By denying living at the place searched, defendant lacked standing to challenge its search. Armstrong v. State, 2026 Miss. App. LEXIS 151 (Mar. 31, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, \u201cBailey’s non-compliance with the deputies’ commands and expressions of suicidal intent\u2014with an alleged gun, from behind a closed door\u2014 supported a reasonable belief that there was a need for force.\u201d Bailey v. Simmons, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66985 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIndeed, the absence of invasive conduct here is notable. A personal seizure usually comes with at least some interrogation, pat-down, express restraint, isolation, securing of the scene, seeking of consent, physical search, or charges, etc. Derosha’s database check and use of Tate’s full name did not approach this level of invasive conduct. And Derosha did not make escalated use of the police vehicle. A reasonable person, trying to tell whether he were free to walk away from an officer in a marked vehicle, would look for the emergency lights or spotlight, listen for the siren or public-address speaker, or see whether the officer exited the vehicle. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575; Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (discussing Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489U.S. 593, 597 (1989)); \u2026.\u201d Tate v. Derosha, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67612 (W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2026).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
By denying living at the place searched, defendant lacked standing to challenge its search. Armstrong v. State, 2026 Miss. App. LEXIS 151 (Mar. 31, 2026). In addition, \u201cBailey’s non-compliance with the deputies’ commands and expressions of suicidal intent\u2014with an alleged … Continue reading