Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claim that a police officer used ALPR technology to track her for personal reasons didn\u2019t state a Fourth Amendment claim because of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in LPN information. \u201cHere, even if Carpenter provides the correct framework to analyze the purported search, the SAC does not allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer that the LPR database reveals the same \u2018depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach\u2019 of information such as CSLI. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 320. Zambrano alleges only that the LPR helps \u2018pinpoint [a] vehicle’s specific whereabouts at a specific time,\u2019 and that Sylvester accessed her LPR location information approximately 111 times.\u201d Rinaldi v. Sylvester, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187115 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized, or implied, that the defendant’s flight from police officers is the most important factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.\u201d State v. Williams, 2025 La. App. LEXIS 1781 (La. App. 5 Cir. Sep. 24, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cAs a primarily matter, we note that driving a third under the speed limit, which Paez was doing, together with other circumstances, has been held to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving while intoxicated.\u201d Paez v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 7445 (Tex. App. \u2013 San Antonio Sep. 24, 2025).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Plaintiff\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claim that a police officer used ALPR technology to track her for personal reasons didn\u2019t state a Fourth Amendment claim because of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in LPN information. \u201cHere, even if Carpenter … Continue reading