{"id":6490,"date":"2012-05-28T20:56:45","date_gmt":"2012-01-03T00:08:01","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2011-12-31T17:42:06","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6490","title":{"rendered":"CA5: A ruse drug checkpoint on an interstate highway does not violate the Fourth Amendment"},"content":{"rendered":"

Plaintiff filed a \u00a7 1983 case alleging that a ruse drug interdiction checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment, but lost. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond<\/a> only applies to actual roadblocks. Webb v. Arbuckle<\/a>, 456 Fed. Appx. 374 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):<\/p>\n

Numerous courts have upheld the constitutionality of ruse checkpoint operations like the one in this case or have implicitly approved of their use. For instance, in United States v. Martinez<\/a>, 358 F.3d 1005, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 2004), officers stopped Orlando Martinez (\u201cMartinez\u201d) for rolling through a stop sign at the top of an exit ramp that followed a sign advising of an upcoming drug checkpoint. Martinez argued that the police were operating an illegal checkpoint, relying in part on Edmond<\/a>. Id. at 1008. The court rejected Martinez\u2019s contention, distinguishing Edmond<\/a> as involving an \u201cactual checkpoint[] at which motorists were stopped regardless of whether they had committed a traffic violation\u201d and noting that \u201c[a]ny traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.\u201d Id. at 1008-09 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court further noted that \u201c[t]he fact that the officers may have believed Martinez was carrying illegal drugs does not invalidate an otherwise valid stop.\u201d Id. at 1009 (citation omitted). In upholding the constitutionality of another ruse checkpoint operation on similar grounds, the court in United States v. Williams<\/a>, 359 F.3d 1019, 1021 (8th Cir. 2004) stated that \u201cthe deputy here probably pursued the traffic violation because he suspected drug trafficking …. But a law enforcement officer\u2019s ulterior motives in initiating contact with an individual (or his pursuit of the more general programmatic purposes of the operation) are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment question when probable cause … exists.\u201d). In addressing a ruse checkpoint operation, the Seventh Circuit stated:<\/p>\n

Wendt argues that based on City of Indianapolis v. Edmond<\/a> …, the traffic stop was unreasonable because the officers lacked individualized suspicion. Moreover, Wendt asserts that the DEA established a \u201cprogrammatic regiment\u201d to stop and search cars with out-of-state license plates for drugs. An automobile stop will violate the Constitution if it is deemed \u201cunreasonable\u201d under the circumstances. The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Wendt\u2019s reliance on Edmond<\/a> is misplaced.<\/p>\n

In Edmond<\/a>, the police established various drug checkpoints, where officers stopped and questioned the driver of every car that passed through. The Supreme Court found that officers seized motorists without any particularized suspicion, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, here, the traffic stop was conducted based on the officers\u2019 reasonable belief that traffic violations had occurred.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

United States v. Wendt<\/a>, 465 F.3d 814, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Similarly, in United States v. Flynn<\/a>, 309 F.3d 736, 738-39 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth Circuit held the use of a ruse checkpoint was constitutional and rejected the argument that such checkpoints were illegal under Edmond<\/a>. As these courts have noted, ruse checkpoint operations that stop cars only when there is probable cause, such as the sign detail operation at issue in the instant case, are distinguishable from Edmond<\/a> and are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Edmond<\/a>, 531 U.S. at 47 (\u201cWhen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as here, however, stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.\u201d).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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