Use of plaintiff\u2019s non-privileged prison calls as evidence was not a Fourth Amendment violation. The fact attorney-client calls were also seized but were segregated and not used as evidence doesn\u2019t state a claim. Criscuolo v. Brandow, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205199 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2025). (But what did they learn from the attorney-client calls, if anything? Doesn\u2019t say. Also note that this is a civil case, not a criminal case, so not purely exclusion.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There was reasonable suspicion for this parole search for a firearm. Such information doesn\u2019t get stale fast. United States v. Quinn, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204996 (M.D. La. Oct. 17, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Overtinted windows justified this stop. State v. Dugas, 2025 La. App. LEXIS 1948 ( La. App. 3 Cir Oct. 15, 2925).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Defendant was driving a stolen car, but it\u2019s a difficult question whether he knew it was when he was driving it. So, going to the merits instead, there was reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the search. United States v. Cherrington, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205211 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Use of plaintiff\u2019s non-privileged prison calls as evidence was not a Fourth Amendment violation. The fact attorney-client calls were also seized but were segregated and not used as evidence doesn\u2019t state a claim. Criscuolo v. Brandow, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS … Continue reading