The officer had reasonable suspicion during the stop from the defendant passenger’s excessive nervousness and his efforts to keep the officer from talking to the driver, his wife. After the officer got her out of the car and talked to her, reasonable suspicion had come together, and consent was sought and refused. Then a drug dog was brought out to sniff the car. The refusal to consent was not a factor in the use of the dog because of the existence of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jones, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88040 (M.D. Tenn. December 5, 2006).<\/p>\n
The exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. United States v. Pittman, 209 Fed. Appx. 725 (9th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished), following United States v. Hebert,<\/em> 201 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).<\/p>\n Confidential informant’s statement satisfied NY’s Aguilar-Spinelli<\/em> rule. People v Collins, 2006 NY Slip Op 9061, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14462 (3d Dept. December 7, 2006):<\/p>\n Judging the warrant, as we must, under the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli<\/em> test …, we conclude that the application was sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the source of the information and the basis of at least one of the confidential informant’s knowledge …. The information provided by the third informant, in affidavit form, was against such informant’s penal interest … and was both thorough and specific concerning defendant’s drug operations at the location sought to be searched …. The identification of defendant as being involved in drug-related activities was also consistent with not only the information provided by the two other informants but also the objective information acquired by the detective that assembled the warrant application …. (citations omitted)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading