\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court has expressly declined to hold that a parolee categorically has no expectation of privacy in any context, \u2026 Lenhart, as a parolee who was subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of his parole, had no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in his location, \u2026. Nor did Lenhart restore any reasonable expectation of privacy in his location when he illicitly failed to charge or removed his electronic ankle monitor. \u2026 Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Lenhart did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his location, and thus appropriately denied Lenhart’s motion to suppress for lack of standing. Our conclusion on Lenhart’s lack of Fourth Amendment standing obviates the need to address his argument that law enforcement needed a search warrant to obtain data from OnStar regarding the Traverse.\u201d United States v. Lenhart, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22269 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cWe agree with Flood’s argument that the police should have obtained a search warrant for Flood’s cell phone location. Nevertheless, the discovery of Flood’s precise location was inevitable. \u2026 As the result of a controlled call, the police knew Flood was in Orlando at a theme park. When the police went to Orlando to arrest Flood, they did so with an arrest warrant. So we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Flood’s motion to suppress.\u201d Flood v. State<\/a>, 2023 Fla. App. LEXIS 5927 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 23, 2023).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u201cAlthough the Supreme Court has expressly declined to hold that a parolee categorically has no expectation of privacy in any context, \u2026 Lenhart, as a parolee who was subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of his parole, had no … Continue reading