{"id":63734,"date":"2026-03-30T05:33:56","date_gmt":"2026-03-30T10:33:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=63734"},"modified":"2026-03-30T05:33:56","modified_gmt":"2026-03-30T10:33:56","slug":"ia-backpack-carried-into-premises-by-visitor-just-before-sw-executed-was-within-scope-of-warrant","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=63734","title":{"rendered":"IA: Backpack carried into premises by visitor just before SW executed was within scope of warrant"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Police were watching a Des Moines house waiting to execute a search warrant. Defendant showed up and entered the house with a backpack. Then they entered on the warrant. The backpack was within the particular description in the warrant. When the police entered, the backpack was in a corner of the room on the floor. Ybarra dealt with the search of a person on the premises, but this was a container on the premises within the scope of the warrant. If it were on him, the result likely would have been different. (Incidentally, defendant disclaimed ownership of the backpack. Abandonment is discussed but not relied upon.) <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iowacourts.gov\/courtcases\/24924\/embed\/SupremeCourtOpinion\">State v. Porter<\/a>, 2026 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 37 (Mar. 27, 2026):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--more-->\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>We decline to extend the Ybarra exception to personal effects or other items on the premises that may belong to a person not identified in the search warrant but not in the physical possession of that person. First, there is a qualitative difference between the search of a person and an unattended effect. A search of the person requires physical contact with or, at a minimum, close physical intrusion upon the human body. Such searches can be degrading in ways that opening a container simply is not. Because &#8220;searches of a person involve a higher degree of intrusiveness, [they] require justification in addition to that provided by the probable cause that supports a premises warrant.&#8221; State v. Gilstrap, 235 Ariz. 296, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014). But this rationale does not extend to personal effects not in the physical possession of a person. The search of such an item, while still a search, is qualitatively less intrusive and does not require the particularized probable cause that Ybarra demands. As we explained in State v. Scullark, searches of a &#8220;person are treated differently from a search&#8221; of other areas or items. 23 N.W.3d at 55.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Second, the physical-possession rule follows from the probable cause determination made in support of issuing a premises warrant. The constitutional text requires that a warrant &#8220;particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.&#8221; U.S. Const. amend. IV. A premises warrant satisfies this requirement by identifying a specific location and the evidence expected to be found at that location. The magistrate&#8217;s probable cause finding is directed to the place and not any particular person or persons who may be present when the warrant is executed. The magistrate need not know, and typically will not know, who will be on the premises or what containers will be present. What matters is that there is probable cause to believe the specified evidence may be found at the specified location. A premises warrant issued to find evidence of controlled substances in a house thus &#8220;permits the police to search everywhere in the house, because &#8216;everywhere&#8217; is where the contraband may be hidden.&#8221; United States v. Bishop, 910 F.3d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2018). This necessarily includes containers on the premises capable of concealing the objects of the search, regardless of who owns them. A backpack in the corner of the room not in the physical possession of any person is simply another container on the premises legally undifferentiated for Fourth Amendment purposes from closets, drawers, or any other repository within the scope of the warrant. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 821.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Third, the conclusion that the scope of the warrant includes any personal effects not in the physical possession of a person not identified in the warrant is supported by Iowa caselaw. Iowa appellate decisions have repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment does not require peace officers executing a premises warrant to obtain separate warrants for each separate thing on site that could contain evidence of criminal wrongdoing as identified in the warrant. See, e.g., State v. Stockman, No. 20-1360, 974 N.W.2d 543, 2022 WL 109183, at *6-7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (holding that &#8220;officers were authorized to search [the defendant&#8217;s] purse found in the master bedroom where she was located when the search commenced&#8221; because &#8220;[s]uch search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment&#8221;); State v. Barbosa-Quinones, No. 08-1830, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 1562, 2009 WL 4111127, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2009) (&#8220;[T]he defendant&#8217;s purse was an item that could be searched, as it was in the residence to be searched where the defendant lived and could have reasonably concealed items of the kind portrayed in the warrant.&#8221;); State v. Fisher, No. 99-1098, 2000 Iowa App. LEXIS 121, 2000 WL 1724552, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2000) (&#8220;[U]nder the warrant, police could search all places small enough to conceal matches\u2026. Because of the small items detailed in the warrant, the officers could legitimately conduct a thorough search of [the defendant&#8217;s] room and all of its contents.&#8221;); Munz v. State, 382 N.W.2d 693, 699 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (&#8220;[E]ven if the warrant-executing officers did in fact search jars and canisters of foodstuffs, as [the defendant] alleges, these were legitimate locations to be searched given the size of the objects [(photographs)] to be seized.&#8221;).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, our conclusion is supported by persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions that have considered the same issue. The Arizona Supreme Court&#8217;s decision in State v. Gilstrap is particularly instructive. 235 Ariz. 296, 332 P.3d 43. There, police executing a premises warrant searched a visitor&#8217;s purse that was not in her physical possession. Id. at 44. The court held the search was within the scope of the warrant. Id. at 47. The court explained that the physical-possession test &#8220;aligns with the Supreme Court&#8217;s decisions in Ybarra and Wyoming v. Houghton&#8221; because &#8220;Ybarra limits the principle that a premises warrant authorizes police to search any item that might contain the object of the search by holding that the warrant does not authorize the search of a person it does not name.&#8221; Id. at 46. The court further observed that the physical-possession test is simple, precise, and offers better guidance to law enforcement than alternative approaches. Id.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Other state courts agree. See Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1988) (&#8220;[T]he police are not prohibited from searching a visitor&#8217;s personal property (not on the person) located on premises in which a search warrant is being executed when that property is part of the general content of the premises and is a plausible repository for the object of the search.&#8221;); State v. Merritt, 567 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018) (adopting physical-possession test); Andrews, 549 N.W.2d at 218 (&#8220;[P]olice can search all items found on the premises that are plausible repositories for objects named in the search warrant, except those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant, irrespective of the person&#8217;s status in relation to the premises.&#8221;).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Federal circuit courts have reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1420 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a premises warrant authorized the search of a visitor&#8217;s briefcase because the briefcase &#8220;could easily contain&#8221; items sought in warrant); United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979, 154 U.S. App. D.C. 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a visitor&#8217;s purse on a coffee table was within the scope of the premises warrant because the purse &#8220;was not being &#8216;worn&#8217; by appellee and thus did not constitute an extension of her person&#8221;); United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that a purse placed on a bed was &#8220;merely another household item subject to the lawful execution of the search warrant&#8221; once the owner set it down and left the room).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Police were watching a Des Moines house waiting to execute a search warrant. Defendant showed up and entered the house with a backpack. Then they entered on the warrant. The backpack was within the particular description in the warrant. When &hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=63734\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[65,59],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-63734","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-particularity","category-scope-of-search"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/63734","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=63734"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/63734\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":63735,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/63734\/revisions\/63735"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=63734"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=63734"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=63734"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}