Defendant was stopped in Arizona for no vehicle license, which turned out to be mistaken. In the vehicle was the defendant and three small children. Defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, and the officer noticed likely gang tat on defendant’s hand. He ordered the defendant to interlock his fingers behind his head and sit on the curb while the DL was run. He asked about the gang tat and was told it was from the Latin Kings in Chicago. The records check came back clean. In the meantime, another officer had arrived and was questioning the defendant. “At that time, [the officer] overheard Mendez telling Det. Jaensson, in response to the detective’s questioning, that he had come to Arizona ‘trying to get away from the gang life.’ Det. Bracke also overhead him answer that he had spent time in prison in Illinois. Det. Bracke then questioned Mendez as to why he had been imprisoned. Mendez replied that he had been convicted of a weapons violation. Det. Bracke then asked him if he had any weapons in the car. According to Det. Jaensson and Det. Bracke’s testimony, Mendez became agitated, told them that he was a good father and was trying to make a good life for himself in Arizona, and then said that there was a firearm in the driver’s door handle. At this point, the officers arrested him. Det. Bracke then searched the vehicle and found a loaded, small caliber, semi-automatic pistol in the driver’s side armrest.” The continuation of the stop was unreasonable, and the gun should have been suppressed. United States v. Mendez, 467 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. October 30, 2006).<\/p>\n
Inmate’s claim that there was a difference in Hudson v. Palmer<\/em> between having a greater privacy right interest outside one’s cell rather than in it is just wrong. [It also makes no sense.] Essentially, there is no general privacy interest of inmates anywhere in a prison. Wappler v. Brevard, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78793 (W.D. Mich. October 30, 2006).*<\/p>\n Officers were sued for entering property for investigation of mistreatment of horses, for which the plaintiff was convicted. “The dispositive factor in the Heck<\/em> inquiry is whether judgment in favor of the [plaintiff] would ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.” This one does, so case dismissed. Shaughnessy v. Garrett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78921 (N.D. N.Y. October 30, 2006).*<\/p>\n Just because officers are congregating in your apartment does not mean that you are not free to walk away and not talk with them. United States v. McGraw, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78740 (E.D. Tenn. October 27, 2006). (Comment:<\/em> This is ridiculous; yet another example of a judicial lack of common sense or knowledge of human nature.)<\/p>\n Defendant cannot change his testimony before the MJ by filing an affidavit in the objections to the R&R. Id.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evGMco.b2evALnk.b2WPAutP.b2evSmil Continue reading