In the case where two brothers, one of whom was a police officer, read about bank robberies in Illinois and determined that their father was the robber, the brothers conducted a search of their father’s house for evidence of the bank robberies. They were determined to be acting as private citizens for the purpose of the search, even though the officer brother came with a bulletproof vest and badge. United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. November 6, 2006).<\/p>\n
Reasonable suspicion not required for a knock and talk. Consent was not coerced. Officers asked for ID and returned it before asking for consent. United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. November 6, 2006).<\/p>\n
Having been told he was free to leave, the defendant voluntarily consented to further discussion with the officer that [apparently was a stall to keep them there long enough and] led to a dog sniff. United States v. Farrior, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80560 (W.D. Va. November 3, 2006)* (it’s a close question):<\/p>\n
The court finds that the defendant’s initial consent to search the vehicle was voluntarily given. The fact that Officer Morris returned Farrior’s license and explicitly told Farrior that he was free to go before asking the defendant to consent to a search of his vehicle strongly indicates that no seizure occurred at that point within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Weaver,<\/em> 282 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2002). That fact alone, however, is not dispositive. The voluntariness of Farrior’s consent is also supported by the circumstances surrounding Officer Morris’ request and Farrior’s response. Officer Morris testified that after telling the defendant that he was free to go, he asked Farrior if he would step out of the car. Farrior responded that he could talk from inside the car. Officer Morris proceeded to do so. Officer Morris testified that he explained to Farrior that the Town of Pulaski was having a lot of drug problems in that area. Officer Morris next asked Farrior if he had any drugs or guns, to which Farrior replied in the negative. Officer Morris then asked Farrior if he could search his car. Farrior consented and stepped out of the car. The court believes that these circumstances indicate that Farrior was not intimidated and that a reasonable person in his position would believe that he had a choice to exercise. Therefore, the court finds and concludes that a reasonable person in Farrior’s position would have felt free to decline Officer Morris’ request.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Apparent overseizure of computer equipment was reasonable. Warrant specified one document, in paper or electronic form, and the police seized 16 computers for off-site analysis. United States v. Cook, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80557 (W.D. Wash. November 3, 2006):<\/p>\n
The object of the search was a document titled “Secured Promissory Note,” and all copies of the document, whether in hard-copy or electronic form. Id. at 23. The warrant authorized the seizure and removal of computer systems and components for off-site forensic analysis. Id. at 24. The search took place on June 29, 2005, and included both a hand search for documents and the removal of sixteen computer systems with seventeen hard drives and various removable storage media. See Johnson Decl., docket no. 126, P 3. Special Agent Kim Young, a computer forensic examiner, took control of the sixteen computers and spent approximately 21 hours imaging their seventeen hard drives. Id. P 4. Agent Young completed her imaging on June 30, 2005. Id. Twelve computers were returned to the Cooks on July 5, 2005, and the remaining four computers were returned on August 22, 2005. Id.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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