Consent to search given to armed officers arresting the defendant at his house at 6 am after surrounding it was not shown to be voluntary. United States v. Real Property and Premises Known as 90-23 201st Street, Hollis, New York, 775 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. N.Y. 2011)*:<\/p>\n
Here, the court finds that the government has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Young voluntarily consented to the police entry into his home. On the morning of October 13, 2005, seven armed agents went to Young\u2019s residence at 6 a.m. to arrest him. The number of armed agents who went to Young\u2019s residence, coupled with the very early morning hour at which they approached, created an environment that was implicitly coercive. When the agents surrounded the home upon arrival and began \u201cknocking\u201d and \u201cpounding\u201d on all the doors and the windows, they intensified that coercion. Young\u2019s failure to answer the door for several minutes in response to agents \u201cpounding\u201d and \u201cknocking\u201d constituted a refusal to admit the agents. The agents persisted for fifteen minutes in the face of Young\u2019s refusal. Under such circumstances, he could reasonably have concluded that the agents would not leave unless the door was opened. After opening the door, Young was faced with three armed agents at his front door demanding entry into his home, at which point he \u201cgrudgingly\u201d allowed them to enter, even though he was \u201cannoyed\u201d and \u201cunhappy\u201d about their presence. Given these circumstances, a reasonable person would understand Young\u2019s consent to entry to be submission to authority, not a voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. Thus, the court finds Young\u2019s consent invalid.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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