Defendant\u2019s claim that the officer was acting pretextually in stopping him is speculative at best. \u201cMr. Ellis also argues that the traffic stop was pretextual. However, an officer’s \u2018actual motivations\u2019 and \u2018[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.\u2019 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. Therefore, even if the traffic stop was pretextual, it does not alter the Court’s conclusion that Lt. Bartlett had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.\u201d One doesn\u2019t automatically get a hearing to flesh out speculation. As for prolonging the stop, it was reasonable based on the return on insurance information which defendant\u2019s wasn\u2019t carrying. United States v. Ellis, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48991 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cUpon learning that Mr. Binion’s license was suspended, the officers had probable cause to arrest him for driving with a suspended license. The officers then searched Mr. Binion, which the officers were permitted to do under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 449 (2013). When the officers recovered suspected narcotics and money from Mr. Binion’s pockets, the officers then had probable cause to believe that Mr. Binion committed a crime involving controlled substances. Mr. Binion’s arrest was therefore lawful.\u201d Then the vehicle search was permitted, too. United States v. Binion, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48999 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2025).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Defendant\u2019s claim that the officer was acting pretextually in stopping him is speculative at best. \u201cMr. Ellis also argues that the traffic stop was pretextual. However, an officer’s \u2018actual motivations\u2019 and \u2018[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth … Continue reading