<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this cell phone search, \u201cAs explained above, however, the first and fourth search categories are sufficiently specific, and defendant conceded below that the third category is sufficiently specific. Further, the sixth category’s command to search for location information\u2014as circumscribed by the limitations included in those categories, such as specific phone numbers, dates, and types of information\u2014is sufficiently specific and does not authorize \u2018undue rummaging.\u2019 See Mansor II, 363 Ore. at 220 (without specificity, digital searches \u2018raise the possibility of computer search warrants \u2026 sanctioning the undue rummaging that the particularity requirement was enacted to preclude\u2019 \u2026).\u201d State v. Meyers<\/a>, 338 Or. App. 59 (Feb. 20, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sovereign citizen\u2019s \u00a7 1983 case was essentially an appeal of state traffic convictions and was barred by Heck. Justice v. Moreau, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29551 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2025).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n The use of force question here is fact bound and not proper for summary judgment. Monroy v. Perez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3875 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" For this cell phone search, \u201cAs explained above, however, the first and fourth search categories are sufficiently specific, and defendant conceded below that the third category is sufficiently specific. Further, the sixth category’s command to search for location information\u2014as circumscribed … Continue reading