\u201cThe warrant here, and, specifically, the attachment describing the items to be seized, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Kerrissey argues, first, that the attachment was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of \u2018\u201call records, in whatever form\u201d for multiple businesses without any temporal limitation.\u2019 \u2026 This argument ignores the plain language of the warrant, which limited the records to be seized to violations of a certain statute during a defined time period, that is \u2018evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. [\u00a7] 1343\u2019 from \u2018April 2020 until the present.\u2019 \u2026 Contrary to Kerrissey’s argument, the Court must read this \u2018broad first clause, which identifie[d] the criminal offense[] that the target evidence was expected to establish\u2019 in light of the more \u2018detailed and particularized\u2019 subclauses that follow, whose particularity Kerrissey does not specifically challenge.\u201d United States v. Kerrissey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228510 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An officer who provided information leading to a probable cause determination that has buyer\u2019s remorse later doesn\u2019t undo the probable cause finding. Jackson v. Dickens, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228646 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 20, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u201cThe warrant here, and, specifically, the attachment describing the items to be seized, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Kerrissey argues, first, that the attachment was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of \u2018\u201call records, in whatever form\u201d for multiple … Continue reading