Officer\u2019s mere hunch of wrongdoing was not reasonable suspicion. The claim of reasonable suspicion fails, and the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Preciado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146366 (W.D. Tex. December 20, 2011):<\/p>\n
The Fifth Circuit case law continues to develop in this area. Recently, the Court reversed a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress a firearm uncovered during a warrantless automobile search. See U.S. v. Macias<\/a>, 658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2011). In Macias, that defendant argued that before the officer ran the computer checks, the officer engaged in detailed questioning about matters unrelated to the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, his proof of insurance, the vehicle registration, or the purpose and itinerary of his trip that unreasonably prolonged the detention without developing reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Id. at 518. The Macias<\/a> Court determined that the unrelated questions impermissibly extended the duration of the stop. The Government argued that Trooper Barragan was permitted to ask these questions because, as soon as he stopped Macias, he had reasonable suspicion that Macias was involved in criminal activity. Distinguishing Brigham, the Macias Court stated that the Brigham officer\u2019s \u201cincreasing suspicion was also fueled by Brigham\u2019s extreme nervousness, his avoidance of eye contact, and his pattern of answering the officer\u2019s questions with questions of his own.\u201d Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508. Accordingly, the Macias<\/a> Court found that the Brigham officer\u2019s questioning represented \u201ca graduated response to emerging facts\u201d whereas Trooper Barragan \u201ccould only point to Macias\u2019s extreme nervousness, which is not sufficient to support the extended detention.\u201d Macias<\/a>, 658 F. 3d. at 520. The Macias Court also stated that \u201cpotentially undercutting Trooper Barragan\u2019s reasonable suspicion is the Government\u2019s failure to present any evidence that sets out Trooper Barragan\u2019s experience.\u201d Id.<\/p>\n
In this case, the Government established that Trooper Cipriani had four years of law enforcement experience, had conducted numerous vehicle stops and had attended \u201cinterdiction\u201d schools, where he has received training in body language and vehicle indicators to detect contraband. The above notwithstanding, looking at the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Cipriani did not have a \u201cparticularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.\u201d U.S. v. Vasquez, 253 Fed. Appx. 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2007). Reasonable suspicion may not be based on \u201cinarticulate hunches of wrongdoing.\u201d U.S. v. Thibodeaux, 276 Fed. Appx. 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2008). The Trooper had \u201cmere uneasy feelings\u201d about the believability of what he was being told. However, that does not constitute articulable facts that support a reasonable suspicion. U.S. v. Cavitt, 550 F. 3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2008).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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