A search warrant that named defendant at his house did not permit a general search of defendant wherever he was found; a frisk yes. United States v. Andrews, 847 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Mass. 2012):<\/p>\n
I find that the warrant in this case did not permit a general search of the defendant away from the premises, 452 Kempton Street, although the pat-frisk of him was reasonable. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Commonwealth v. Santiago<\/a>, 410 Mass. 737, 741-742 (1991), and Professor LaFave indicate that, in the context of the language in the search warrant in this case, the officers were authorized by the warrant to search Andrews only at 452 Kempton Street. See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, \u00a74.9(a) (“Sometimes the search warrant which is being executed will describe not only certain premises but also a person. There is no inherent defect in a single warrant which authorizes the search of a place and also a person, and thus a search of the named person when he is found at the place will be a valid search under the warrant.”).<\/p>\n
The warrant was for contraband, not for mere evidence of a crime. Andrews was a felon and known to be a felon. It was a federal crime for him to possess a gun. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7922(g). In addition, he did not have an FID card. See M.G.L. c. 140, \u00a7129C. The search for guns at 452 Kempton Street was a search for contraband in the circumstances of this case.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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