An operating meth lab is inherently dangerous and, therefore, exigent circumstances justifying an immediate warrantless entry to neutralize it. A warrant was obtained to continue the search. Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2006):<\/p>\n
We expressly agree with the conclusions of these courts and hold that the operation of a methamphetamine lab is inherently dangerous, presents an immediate threat to public safety, and is well within the scope of the exigent circumstance exception.<\/p>\n
In the instant case, the detectives had reasonable cause to believe that Barth had a methamphetamine lab in operation within the dwelling based on their experience, facts developed during investigation, and observance of Barth’s activities that day. Thus, their initial entry into the residence was based on clear exigent circumstances and was therefore lawful.<\/p>\n
Because the detectives took the precaution of waiting until the search warrant arrived before reentering the residence and conducting their search, we need not examine whether the exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry also justified the subsequent search and seizure of the evidence Barth sought to have suppressed. Instead, the search was conducted pursuant to a properly executed warrant, and the evidence discovered during that search was therefore admissible. See Segura v. United States,<\/em> 468 U.S. 796, 810, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); State v. Riley,<\/em> 462 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1984); Mercier,<\/em> 579 So. 2d at 309.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Record supports the conclusion that the defendant consented to a search of his person during a traffic stop. State v. Conn, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 935 (November 21, 2006). Nothing is mentioned, however, that this extended the detention of the initial stop or that there was any reasonable suspicion. Apparently, in Tennessee, it is permissible to ask any motorist for a search of the person without cause.<\/p>\n
Inventory of defendant’s car was conducted by a parole officer, even though he was not on parole. The PO was acting as an LEO under state law and as an agent of the officer at the time, and the inventory is valid. State v. Nash, 2006 Ohio 6396, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6346 (5th Dist. December 4, 2006).*<\/p>\n
911 call brought officers to defendant’s residence, and one of the other two occupants consented to an entry and search, which defendant did not dispute. State v. Ramirez, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 928 (December 4, 2006).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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