012):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[*P11] To the extent that Gomez is asserting that his refusal to consent to the search ended the investigation as a matter of law, we do not agree. Courts generally hold that refusal to consent cannot establish or\u2014according to some courts\u2014even support reasonable suspicion. &#8230; The Tenth Circuit has well stated the rationale of these cases: &#8220;If refusal of consent were a basis for reasonable suspicion, nothing would be left of Fourth Amendment protections. A motorist who consented to a search could be searched; and a motorist who refused consent could be searched, as well.&#8221; Santos, 403 F.3d at 1125-26; see also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1351 (10th Cir. 1998) (&#8220;Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine.&#8221;).<\/p>\n<p>[*P12] However, the issue here is not whether refusal to consent <em>supports<\/em> reasonable suspicion, but whether it <em>dispels<\/em> reasonable suspicion, or at any rate terminates an officer&#8217;s attempts to confirm or dispel his or her original reasonable suspicion. On this point, the case law is equally clear. Gomez &#8220;cites no case law, and we have found none, that would require [the officer] to ignore all that he had observed and all that he knew up to the moment he asked for consent.&#8221; See Leal, 235 F. App&#8217;x at 940. Indeed, courts routinely hold post-refusal detentions to be supported by pre-refusal reasonable suspicion under an ordinary totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. &#8230; Thus, a brief investigative detention of a suspect who has refused consent, like any other official detention, is lawful to the extent it is supported by reasonable suspicion, and the investigating officer acts diligently to pursue a means of investigation likely to quickly confirm or dispel that suspicion. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.<\/p>\n<p>[*P13] Nor do we agree with Gomez that, as a factual matter, once he denied consent to search, Officer Speeth &#8220;had done all that he could to quickly confirm or dispel his suspicion that Gomez was involved [in] drug trafficking.&#8221; Gomez&#8217;s own response to the officer&#8217;s request suggested a further avenue of investigation. When the officer made the original request, Gomez did not consent, but neither did he categorically refuse consent. He gave a response from which the officer inferred that &#8220;some of the other occupants had something incriminating inside the hotel room.&#8221; That inference cued up the next logical step in the investigation: determining whether Gomez&#8217;s companions would object to a search of the hotel room. When they disclaimed any interest in the room, the officer again approached Gomez. This time, Gomez consented.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>b2evALnk.b2WPAutP <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6953\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"pingsdone","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6953","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6953","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6953"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6953\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6953"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6953"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6953"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}