The officer made a traffic stop of defendants’ truck and then asked them questions about their destination, which was somewhat inconsistent. The district court found the inconsistency, not followed up on, to not amount to reasonable suspicion to continue the detention and ask for consent. Nervousness added nothing. United States v. Robinson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94355 (S.D. Miss. December 29, 2006):<\/p>\n
In this case, Deputy Redditt testified that the driver and passenger gave inconsistent answers to the deputies’ questions: the driver claimed the passenger was his cousin, the passenger stated they were not related; the driver stated their destination was in Texas, the passenger said Louisiana. Redditt testified that he felt it was unusual for an 18-wheeler to be traveling without a load. (Transcript, p. 20). He also stated that the driver appeared to be nervous. (Transcript, p. 20).<\/p>\n
In Jenson,<\/em> the Fifth Circuit found that the government had not shown reasonable suspicion beyond the time it took the license checks to clear; thus, the extended stop was illegal. The reasons given by the government for the prolonged stop were “(1) It took an unusually long time for Jenson’s van to pull over, (2) Jenson’s excessive talkativeness indicated nervousness, and (3) Jenson and [his passenger] Cotton appeared to give inconsistent answers.” 462 F.3d at 404. The court disregarded the inconsistent answers because they occurred after “the initial purpose of the stop [had] been fulfilled.” Id. However, the court also found that the officer could have dispelled his suspicions by asking follow-up questions. Id. at 404 n.4 (citing Florida v. Royer,<\/em> 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining that an officer should use “the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time”)).<\/p>\n
The remaining reasons were found by the Fifth Circuit to be “relatively weak by comparison to the facts in our relevant precedents.” Id. at 405 (citing United States v. Jones,<\/em> 234 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 2000) (no reasonable suspicion to search vehicle even though one occupant had a previous arrest on a crack cocaine charge); Santiago,<\/em> 310 F.3d at 338-39 (search unreasonable even though defendant lied to officer about the identity of a passenger)). “More importantly,” the court found, “the government [did] not present adequate evidence of a nexus between Jenson’s allegedly suspicious behavior and any specific criminal activity.” Jenson<\/em>, 462 Fed.3d at 405. The Fifth Circuit concluded that because the officer “[had] not articulated any particular connection between the allegedly suspicious behavior and drug or weapons possession, beyond the fact the driver’s hesitation in pulling over may have been the product of intent to conceal,” the government had not shown reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop once Jenson’s ID cleared. Id.<\/em> at 406.<\/p>\n
In the case at bar, the inconsistency concerning Thompson and Richardson’s stated destination, Louisiana or Texas, becomes less glaring if one considers the further explanation that they were “looking for a load.” At any rate, the officers apparently did not attempt to dispel their suspicions with further questions. The conflict concerning whether Thompson and Richardson were cousins or not is certainly no more suspicious than the lie about a passenger’s identity in Santiago. Similarly, Thompson’s nervousness, without more, does not create a reasonable suspicion. The officers failed to articulate reasonable suspicion sufficient to prolong the traffic stop past the time it took to clear the occupants’ driver’s licenses. See Jenson,<\/em> 462 F.3d at 406.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Cracked windshield was grounds for a stop, even if it turned out that the cracked windshield was not illegal per se in Kentucky. United States v. Carter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 696 (W.D. Ky. January 3, 2007).*<\/p>\n
In a case with five search warrants in an environmental case involving a host of issues, defendant’s staleness challenge was defeated by officer’s reconfirmation of material ongoing facts the day before the affidavit was prepared. The affidavit also showed probable cause to search the defendant’s computer in his residence as a records search because the officers were looking for records of a bypass system. In the ten years experience of the officer, recited in the warrant, even polluters keep records at home. United States v. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94369 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006) (Note:<\/em> The court also engaged in a detailed finding that the good faith exception would apply.). In a related case with one defendant, the same court found that officers looking in a building to determine whether it was a source of waste water could look in a black bag found in the building, rejecting the contention that looking in the black bag exceeded the scope of the warrant [which it did] by finding plain view [the bag was in plain view, but its contents were not]. United States v. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94368 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2006). (Note:<\/em> I find the black bag search to be indefensible.)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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