Officers set up covert Snapchat accounts to communicate with defendant. He\u2019s not entitled to discovery about that for Brady or Franks purposes because he can\u2019t show materiality. United States v. Stroup, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132483 (D. Mass. July 26, 2024).* [At bottom, where’s the reasonable expectation of privacy in a viewable Shapchat account?]<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Petitioner\u2019s guilty plea waived his Fourth Amendment claim so it couldn\u2019t be raised in a 2255. Thirkill v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18272 (6th Cir. July 24, 2024).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIn arguing that Detective Gillilan did not have reasonable suspicion to investigate the package, Sherrell faces a steep climb from the outset. When a CI provides specific information that is confirmed upon investigation, it is a strong indication of reliability and often justifies reasonable suspicion. \u2026 This is true even if the CI has not always been reliable or even if the CI provided only partially accurate information about the events at issue. \u2026 And we have held that many of the other indicators of criminal activity that are present here will support an officer’s reasonable suspicion.\u201d United States v. Sherrell, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18287 (6th Cir. July 24, 2024).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Officers set up covert Snapchat accounts to communicate with defendant. He\u2019s not entitled to discovery about that for Brady or Franks purposes because he can\u2019t show materiality. United States v. Stroup, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132483 (D. Mass. July 26, … Continue reading