\u201cThe Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts \u2018not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.\u2019 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citation omitted). \u2018The dispositive question is \u201cwhether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.\u201d \u2026 Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.\u201d Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011)).\u201d United States Court of Appeals Fifth Cir. Filed Donald Woods v. Harris County, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6684 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201c\u2018[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an offic[ial] to determine how the relevant legal doctrine \u2026 will apply to the factual situation the offic[ial] confronts.\u2019 Id. (citation omitted). Finally, whether a government official may be held liable \u2018generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness\u2019 of the action, \u2026 assessed in light of the legal rules that were \u201cclearly established\u201d at the time it was taken.\u2019 Jenkins, 838 F.3d at 946-47 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987)).\u201d Davitt v. Spindler-Krage, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6697 (8th Cir. Mar. 21, 2024).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u201cThe Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts \u2018not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.\u2019 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citation omitted). \u2018The dispositive question is \u201cwhether the violative nature of particular … Continue reading